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Russian capacity to develop its offshore hydrocarbon resources in the Kara Sea:
Arctic and global implications
Increasing seasonal ice free Arctic waters and market demand to expand hydrocarbon 
extraction to previously undeveloped offshore regions has accelerated an Arctic priority in 
national strategies and international forums. It is proposed that geo-strategically, the sheer size 
of the Kara Sea hydrocarbon fields is of a predictive magnitude great enough to impact the 
progression or regression of the Russian economy; and thereby have a predictive value on the 
capacity for Russian unilateral foreign policy decisions. Rosneft has released figures of a 
potential 30 to 40 billion barrels of recoverable undiscovered oil reserves in the South Kara Sea 
basin and significantly more in the more remote northern waters, representing the largest 
unexploited hydrocarbon potential remaining for the Russian Federation. There are also 
undercurrents of skepticism that the Russians may not achieve offshore production at the pace 
and or scale they envision. Though the direct economic contributions to the global economy of 
exploitation of Kara Sea hydrocarbons is likely not a game changer, the technological 
sophistication it will require and the level of cooperation and integration needed between the 
most advanced Western corporate techniques and Russian partners, could well be for Russian 
central state stability. In this context, hydrocarbon development in the Kara Sea region lends 
itself to interdisciplinary study as a means to assess Russia’s relative strategic stability. The 
research incorporated two primary tools to assess the drivers impacting successful Russian 
hydrocarbon development of its Kara Sea resources. The first was a survey-interview of experts 
and the second was the creation of scenario narratives (assisted by a workshop of Arctic experts 
and stakeholders). The four scenarios were designed to explore the complexity of the interplay 
of the drivers of hydrocarbon development in the Kara Sea, with the objective, of identifying 
plausible future decision points for planners and policy makers.
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Chapter 1 Introduction
1.0 Current context of hydrocarbon development in the Kara Sea
In the fall of 2014, Arctic offshore drilling in the University-1 prospect in Russia’s Kara 
Sea penetrated into the hydrocarbon zone and indicated an economically viable crude oil field 
(Sputnik News 2014). This Arctic offshore exploratory drilling “success” of the Rosneft- 
ExxonMobil Joint Venture (JV) stands in contrast to Statoil’s efforts to the immediate west in the 
Barents Sea (United Press International 2014) and Shell’s announced economically unviable 
results in the Chukchi Sea off Alaska (Dlouhy 2015). Also in 2014, the Norwegian owned West 
Alpha rig conducting the Kara Sea drilling, was directly impacted by foreign policy imperatives; 
it was halted by punitive Western sanctions on the Russian hydrocarbon industry. These 
sanctions were imposed on frontier hydrocarbon high technologies, supporting banking, specific 
individuals (such as Rosneft’s Chief Executive Officer (CEO) Igor Sechin) and new projects in 
response to Russian policy actions in Crimea and the Ukraine (Henderson and Loe 2014). 
ExxonMobil’s own CEO Rex Tillerson, Rosneft’s partner in the JV, personally engaged with the 
US Treasury Department for a two-week extension to the sanction deadline to allow for the safe 
curtailment of drilling (ExxonMobil 2014).
The strategic context of these events was both a push for new hydrocarbon reserves by 
the largest International Oil Corporations (IOCs) and the geopolitical priorities of the Russian 
Federation. In comparative numbers, the Arctic has 13% of the world’s remaining undiscovered 
reserves of oil and 30% of the Natural Gas (NG) (Gautier 2009). It is estimated that of this total, 
75% of the circumpolar Arctic hydrocarbons lies offshore, the remaining 25% onshore (National 
Petroleum Council 2015). The greatest proportion of these undiscovered Arctic hydrocarbon 
resources are within Russia’s Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) on its continental shelf and the 
Kara Sea is considered to have the richest hydrocarbon reserves of all (Piskarev and Shkatov 
2012). Thus, both in terms of recent exploratory success, as well as by virtue of the magnitude 
of predicted recoverable undiscovered reserves, Russia’s Kara Sea can be seen as the most 
significant undeveloped region in the Arctic Ocean for hydrocarbons and shares with Alaskan 
waters the best potential for traditional crude oil (National Petroleum Council 2015).
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1.1 Significance of the study
The Kara Sea is both in the forefront of global energy strategies and  a foreign policy 
concern of high order, but it also lends itself to study for unique and cross-disciplinary values 
that predate and supersede the topical issues of Western sanctions and Arctic energy ventures. In 
Russia, for over a century the strategic commercial objectives of the international Oil and Gas 
(O&G) industry have had a unique, generally obscure, but highly significant relationship with 
Russian strategic priorities. For the current regime, hydrocarbon exports have been a central 
element in re-establishing geopolitical relevance. In a governmental policy lens, the Kara Sea is 
a frontier region critical to the Russian Federation’s strategy of expansion of energy production 
in the Arctic (Strategic 2013). Hydrocarbon exploration and the necessary infrastructure 
development for extraction is likely to continue to drive central government priorities for the 
management and regulation of the Northern Sea Route (NSR) and continued hegemony of its 
littoral Arctic regions. What does and does not develop in terms of hydrocarbon extraction in the 
Kara Sea will likely be a strong trend indicator for Russia’s development success on its 
geographic and technological frontiers; and characterize its relative capacity as a state actor to 
mid-century.
1.2 Statement of the problem and purpose
It is proposed that a detailed, comprehensive interdisciplinary assessment of the 
hydrocarbon extraction enterprise in the Kara Sea can provide insight into the nature of a future 
Russia’s relative strategic stability and capacity to make future foreign policy choices. Russian 
development of its Arctic natural resources, particularly hydrocarbons, is central to its overall 
geopolitical strategy and is candidly declared so in its strategic policy. The need to expand and 
to maintain its hydrocarbon production level is a strategic Russian imperative. Failure to do so 
in the 1980s, it has been convincingly argued, was a causal factor in the Soviet Union’s collapse 
(Reynolds and Kolodziej 2008). An identified declared risk and threat to Russia’s Arctic 
strategy is a: “ .. .lack of modern technical means and technologies for exploration and 
development of offshore hydrocarbon fields in the Arctic (Strategic 2013, 2).”
The sheer size of the hydrocarbon reserves in the Kara Sea, particularly of oil, may be 
great enough to impact the long-term progression or regression of the Russian economy, and
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thereby influence future policy decisions and interactions with the global community in the 
broadest sense. Rosneft has released estimates of a potential reserves of 87 Billion Barrels of Oil 
Equivalent (BBOE) (gas and oil) in the three Kara Sea lease areas alone (Rosneft 2014). This 
equates to close to twice the size of the estimates for offshore Alaska (50.3 BBOE), though the 
US Alaskan littoral is predicted to have a greater proportion of oil vs gas (National Petroleum 
Council 2015). In short, the Kara Sea reserves are of a globally significant magnitude and the 
largest unexploited hydrocarbon potential remaining in the Russian Federation (Piskarev and 
Shkatov 2012).
But Russian policy intent, and multi-billion-dollar investment, whether with revamped or 
returning Western commercial partners in a post-Western sanction regime, or with emerging new 
partners, does not ensure success. There were pre-existing strong undercurrents of skepticism 
that the Russians might not achieve offshore hydrocarbon production at the pace and or the scale 
they envision before sanctions and the dramatic slide in the price of oil in 2014 (Gustafson
2012). Though the direct economic contributions to the global economy of exploitation of Kara 
Sea hydrocarbons is likely not a game changer — the technological sophistication it will require 
and the level o f  cooperation, management techniques and integration needed between with the 
most advanced IOCs and Russian partners --- could well be for Russian central state stability. 
And that required cooperation would have to be sustained and survive not only current 
geopolitical reverberations, but those to come well into mid-century. Additionally, the potential 
negative environmental impacts of hydrocarbon exploitation in the Kara Sea could have global 
policy ramifications independent, to a degree, of actual quantifiable environmental degradation, 
e.g. a massive oil spill. Failure by the industry’s best practices and the Russian state to mitigate 
damage to what is a fragile and critical habitat would likely render hydrocarbon extraction in 
other Arctic regions even more politically and diplomatically difficult, or unlikely.
1.3 Research questions
This investigation’s objective was to first identify the key drivers impacting hydrocarbon 
extraction in the Kara Sea. Some of these drivers were policy driven, e.g. Russian strategic 
goals; some climatic; and others market based, such as the fluctuating demand and price of oil. 
These drivers were then analyzed to assess the most critical and uncertain for future development
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of the Arctic offshore in general, and when possible, the Kara Sea specifically. The last step was 
to game or experiment with how these drivers, or variables, might interact within a complex 
system by the creation of plausible future scenarios.
1.4 Tools, methods and research structure
In preparatory research, tools were used from international relations and energy 
economics. Also incorporated were historical, environmental science, geographic area studies, 
and technical reports from the O&G industry. Primary research incorporated three qualitative 
methods; a survey of experts (Chapter 5), and a scenario development process assisted by a 
workshop (Chapters 6 and 7). The intent was to identify and differentiate between key drivers 
that could influence future change from the predetermined elements (those that might have 
causal impact but could be assumed to hold relatively constant in scenario construction) (van der 
Heijden 2005). The goal was to unmask critical uncertainties as a means of hypothesis 
development and to frame plausible future scenarios for Kara Sea hydrocarbon development. 
These scenarios were designed to reveal how differing drivers might interact in structured, 
complex, but plausible futures.
This process of scenario construction relied heavily on Peter Schwartz’s methods 
developed while at Royal Dutch Shell and Global Business Network (GBN) (Shwartz 1991). 
Fundamental to this approach is that there is no effort to predict the probability of future events. 
Rather, the objective is to identify the variables, usually termed drivers, and assess how they 
might interact within a complex system to produce plausible outcomes or narratives. Scenario 
futures are not attempts to forecast or predict linear projections into the future. Rather they are 
used to best prepare decision makers for the uncertainties. Kees van der Heijden, who has often 
partnered with Schwartz, further characterizes this process: “A scenarios focus on developing 
and differentiating drivers and how they are interconnected in a complex system, will produce 
structurally different futures .co n ce iv ed  through a process of causal rather than probabilistic 
thinking (van der Heijden 2005, 27).”
1.5 Limitations, delimitations, assumptions and worldview
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The focus on the Kara Sea region reflects its unique characteristics: the magnitude of 
hydrocarbon potential; its centrality to the strategic stability the Russian Federation; the global 
geopolitical significance of foreign policy choices made by that sovereign state; and the 
proportionally large impact of Kara Sea hydrocarbon development for the circumpolar Arctic 
offshore. No one discipline could sufficiently address the complexity of the drivers (or 
variables) and their interactions. Though Arctic focused, the study was not Arctic limited; key 
drivers ranged across political and geological borders and a judgment was made that they could 
not be isolated arbitrarily. Another early judgment was that there was a level of relevant detail 
specific to O &G operations in the Arctic littoral, especially so in the Russian offshore and Kara 
Sea, that was not readily transparent or examined holistically in more theoretical academic works 
or engineering studies. Therefore, I collected that detail, then framed and explored the dynamics 
within plausible future scenarios. Lastly, in my pragmatic worldview, or bias (Creswell 2014), 
an already complex analysis would have become impenetrable by the addition of philosophical, 
normative or ideological policy questions; the most potent and unanswerable being is a strong 
Russia good, or bad?
5
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Chapter 2 General context
2.0 Overview
A focus on the Kara Sea region of the Russian Arctic was chosen to allow a deep look at 
the hydrocarbon development potential on the geographical and technological frontier, in what is 
estimated to be one of the most globally significant technically recoverable / undiscovered 
hydrocarbon reserves, of critical strategic significance to what remains one of the world’s 
traditionally “great power” states. Russia’s capacity to retain that status will likely continue to 
depend on its ability to gain massive capital investment, the most advanced technologies 
existing, and ability to maintain collaboration with foreign industry to extract offshore Arctic 
hydrocarbons. There are few similar interdisciplinary studies specific to the Kara Sea with a 
desired balance of geopolitics, economics and input from the O&G industry, but nonetheless, the 
literature from the social sciences on the Russian Arctic hydrocarbon policy, strategy and 
international influences is extensive; and there is highly applicable work bearing on the research 
questions from energy economics. Due to this interdisciplinary breadth, relevant literature is 
addressed throughout the background and contextual discussion (Chapters 2 and 3) and 
embedded in the methods and research design (Chapter 4).
2.1 Centrality of hydrocarbons to Russian strategic stability
Regulation and control of the hydrocarbon industry has been an exceptionally hands-on 
central government concern in Russia. Following initial relative indifference and incoherence 
under President Yeltsin, the Russian state under President Putin methodically and systematically 
emphasized establishing re-control of Russian oil resources (gas always remained primarily 
under Russian Federation ownership) as the critical step necessary for Russia’s resurgence as a 
major power, and continues to dominate all aspects of its domestic and international policy 
(Gustafson 2012). The survival of the current political regime, with all its domestic and 
international policies in the balance, as with its predecessors, can be seen as directly dependent 
on oil and gas expansion. Russia’s inability to continue to grow its economy through lack of 
success in the expansion of its undeveloped hydrocarbon reserves would be devastating and 
would threaten the Kremlin’s ability to maintain the loyalty of its political power base (Aron
2013). As production output from the traditional onshore areas in West Siberia and European
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Russia plateau, Russia looks to the Arctic offshore areas as critical to even maintain the daily 
2015 production level above 10.5 million barrels of oil. For comparison, this was slightly higher 
than daily US production which peaked at over 9.5 million barrels in 2015 (US Energy 2016). 
But while revenue from oil alone accounts for 40% of the Kremlin’s total revenue (Tully 2016a) 
it is a much smaller part of the US overall economy. Estimates of the amount of investment 
necessary for Russia to maintain that level of oil production, as well as gas, for the next 20 years, 
are as high as $900 billion (Laruelle 2014a).
2.1.1 Russian dependency on extractive export earnings
The strategic criticality of the hydrocarbon sector to modern Russia can reasonably be 
characterized as a lineal descendant of the Soviet Union (Reynolds and Kolodziej 2008). A 
Russian failure to expand its undeveloped hydrocarbon reserves and thereby continue to grow its 
economy, would be devastating to its ability to maintain the loyalty of its political power base.
A constant in the Soviet period that continues in modern Russia, was a need to build hard 
currency cash reserves. Hydrocarbons, as well as some of the other extraction industries, were 
critical to obtaining the necessary sums of hard currency not otherwise obtainable in their closed 
economy. Pointedly: “No other part of the Soviet economy [was] so closely linked with the 
outside world as the energy sector (Gustafson 1989, 20).” Soviet policy also did not shy from 
using energy exports as a political weapon. They used cheap fixed price oil exports to its 
strategic and ideological Cold War allies, such as Cuba and the Warsaw Pact countries. 
Nevertheless, hard currency derived from hydrocarbon exports (oil, gas and gas liquids) on the 
global market was critical to export policy and therefore was prioritized, as can be seen by the 
Soviets refusal to support the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries’ (OPECs’)
1973 oil embargo, despite the fact that in the Yom Kippur War they were the primary arms 
supplier and political ally of the Arab states (Reynolds 2011). This reliance on hydrocarbon for 
export earnings remains for the current central leadership and cannot be overestimated. Russia 
has not been successful in making structural reforms that would help the economy to diversify 
away from its reliance on hydrocarbons for export. As a result, economic stability still depends 
primarily on the oil and gas sector (Morozova 2013).
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This sustained dependence on resource extraction, and especially hydrocarbons, which 
provided over ha lf o f  Russia’s federal revenue in 2015 (Trading Economics 2016), can partly be 
understood by what economists term “Dutch Disease.” This economic condition is characterized 
by the predominance of a single commodity, especially true for high hydrocarbon revenues, on a 
nation’s overall economy. In the archetype case study of the Netherlands in the 1960s and 
1970s, newly introduced natural gas wealth raised the value of the Guilder, and thereby 
significantly suppressed investment and export of other Dutch industry (Rudd 1996; Karl 1997). 
This economic model is often used to explain similar, often more stark economic and 
institutional conditions, in the less developed world where a very high percentage of the 
economy is based on rents from extractive industries, and the proportion of central government 
engagement in the major drivers of the economy is disproportionately large as well as non­
transparent (Ross 2012). Relevant also to consider are stagnant ongoing macro-economic 
conditions in Russia, though Russia’s scientific base and historic relative world power mitigate 
extending the economic model too far.
2.1.2 Russia’s Arctic strategy and energy production
Russia’s geopolitical ambitions are correlated to success in its hydrocarbon energy sector, 
much as were its Czarist and Soviet predecessors (Goldman 2010). Before Vladimir Putin’s 
rapid ascendance to president, he wrote his doctoral thesis outlining a more powerful Russian 
state that could only be financed through the extractive industries, particularly gas and oil. He 
identified, as did others, the necessity of a reliance on these industries, to rebuild the lost power 
of the humiliated central government and its bureaucracies, such as the KGB from which he 
himself came (Dawisha 2014). Expansion of energy production fundamentally underlies the 
main drivers that shape Russia’s Arctic policy: new reserves to maintain energy superpower 
status; the capacity to reassert Kremlin domestic control; industrial revival; and hope for 
recognition by the world community as a great power (Laruelle 2014b).
In Russia’s 2013 Arctic Strategy, development of its Arctic offshore oil reserves is 
clearly more than an important policy goal for the Russian Federation; it is the strategic priority 
and influences discussion of other priorities, such as endemic economic hardship. The freefall 
collapse of the Soviet Union impacted the Northern Regions with particular harshness
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accelerating demographic decline and unsustainability in many centrally planned industrial 
settlements supporting the military-industrial complex (Blinnikov 2011). Even NSR 
infrastructure development and the need to rebuild its icebreaker fleet, though prominent, is 
arguably only a supporting strategic endeavor enabling hydrocarbon extraction: “ .. .in order to 
diversify the main supply routes for Russian hydrocarbon to world markets (Strategic 2013, 11).” 
An explicitly identified risk and threat to its Arctic goals are a lack of modern technologies for 
exploration and development of offshore hydrocarbon fields necessary to maintain and expand 
production. Russia’s hydrocarbon extraction objectives are dependent on foreign willingness to 
provide the necessary investment capital and technology, which is acknowledged candidly in its 
2013 Arctic Strategy (released prior to the dramatic negative shift in relations with the West and 
the sanction regime).
2.1.3 The Kara Sea: strategic maritime region for the Russian Federation
Success in development of Russia’s offshore hydrocarbon reserves, especially oil, will 
allow for the stabilization of Russia’s future economy and overcome the depletion of its existing 
reliance on aging fields in Western Siberia:
Development of hydrocarbon potential of the continental shelf of the Arctic Seas and 
northern territories of Russia is intended to play the stabilizing role in oil and gas 
production dynamics, compensating possible decrease in production level in traditional 
oil and gas producing regions of the Western Siberia for the period 2015-2030 (Energy 
2010, 60).
The South Kara Sea has the greatest potential of those offshore regions due to magnitude of the 
scale of the reserves (still unproven) and as a threshold, or bridge, to the even more challenging 
North Kara and Laptev Seas. If the technological and operational complexities of extraction in 
the South Kara Sea can be surmounted, as intended by the Russian Federation and the O&G 
industry, it could prove a strategic step to advance hydrocarbon extraction for the rest of the 
frontier Arctic shelf (Piskarev and Shkatov, 2012).
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2.2 Context of Kara Sea hydrocarbons
Geographically, Russia controls roughly half of the circumpolar coastline and 
proportionate EEZ and is generally seen as controlling the most significant hydrocarbon reserves 
in the Arctic Ocean (Gautier 2009) (Note: for crude oil, Alaska’s offshore reserves are also 
comparatively significant). “Russia is estimated to have by far the largest Arctic resource 
potential.. .and will continue to be a dominant player in Arctic oil and gas development (National 
Petroleum Council 2015, E 11).” As outlined by Piskarev and Shkatov, globally, in the last 20 
years:
. t h e  resource base of the main hydrocarbon. supplier countries has been increasing, 
chiefly due to offshore fields.. .exploration geologists all over the world are increasingly 
convinced that a major share of the so far undiscovered large fields is confined to the 
subsurface of the Arctic Seas of Russia (Piskarev and Shkatov, 2012, vii).
Russia’s offshore Arctic shelf potential of large reserve fields is assessed between 300 to 
600 billion barrels of oil equivalent (Russian estimates tend to be in the higher range). Of those 
offshore areas, the Kara and the Laptev Seas indicate the greatest potential, the Barents Sea less 
so (Piskarev and Shkatov, 2012). Assessment of reserves in undiscovered hydrocarbon basins 
are based on theoretical analysis and modeling of geological formations, and generally, 
preliminary seismic data. There remain many unknowns before actual exploratory drilling, such 
as the difficult to ascertain ratio of the more valuable oil to gas. Also critical unknowable in 
detail, are the future market dynamics that will determine the viability, and thus the timing of 
exploiting “technically recoverable” reserves. Vagit Alekperov, current CEO of LUKoil, 
characterizes the offshore potential, “ .p roduction  of crude hydrocarbons produced on the 
continental shelf could reach 20% of total crude hydrocarbons produced in the Russian 
Federation.. .The bulk of the resources (about 66.5%) lie under Arctic shelves (in the Barents and 
Kara Sea) (Alekperov 2011, 333).” Figure 2.1 illustrates by country the “estimated” relative 
proportion of “Arctic” conventional reserves of both oil and gas. Figure 2.2 illustrates the 
proportion “offshore” to onshore (roughly 3 to 1). Note: estimate totals differ significantly in 
total magnitudes among various national assessments and proprietary corporate studies, but 
nonetheless remain relatively “proportionally” consistent on an Arctic wide scale (defined by the 
“Arctic Circle” for Figures 2.1 and 2.2).
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Figure 2.1 Global Arctic oil and gas by country
Source: National Petroleum Council, Arctic Potential: Realizing the Promise o f  U.S. 
Arctic Oil and Gas Resources, 2015, page (E-12). Copyright permission granted 
(Appendix C)
Figure 2.2 Onshore vs offshore potential by country
Source: National Petroleum Council, Arctic Potential: Realizing the Promise o f  U.S. 
Arctic Oil and Gas Resources, 2015, page (1-8). Copyright permission granted 
(Appendix C)
12
Figures 2.1 and 2.2 above clearly indicate that Russia’s hydrocarbon potential is the greatest by 
far among circumpolar nations, and is predominantly offshore and gas. Figure 2.3 below depicts 
the Kara Sea 2014 drilling by the Rosneft and ExxonMobil JV in their University-1 prospect in a 
circumpolar perspective.
Figure 2.3 Site of South Kara Sea drilling 2014
Source: National Petroleum Council, Arctic Potential: Realizing the Promise o f  U.S. 
Arctic Oil and Gas Resources, 2015, page (1-34). Copyright permission granted 
(Appendix C)
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Figure 2.4 below depicts an estimate, widely used, published by the US Geological Survey of the 
Arctic’s relative resource hydrocarbon density distribution. The Kara Sea clearly stands out in 
the center-left below. This depiction does not assess the economic viability of extraction.
o°
Area of low petroleum potential ] gQ°
Assessment units (A lls) in the Circum-Arctic Resource Appraisal (CARA) 
color-coded by assessed probability of the presence of at least one undiscovered 
oil and/or gas field with recoverable resources greater than 50 million barrels of 
oil equivalent (MMBOE). Probabilities for AUs are based on the entire area of the 
AU, including any parts south of the Arctic Circle
Figure 2.4 Estimates of undiscovered oil and gas north of the Arctic Circle
Source: US Geological Survey, “Circum-Arctic Resource Appraisal: Estimates of 
Undiscovered Oil and Gas North of the Arctic Circle,” July 2008. Public Domain 
confirmed (Appendix C).
If it is assumed that the oil reserves in the offshore Russian Arctic are within the general 
assessed magnitude (30-40 billion barrels for the Kara Sea) (Piskarev and Shkatov, 2012), the 
most challenging unknown is the timing o f  the economic and logistical feasibility of exploiting
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the very different, specific offshore regions, requiring in some cases, currently undeveloped 
technologies (the Barents is less ice challenging than the Kara Sea, for example).
2.2.1 Specifics of Kara Sea Rosneft-ExxonMobil JV
October 2014 saw the seasonally pre-mature shutdown of exploratory drilling in the Kara 
Sea as a result of compulsory punitive sanctions prohibiting ExxonMobil’s continued 
collaboration with its JV partner. At the University-1 site, drilling occurred in the open water 
August-October on the continental shelf. It was a conventional well in approximately 80 meters 
of water, drilled about 2,300 meters deep. The Norwegian owned West Alpha rig was semi- 
submersible and designed for the harsh operating environment (ExxonMobil 2014). The project 
is now on hold as a result of both specific foreign policy objectives of the world’s major powers 
(China excluded) and a significant shift in market conditions (continued drop in oil demand vs 
supply) (Kennedy 2015). It is unclear if  the Rosneft-ExxonMobil JV relationship will continue 
or resume as structured if and when legal restrictions are removed. In this context, it is relevant 
to consider that Rosneft’s original strategic partnership, negotiated for over a decade, was with 
British Petroleum (BP) not ExxonMobil. However, litigation in 2011 resulted in a decision by 
the Court of International Arbitration in Stockholm that would have awarded the partnership to a 
firm that lacked the finance and technology an IOC could bring to the JV. “As a result, at the 
end of August 2011 Rosneft reached a very similar deal [to what had been negotiated with BP] 
with ExxonMobil to develop the Kara Sea (Bradshaw 2012, 219).” It is a Russian strategic 
objective to develop the Kara Sea, perhaps even if only marginally economically viable; and for 
the most capable of the IOCs, the magnitude of its geological potential has been worth the 
complex risk and massive necessary investment. These drivers will likely remain for the 
foreseeable future, though the specifics of the business relationships, and the ownership of the 
corporations involved, may change or evolve. This also holds true for the mandated foreign vs 
Russian owned proportion, or the public-private ratio for Russian projects. To meet its need for 
funds in the current austere economic and fiscal environment, the Russian central government 
announced approval for the privatization of 19.5% of Rosneft and 50% of Bashneft (Russia’s 6th 
largest oil firm).
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Nonetheless, for this study’s multi-decade, strategic focus, the Rosneft-ExxonMobil JV 
holds relevancy, though suspended. It is descriptive, both in manner and form, of how the 
Russian Federation implements its Arctic policy objectives. The scale and vision of the Kara Sea 
project is truly huge, announced to be on the order of $400 billion by Rosneft’s CEO (Kennedy 
2015). The collaboration is structured so that ExxonMobil owns only a third of the JV with 
Rosneft (which includes the Kara Sea leases). This allows ExxonMobil enough control to book 
reserves on its balance sheet and also includes a key incentive; a purposely designed favorable 
tax structure for IOCs investing in Arctic offshore regions. ExxonMobil and Rosneft both 
requested such a tax change as a prerequisite for the agreement. The license was exclusively 
granted to Rosneft, but operated by a Karmorneftegaz JV, a company jointly owned by Rosneft 
(66.7%) and ExxonMobil (33.3%): “That company will fund all expenditures and receive cash 
flows, which will then be shared between the partners in accordance with their equity interest 
(Henderson and Loe 2014, 30).” Russia’s leasing concession process, much like Norway’s and 
the UK’s, allows foreign concessions to be excluded, unlike the wide open bidding in the US 
offshore regions (Parra 2013).
During the exploration phase ExxonMobil is to fund the entire cost of the first six wells 
estimated at $3 billion. As the project moves into production, costs are to be shared on a pro rata 
basis. Significantly, ExxonMobil covers all exploration costs until oil is discovered. The pre­
agreement Russian tax model did not take into account or allow for deductions for expenditures, 
nor take into account profitability, and had an overall tax rate of about 70%. There is, “no 
allowance for accelerated cost recovery in the early years of production (Henderson and Loe, 
2014, 30).” The new tax structure, approved by the central government, is a system based on 
“profit” and takes into account the varied difficulties of development in different offshore 
regions. The South Kara Sea is grouped in the fourth tier, which has the lowest tax rate; no 
mineral extraction tax, and a profit tax of 20% only after costs are accounted for. Also included 
in this grouping are the other regions given the most incentive, including the northern Barents 
Sea and eastern Arctic. By comparison, in descending order of incentive, the southern Barents 
Sea is in the third, offshore Sakhalin the second and the Black Sea in the first (Henderson and 
Loe 2014). The following Figure 2.5 displays the lease areas for that 2014 exploratory drilling.
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To help visualize the size of the hydrocarbon region, superimposed with a dotted line is the 
United Kingdom North Sea area (Central and Northern).
Figure 2.5 Kara Sea 2014 drilling
Source: Oil and Gas Journal. Copyright permission granted (Appendix C)
2.2.2 Major projects in the Kara Sea region and their inter-relationship
To the southwest of Novaya Zemlya, in the Pechora Sea (southern edge of the Barents 
Sea), Gazprom Neft, a subsidiary of Gazprom, has begun oil production from a floating drill site 
60 kilometers from shore. The Prirazlomnoye oil field is assessed at approximately .5 billion 
barrels of oil, which is significant, but about half of Rosneft’s announced exploratory results at 
the University-1 drill site (Gazprom 2016). It is also at a less challenging 20-meter depth (the 
2014 Kara Sea University-1 drilling was in 80 meters of water, 100 kilometers from shore, in 
harsher ice conditions). But if  its annual production level reaches close to the projected 50 
million barrels, it could impact the economic feasibility of Gazprom’s rival Rosneft to the west 
in the Kara Sea. The market viability in a general sense to all hydrocarbon projects, but 
especially the largest in most difficult frontier regions, such as in the Arctic offshore, is the
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proximity of infrastructure to transport production to the customer. Other projects, even from 
industry rivals, spread development of infrastructure costs to a wider base and allow for a 
synergy of effort. Potentially an innovative, clustered pipeline infrastructure could be shared 
regionally for projects in both the Barents and Kara Sea. Anchor fields, and a number of satellite 
fields, on both sides of Novaya Zemlya would share the same pipeline to shore, or to ship, 
infrastructure (Efimov, Zolotukhin, and Kornishin 2014). Such a concept would allow transit to 
European markets from terminals in the Barents Sea which would have significantly less harsh 
ice conditions.
Rosneft’s major Russian O&G rival, Gazprom and its Western JV IOC partners, have 
suspended the Schtokman project, though it remains one of the most significant gas discoveries 
ever made. Its remote location in the Barents Sea, 550 kilometers from the Kola Peninsula, has 
proven unmarketable to currently develop (National Petroleum Council 2015). Norwegian oil 
production (all Norwegian production is offshore) dropped significantly in 2013, impacted by 
increased taxes and the doubling of costs between 2005-2013 (Strategic Assessment 2014). 
Declining market conditions also have contributed to delays in Norwegian lease areas, but 
production began in 2016 in Eni and Statoil’s Goliat oil field, 85 kilometers northwest of 
Hammerfest, and is the furthest north Arctic oil production (Eni 2016). Statoil’s Johan Castberg 
oil field, even further northwest of Norway, has seen reduced but continued investment. The 
break-even profitability of production vs cost associated with the project have not been released, 
but in general terms, statements from Statoil imply a $50 to $60 per barrel price is needed 
(Holter 2016). Both these projects and associated fields are estimated to be significantly smaller 
than the University-1 site in the South Kara Sea, but are also closer to European markets and 
without the much restricting seasonal ice conditions.
2.2.3 Timelines and their impact: exploration to production
Success for hydrocarbon resources in the frontier Arctic offshore will require massive 
investment and projects of great enough scale to be marketable. Though there are differences, a 
timeline analysis by the US Bureau of Offshore Energy Management (BOEM) for the offshore 
lease areas off the Alaskan coast in the Chukchi Sea has comparative value. In their analysis the 
timeline from exploration to final production is estimated to be about 75 years. The concept
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modeled by BOEM in October 2014 to estimate long-term production impacts assumed a 
profitable “anchor” discovery would have a multiplier effect as it would allow for production in 
less profitable “satellite” discoveries that could be connected by undersea pipelines to the anchor 
platforms. Of special significant for the Kara Sea, which is estimated to have even greater 
potential for gas, NG production modeling indicated that after year 31, or about 20 years after 
crude oil begins production, NG could be economically recovered as well with much of the same 
core infrastructure created for the more profitable crude oil (Bureau of Ocean Management 
2014).
2.2.4 The Northern Sea Route
Of critical importance to any hydrocarbon project in the Russian maritime Arctic is the 
revival of the robustness of the infrastructure of the NSR. The overall extractive transport 
concept for crude oil would be to utilize the NSR for tanker transit to the global market. For gas 
likewise, the NSR allows Liquid Natural Gas (LNG) transit to global gas markets not bound by 
the Eurasian pipeline infrastructure (STRATFOR 2013). Currently the NSR can be 
characterized as an improving route for destination shipping, mostly port to port within the NSR, 
with an increasing but still small comparative volume of seasonal through global shipping 
primarily in support of Arctic extractive industries. The number of such voyages remain small 
and they are perhaps best characterized as experimental or demonstrations (World Economic 
Forum 2014a). Revitalizing the NSR infrastructure into a “global” trade route is recognized in 
Russia’s 2013 Arctic Strategy as a fundamental to the socio-economic development of their 
Arctic Zone which is now hampered by:
... depreciation of fixed assets, particularly transport, industrial and energy 
infrastructure, [and] .underdevelopm ent of basic transport infrastructure, its marine and 
continental components, aging icebreaker fleet, lack of small a i r c ra f t . . [therefore, it is 
Russia’s intent by 2020 to prioritize].developm ent of Infrastructure of the Northern Sea 
Route and the Navy, including icebreakers, for solving the transport of arctic areas, and 
Eurasian transit (Strategic 2013, 2-3).
The term NSR “revival” is an accurate one, for in the Soviet era, during the more severe 
climatic ice conditions of the 1950s through the 1980s, with great effort and expense, the NSR
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was an effective transit quarter for thousands of ships, though not one designed or capable of 
competing in global shipping markets (Brigham 1991). But the Cold War NSR was an internal 
maritime corridor, tightly controlled, developed and maintained for strategic military purposes, 
integral to Russian Arctic heavy and extractive industries; and one fundamentally to allow the 
USSR independence from the global vulnerability of Western controlled commodity markets.
The newly envisioned NSR of the Russian Federation is in some ways much the opposite of its 
Soviet predecessor. It is a recognized central piece of a Russian strategy to be successful in 
offshore hydrocarbon extraction fo r  profit from  the global market.
2.2.5 Yamal and the Sabetta Port Project
The Kara Sea in addition to its oil riches, is also world class in predicted NG reserves that 
are a geological extension of the inland West Siberian hydrocarbon fields that have been in 
production for 50 years (Piskarev and Shkatov 2012). Yamal has been, and is now, the largest 
producing gas field in the Arctic (on shore), but is also geographically central to the even greater 
offshore reserves and well placed to be the major industrial hub for offshore hydrocarbon 
extraction. The Sabetta Port and LNG project currently under construction on the western edge 
of the South Kara Sea, on the Yamal Peninsula, is poised to be a logistical port for the 
broadening of hydrocarbon extraction offshore and onshore in the Yamal-Nenets Autonomous 
Region. The Project is central to Russian energy and geostrategic objectives; both as a new 
export hub for the developed gas fields ashore and for future extraction on the Arctic shelf. Once 
completed, the Sabetta LNG port will be the largest LNG shipping facility in the Arctic (Total
2014). If all three trains are completed, output is projected to be 16.5 million tons of LNG per 
annum. By comparison, Chevron’s Gorgon facility in Western Australia, which came on line 
this year, is similar in scale at 15 million tons per annum, though it is only one of a half dozen 
such new or planned LNG projects in Australia (Maritime Executive 2016). Note: The term 
“trains” refers to LNG processing units. A typical large facility would have multiple trains 
running in parallel.
While NG has long been exploited in the Yamal region, the vision for the Sabetta project 
is different in both scale and kind. It seeks a market not constrained by overland natural gas 
pipeline systems, but one that compete across the globe in a growing LNG market by use of
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polar class tankers that can transit west along the NSR all year towards Europe, as well as east 
with dedicated ice breaker support in a potentially extended summer transit season. The major 
LNG plant near Sabetta will be supplied with gas from fields in the Yamal Peninsula and will be 
built to handle annually more than 30 million tons of cargo. The project was initially a corporate 
joint venture of French-owned Total (20%) and Russia’s Novatek (80%) (Novatek 2014). 
However, as the project has had difficulty obtaining investment loans from the EU and US in the 
current sanctions regime (one of Novatek’s major shareholders is on the sanctions list), Chinese 
firms now have a 29.9% share of the project; Chinese National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC) 
holds 20% and the Silk Road Fund holds 9.9% (Novatek retains a 50.1% controlling interest and 
Total remains engaged with 20%). The first phase of the three phase project is expected to be 
operational in late 2017 and the third by 2021 with Chinese and other Asian consumers the 
primary initial market. The Russian central government has contributed significant support; all 
imported equipment has been exempted from taxes and a $2.5 billion loan has been allocated 
from the National Welfare Fund at a low interest rate (Gerden 2016). The massive project cost 
(the LNG plant itself was estimated at $27 billion---and is continually rising), also includes a 
fleet of 16 ice capable tankers and other very large supporting operations (Hydrocarbons 
Technology 2014).
Sabetta Port and LNG facility will have to compete in a global LNG market. Regionally, 
the Barents Sea to the west also has impressive hydrocarbon reserves and an operating 
Norwegian LNG plant. The Barents is also closer to European markets (Ebinger, Banks, and 
Schackmann 2014). Many of the infrastructure and environmental challenges the Sabetta LNG 
project will have to overcome have parallels to the offshore Kara Sea region into which the 
Yamal Peninsula protrudes; both in a geographical and geophysical sense. However, in sparsely 
developed Arctic regions distances can be deceiving. It is in the range of 500 kilometers by air 
from the University-1 prospect 2014 drilling site to the Sabetta Port on the Yamal Peninsula. 
Transit by sea is not direct and significantly longer, for the foreseeable future, with harsh ice 
conditions most of the year. It is also possible that offshore hydrocarbon production, if it does 
come to the region, will use alternative means of infrastructure support in concert with Barents 
Sea production.
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2.2.6 Maritime character of the Kara Sea
Offshore drilling conditions in the South Kara Sea, are considered moderate for the 
Arctic. Operations must contend with comparatively much greater ice extent than the southern 
Barents Sea, but it is not as harsh an environment as for example, as the North Kara Sea, Laptev 
Sea to the east, or Northeastern Greenland. The summer drilling open water season varies, but is 
about two months at the 2014 offshore University-1 drill site. Maximum ice thickness is rated at
2.2 meters with ice loads less than offshore Sakhalin. Minor icebergs along the coast of Novaya 
Zemlya are much smaller than what is encountered along eastern Canada. A comparative chart 
of Arctic offshore regions is in Figure 2.6. The South Kara sea drilling region is within current 
O&G technological capacity, and is viewed as valuable and sequential “step out” onto the 
Russian shelf for more demanding regions, in terms of ice severity and new technology 
requirements. The biggest technology gap is economic drilling of wells in water limits beyond 
the limits of bottom founded structures (generally 100 meters) (Chevron 2012).
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Physical Ice Environment and Water Depth
Description Examples
Figure 2.6 Comparative Arctic offshore ice conditions
Source: National Petroleum Council, Arctic Potential: Realizing the Promise o f  U.S. Arctic Oil 
and Gas Resources, 2015, page (2-16). Copyright permission granted (Appendix C)
2.2.6.1 Impact of climate change
Climate change trends have increased seasonal ice free zones as well as the length of the 
seasons themselves, especially in Arctic Eurasia, which includes the Kara Sea and Russia’s 
traditional NSR. The speed and specific effects of climate change on the characteristics of the 
ice pack in the Kara Sea are hard to predict, but there is strong scientific consensus that there will 
be a continued reduction in the summer sea ice extent; an accelerated disappearance of multi­
year ice, especially on the Eurasian side of the pole; and the lengthening of the exploration 
season and navigation service (within the timeframe of currently planned Arctic offshore 
hydrocarbon projects past mid-century (Arctic Council 2009). Climate change will not create an
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ice-free Arctic Ocean year round as sea ice will always re-form during winter and remain 
partially ice-covered in the spring and autumn. Paradoxically, this can increase risk by greater 
unpredictability of ice encounters. It is also important to note that ice properties and coverage 
will vary greatly within the Arctic regions. And sea ice is not the sole obstacle to shipping and 
maritime structures such as drilling platforms. Other challenges include polar darkness, poor 
charts, lack of critical infrastructure ashore and navigation control systems, low Search And 
Rescue (SAR) capability, high insurance / escort costs and other non-climatic factors (World 
Economic Forum 2014a). Thus, longer sailing and exploration seasons in Arctic waters may be 
offset by the difficult to quantify changing conditions ashore as well as at sea; which may 
increase the cost of extraction (Smith 2011). Though climate change impacts are, and are 
expected to be increasingly significant, global markets remain the biggest driver for offshore 
hydrocarbon development Arctic wide, and the Kara Sea specifically.
2.2.7 Regional social impacts on hydrocarbon development
Russian Arctic offshore oil exploration and production is exclusively a central 
government policy concern not subject to direct regional government or peoples’ capacity to tax, 
regulate or influence. Inland, it is worth noting that the central government has retained actual 
ownership of sub-surface hydrocarbons from the days of the czars. The most important two 
bureaucracies regulating Russia’s hydrocarbon industries are the Ministry of Natural Resources 
and Environment and the Federal Service for Environmental Technology and Nuclear 
Surveillance Issues. Formal regulations allow extraction and use under multiple arrangements 
but this “use” can be restricted for national security or natural environmental concerns 
(Morozova 2013). There is little likelihood that key decision making on hydrocarbon extraction 
will devolve to administrative institutions, regional government or suffer benign neglect.
The indigenous population ashore in the Yamal region, where most of the infrastructure 
is planned for NG extraction and the new LNG project, have a history of interaction with the 
O&G industry that cannot be characterized as entirely positive or negative. From the positive 
perspective, the regional governing authority, the Yamal-Nanets Autonomous Region / District 
(YANAO) ranks fourth in Russia for direct foreign investments per capita and second in Russia 
overall for a sustained 10-year period. This favorable investment and development climate is
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directly correlated to oil and gas development. The largest indigenous regional group, the 
Nanets, number about 40,000 throughout the district. Other significant numbers of indigenous 
people include the Khants and Selkups (Total 2014). Igor Osipov characterizes the indigenous 
population of the Yamal-Nanets region:
Though the Yamal is the most resource-rich region in Russia, where 90% of the natural 
gas and 15% of the oil in Russia is currently developed and exported.. .Yamal is [also] 
home to a variety of local communities and indigenous groups living intact nomadic 
lifestyles both inland and near the coastline; and Yamal is the base for the largest reindeer 
herd in Eurasia, numbering between six to seven thousand (Osipov 2012, 15).
Inclusive social license to operate concepts for the O&G industry in Russia are complex 
and civil society is generally seen as weak, with little institutional engagement for stakeholder’s 
interests. However, as shown in a case study from the Komi Republic, there may be other 
factors influencing regional support, where, “ .d ec is io n s  are made in the oil capital of the 
region.. .where the population has a high proportion of incomers, and has experienced many 
benefits from the industry (Wilson and Stammler 2016, 6).” There is a pattern of extractive 
industries in Russia, and a great many other places in the world, to rely on transitory workers 
from distant urban areas outside the region, who operate in closed enclaves. A maritime 
extraction method, via oil or LNG tankers, may prove to have little direct interaction with inland 
societies.
2.2.8 Character of governance
Russia controls the preponderance of hydrocarbon resources in the Arctic. Faced with 
these dynamics, the most significant portion of Arctic hydrocarbon development will be under, 
and deeply characterized by, Russian governance. This holds especially true for the Kara Sea, 
which unlike the Barents Sea to its west, shares no international borders. That governance will 
likely continue to prioritize hydrocarbon extraction commensurate with the strategic level 
priority of the political leadership, on par or superior to any other. In Russia, especially in the 
Arctic regions, governance in a holistic sense is generally considered among political scientists 
to be immature and underdeveloped in comparison to the other eight members of the Arctic 
Council (AC) (McBeath 2010). Rights and legal protection for individuals and groups are weak.
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Regional elections for governors were abolished in 2004, after which governors became 
residential appointees. There is a: “dysfunctional and hyper-centralized relationship between the 
capital and the 83 federal subjects of the Russian Federation (Zubarevich 2011, 1).” In short the 
Arctic region ashore of the Kara Sea likely has limited to no capability to shape decisions on 
extraction.
2.2.9 Environmental standards in Russia
Oversight and operations based on alignment with environmental international standards 
and norms are not a given for Kara Sea development. The 2013 Russian Arctic strategy 
acknowledges the need to adhere to environmental higher standards and to redress the past 
misuse of the region. But historically, distinctions that have characterized the Russian 
hydrocarbon industry are a relative lack of the most-advanced offshore techniques, compared to 
the best of the IOCs, and a lack of adherence to a steady and consistent legal enforcement 
standard (Gustafson 2012; Yergin 2012). Transparency International, a highly regarded non­
profit international Non-Government Organization (NGO), ranks Russia 119 out of 168 counties 
in its corruption perception index (Transparency International 2016). The Yamal peninsula on 
the eastern edge of the Kara Sea, has long been a core gas producer for Russia. Environmental 
damage by trucks and all-terrain vehicles conducting exploratory operations and production 
support over the last fifty years have created kilometer wide “tracks” that are easily identifiable 
from space (Blinnikov 2011). The historic lack of adherence to environmental concerns is a 
result of inefficiency and instability in the political system in which it operates (Gustafson 2012). 
In Russia, this is particularly true of smaller companies and sub-contractors where there is much 
incentive to cut corners:
. i n  Russia, while large companies are fairly effective and conscious environmental 
stewards, it is the projects of smaller Russian companies where problems arise.. .one of 
the biggest problems the oil and gas industry confronts today in Russia is the activities of 
sub-contractors, where performance schedules are often tight and who are incentivized to 
cut corners while operating in highly vulnerable marine environm ents. .Another 
problem is that the break-up of vertically integrated companies has led to more 
outsourcing of project management with oversight becoming very lax (Ebinger, Banks, 
and Schackmann 2014, 46).
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Though documentation is mostly anecdotal, hydrocarbon extraction in Russia has 
demonstrated a pattern of corruption and short corners cutting on environmental standards, 
despite what legal stricture might actually indicate. Additionally, it is acknowledged by the 
Russian central government and Russian corporations themselves, that the most advanced 
drilling techniques and managerial expertise in the hydrocarbon industry are in the IOCs abroad. 
Currently these same domestic corporations, such as Rosneft and Gazprom, are undergoing 
severe revenue retrenchment due to both the sanctions regime and the precipitous fall in the price 
of oil (2014 to 2016).
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Chapter 3 Global influences on Russian hydrocarbon development
3.0 Overview
Hydrocarbon extraction in the Russian Arctic offshore region is not envisioned as a 
domestic enterprise by the Russian Federation. It will require sustained and significant 
engagement with foreign industrial and banking enterprises, with an objective of export capital 
earnings in an international market. Therefore, Russia’s ability to engage in an international 
market successfully will impact the success or failure of its objectives.
3.1 Russia and the oil and gas industry
The international O&G industry has a deep and unique relationship in Russia with many 
central components enduring for well over a century. As far back as the late 19th century, unlike 
its oil production rival the United States, Russia was not an industrial giant and needed to import 
technology and capital to meet even its domestic needs. From these early days, a recurring 
systematic characteristic of the Russian oil industry is that it expands or opens up to foreign 
investment and partnerships when absolutely necessary; but then contracts and excludes the very 
same engagement when opportune, generally prematurely from a strictly production 
maximization perspective (Goldman 2010). After the truly “revolutionary” Bolshevik 
nationalization of the hydrocarbon industry, Lenin personally intervened with the development 
of the New Economic Policy in 1921. The need to expand and to maintain production level 
became a strategic imperative. The British, Americans, French and Germans returned gradually 
bringing production back close to pre-revolution levels. Once the oil industry was rebuilt 
however, the Soviets began to squeeze out foreign concessions. With a few exceptions, 
including Standard Oil (the corporate origin of ExxonMobil), all foreign concession projects 
were revoked prior to WWII (Alekperov 2011). Another developing Soviet characteristic was 
the use of oil production export as a state policy to gain hard currency. Generally, this was an 
apolitical pattern that would continue into and after the Cold War. For example, though fighting 
an ideological proxy war against Franco-fascism in Spain to which Germany and Italy were 
closely aligned, Italy was the Soviet Union’s greatest oil importer amounting to about half of all 
its imports, not being stopped until 1938 (Goldman 2010). By the end of WWII many Soviet
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fields had been damaged by the war itself and inefficient practices resulting in production 
significantly below pre-war levels.
By the 1960s the core oil fields of the time were past their production peak and the 
Soviets would have to rely on secondary techniques to maintain production. Water injection was 
only partially successful. Soviet engineers were hampered by restrictions on acquiring the best 
Western technology and techniques. The foundation of the Russian economy had been 
dramatically altered by the years of communist rule. Non-renewable extractive industry, 
primarily oil and gas, had replaced the even more mismanaged agricultural sector as the pillar of 
its economic sustainability and grip on power (Gustafson 2012).
3.1.1 Historical precedent: the fall of the Soviet Union
Political science accounts of the fall of the Soviet Union often do not sufficiently address 
the significance of the failure of the O&G industry (especially oil) to expand or even maintain 
levels of production. But for the current Russian regime it remains a well versed cautionary 
lesson that weakness in oil production, at a critical time, devastated an inefficient Soviet central 
state that could not rebound. Zbigniew Brzezinski spoke and wrote early of a coming Soviet 
collapse due primarily to a fatally abstract and detached communist ideology (Brzezinski 1989). 
Stephen Kotkin emphasized Gorbachev’s failed humanist attempt to turn away from Leninism to 
reform that communist ideology as the primary causal driver of the subsequent collapse. 
Gorbachev and his allies believed that the Communist Party could be democratized, but 
unintentionally undermined the authority of the “Party” and provided the catalyst for dissolution: 
“The monumental second world [communist] collapse.. .was triggered.. .by Communist 
ideology” (Kotkin 2008, 2). Serhii Plokhy portrays the decisions and events of the time as the 
most critical factors. Despite Russia’s uniquely troubled political and social history, there was 
no predetermined collapse (Plokhy 2014). But two tools from energy economics, known as the 
Granger Causality Test and Hubbert’s Curve, or “peak oil,” lend support to another interpretation 
for the Soviet collapse, especially relevant for a study on the significance of new hydrocarbon 
production for modern Russia. Rather than primarily the result of “general” economic stagnation 
and resulting political devolvement these tools support the proposition that a stronger causality 
can be identified by the inability of the USSR to maintain planned oil production levels.
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By the 1970s global demand for oil had increased, and coupled with the 1973 oil 
embargo, the Soviets came to be seen in the international markets as no less reliable producers 
than OPEC. Their production rose to where by 1975 they were the world’s largest oil producer. 
“During this period, Western Siberia was a kind of hydrocarbon Klondike for the Soviet 
Union. . I t  became advantageous simply to sell raw hydrocarbons for hard currency and then to 
buy everything the country needed (Alekperov 2011, 310).” But by the end of the decade the 
Soviet Union struggled to maintain and increase production. It could no longer simultaneously 
meet its fixed price domestic needs, its geopolitically driven subsidized export to Warsaw Pact 
allies, and its hard currency export requirements (Gustafson 1989; Yergin 2012).
It can and has been argued that this inability to increase production was due to an 
inherently weak “command economy” system, Marxist-Leninist ideological imperatives, Cold 
War directed embargoes on key technologies and trade, and simply inherently “Russian” social 
pathologies. The centralized bureaucracies were not aligned to any logic of efficiency let alone 
Western style vertical integration, and had been held together and directed by the Soviet 
GOSPALN (Central Planning Agency). “For over half a century, the Soviet oil industry had 
developed in near isolation from the rest of the world (Gustafson 2012, 148).” The larger point 
though is that these same “inadequacies” were overcome to allow the Soviet Union to regain the 
position, once held in 1901 by Russia, as the world’s largest oil producer. A good perspective 
would be to view the Soviet hydrocarbon industry as a distinct subset within a global production 
regime with both internal and external barriers limiting and restricting its interaction and general 
integration with the larger system or global industry. Paradoxically, that system also had a track 
record of persevering and weathering short term market cycle contractions.
The Soviet economy was actually strong in the 1980s, but was burdened with a 
collapsing oil industry even though Soviet investment in drilling increased in the 1970s and early 
80s. Capital spending in oil and gas increased 27% between 1980 and 1985 (Reynolds 2011). 
But it had passed “peak oil” or Hubbert’s Curve, which contends that when production has 
already passed its peak in known reserves the supply of oil will increasingly be unable to meet 
demand. When applying this theory, it is important to emphasize that, once past “peak oil” 
production decreases independent o f  market demand. In the 11th GOSPLAN, January 1, 1981,
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the need for heavy increases in investment in oil production and investment was acknowledged 
and allocated before the Reagan military buildup and economic pressure from the US. But less 
oil to export allowed for less foreign currency and less investment for oil production. Concurrent 
with these developments were the impacts of a reduction in production and oil export to the 
political stability of the Soviet alliance system in Eastern Europe. By the late 1980s the Soviet 
Union no longer had the capacity to maintain these fixed contracts, without which, they could no 
longer “buy o ff’ elites in these countries with low energy prices (Reynolds 2011).
An application of a second tool utilized in energy economics, “The Granger Causality 
Test” (a statistical tool to test whether “one” time series is useful in predicting another), as 
applied by Reynolds and Kolodziej, indicated oil production went down before a drop in Gross 
Domestic Product (GDP). Coal demonstrated the reverse or opposite trend, GDP fell first. In 
the 1980s, using the Granger Test for natural gas, no production decline occurred as there were 
no distribution bottlenecks, and no scarcity. Natural Gas did not drive Soviet GDP and proved 
largely independent of it. Coal can also be demonstrated using the Granger Test to not have been 
a driver of GDP, but it was also demand driven by GDP, as coal, was primarily utilized for 
electric and steal production. It rose when GDP rose. Unlike NG and coal, oil is intrinsically 
significant to GDP, and can be so correlated in the Soviet Union in the late 1980s. Therefore, oil 
was shown to have determined GDP and coal, but not vice versa (Reynolds and Kolodziej 2008). 
To conclude, oil production in the last decade of the Soviet Union had reached “peak oil” within 
a closed system and could not expand. The Soviets had neither the time nor the capacity to 
institute the changes and integration with global partners necessary to allow for its own survival. 
The inability to maintain and expand oil production to new reserves, was arguably the greatest 
causal factor in the Soviet collapse (Reynolds and Kolodziej 2008). It can be debated whether 
the failures of the Soviet Union’s oil industry were the primary causal driver for its collapse; but 
it was clearly a critical variable; and one not distant or abstract to the current leadership in the 
Kremlin.
3.1.2 Confusion, privatization and reassertion of control
The post-Soviet Russia Federation retained the preponderance of the old Soviet oil 
industry infrastructure, but nonetheless was poorly positioned in the early 1990s for the O&G
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geographic fracturing along the political borders of the new republics. The centralized 
bureaucracies themselves were not aligned, efficient or vertically integrated (own their entire 
supply chain) in the Western style. The Russian hydrocarbon industry lacked market 
mechanisms or expertise to transition to the global capitalistic system. When the Western O&G 
entered Russia in the1990s:
They brought with them far more efficient management and advanced technology and 
radically higher standards of execution, job safety and environmental protection than 
anything seen in the Soviet Union. Along with the large international oil companies 
arrived a phalanx of service companies and equipment suppliers and smaller operators, 
not to mention law firms, financial advisors, management consultants, and other modern 
missionaries, who promptly set up shop in Moscow, to the fascinated amazement of the 
Russians, for whom all of this was wholly new (Gustafson 2012, 146).
But the excitement and change did not necessarily generate high profits for Western 
business. A mix of Russians including former O&G bureaucratic ministers, scientists and 
entrepreneurs, with or without O&G experience, made billions: “In Russia in the 1990s, risks 
seemed to be everywhere. An epidemic of violent crime swept over Russian cities, as rival 
gangs fought for control of the assets pried loose from the moribund Soviet state system 
(Gustafson 2012 177).” But the privatization “Loan for Shares” frenzy of the Yeltsin years and 
the collapse of even a superficial semblance of consistent law or regulation obscured an old 
trenchant reality of doing business in Russia (Hoffman 2011). Regulation and taxes, and direct 
payoffs to officials and even organized crime, appeared and changed in a predictive fashion; to 
extract as much profit from the oil as possible. Conoco (later ConocoPhillips) for example, who 
had invested in Barents Sea development: “ .fo u n d  themselves having to pay 20 different taxes 
(Goldman 2010, 85).” Additionally, one of their field projects was arbitrarily given to a Russian 
firm by fiat. Below the threshold of the major IOCs, smaller Western service companies 
provided the technology that was most valuable for newly privatized Russian oil companies to 
maximize production in legacy fields. One of the first post-Soviet Russian joint ventures, White 
Nights, applied Western techniques to fields long past peak production, with considerable 
success, but not necessarily profit for the joint venture: “By the time taxes were collected (many
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imposed just for this occasion), the increased transit fees deducted, and the bureaucrats properly 
mollified (paid off), there wasn’t all that much to share (Goldman 2010, 84).”
In Putin’s first two presidential terms (2000-2008) the O&G industry was wrestled back 
from foreign firms as well as recently risen Russian oligarchs who failed to yield to prerogatives 
as determined by the Kremlin. The dismantlement of Mikhail Khodorkovsky’s rebuilt, and 
relatively transparent, Yukos oil company was a dramatic example of the latter. It could be 
argued that the Yukos affair defined the central government’s policy: that the purpose of laws 
and regulation, in general, but for the energy sector in even more so, was to serve presidential 
administration objectives, not to ensure a level playing field. Laws could and would be bent and 
selectively enforced as necessary (Gustafson 2012). Western IOCs had to adjust to a changed 
regulatory regime where the central government and its president were engaged in the details of 
the O&G business. However, “ . the Russian state is not a unified actor, something 
demonstrated by the competition between national champions (Aalto et al, 2012, 25).”
Foreign investment in Russian oil was reduced as the Russian Federation re-asserted its 
control. Production Sharing Agreements (PSAs) were in particularly disfavor and seen as a 
colonial model inappropriate for a world power like Russia, though a few grandfathered projects 
were allowed to continue. Other measures were taken that made it more difficult for Western 
firms to operate, even with approved Russian partners, such as a law mandating the details of 
Russian hydrocarbon reserves be kept as state secrets (Gustafson 2012). In 2006, Russia forced 
Royal Dutch Shell out of its controlling share of the LNG project Sakhalin-2 after $9-11 billion 
had been invested. Coinciding with an overall political deterioration between Russia and the 
West, a law was passed in 2008 forbidding majority foreign ownership of significant ventures in 
strategic industries (Aron 2013). Thus, the O&G industry in Russia was, and is largely still, 
characterized by the Russian need for export earnings from hydrocarbons and for Western IOC 
capital and expertise to recover it. But Russia also has struck a hard bargain. The regained 
political and economic clout by the Russian Federation since the late 1990s (until sanctions and 
the concurrent oil price collapse in 2014) was primarily “not” attributable to dramatic 
improvements in oil exploration or production method. Rather, it was largely the Kremlin’s
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reclaimed control of the hydrocarbon industry from the private sector, and thus the “rents,” as 
well as the rise in the export price of Russian oil on the global market.
3.1.3 Energy as a geopolitical weapon?
It has been argued that Russian policy under President Putin has used, and intends to 
continue to use, hydrocarbons, especially gas, as a regional and even global geopolitical weapon: 
“ . a f t e r  a long period of failure to sustain itself as a military superpower, Russia has emerged--- 
even if inadvertently---as a different breed of superpower, one whose power rests on economics 
and energy (Goldman 2010, 16).” But dependence, especially by the smaller states on Russia’s 
periphery tied to a fixed NG pipeline infrastructure, also implies Russian dependence on the 
export revenue. Russia needs stable customer demand and has therefore generally followed a 
more measured energy policy, with specific exceptions (Kaloudis 2009). When economic 
potential is very high, even major geopolitical rivals can reach accommodation, such as Russian- 
German energy cooperation on long term NG gas contracts. However, when the economics 
underlying an energy deal are marginal, geopolitics and internal domestic influences often 
prevail (Svyatets 2013). New pipeline projects built on long-term contracts to powerful states, 
like China, will likely allow Russia even less leverage for the primacy of geopolitics objectives 
over profit.
3.2 Current and future global demand
New investment in very costly, risky, and large Arctic offshore projects is generally more 
the result of changes in global hydrocarbon market dynamics than a reaction to “new” 
discoveries. The Kara Sea has been considered a very lucrative region for exploration for a 
considerable time; geologically the coastal shelf is an obvious extension of the West Siberian 
plate which has been Russia’s greatest productive region for 50 years (Piskarev and Shkatov
2012). A publically released, redacted, 1988 Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) report, The 
Kara Sea: A Soviet Oil Resource fo r  the Turn o f  the Century, identified almost 30 years ago that: 
“Western financial and technical involvement in the Kara Sea would be a boon to the Soviet 
[but] . W e  believe Moscow would give higher priority to the Kara Sea only in the event that 
national production begins to worsen dramatically (Central Intelligence Agency 1988, 10).”
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Technological capacity has improved a great deal in drilling offshore in harsh ice conditions 
since that 1980s report, but demand and the Russian need for new reserves changed more.
Relative global hydrocarbon scarcity in the new millennium, especially traditional crude 
oil, led to increased investment in infrastructure and exploration in offshore circumpolar regions. 
This holds especially true for the largest, or super major IOCs, which lost control of their biggest 
reserves to the National Oil Corporations (NOCs) around the world (the size of claimed reserves 
for publicly traded IOCs like ExxonMobil impacts stock trading price) (Yergin 2009). That 
pattern, in a sense, began dramatically a century ago in Russia itself with the Bolshevik 
revolution. Over time, as more readily exploitable reserves pass their peak production and 
decline, exploration globally expands to previously inaccessible, technologically unviable or 
otherwise economically unrecoverable hydrocarbon frontier regions such as the Kara Sea. The 
strategic view of ExxonMobil, as stated by its CEO, is to take on the risk and invest and explore 
in the present day for global hydrocarbon demand in the future:
The size of the resource prize has to be large to support the risked capital that has to be 
put in place. The Arctic is one of the few places left where we believe those 
opportunities e x i s t . . Because eventually we are going to need it. It’s back to that 
insatiable appetite that the world has for energy. Oil demand is going to continue to 
grow as population grows.. .we’re going to be at 9 billion people. Something like 3 
billion people are going to move from poverty into middle class status. When they do 
that, the energy demand goes up enormously (Fahay 2015).
Current oil production of approximately 95 million barrels a day in 2016 (International Energy 
Agency 2016) is expected to grow by 30% and gas demand by 60% to meet this demographic 
change that will drive increases in discretionary spending, e.g. more cars, refrigerators and air 
conditioning (Yergin 2012).
With a relative Arctic preponderance of hydrocarbons, Russia is well positioned to take 
advantage of this perceived shift in the global resource economy. Demand is generally expected 
to be on a steady rise by the O&G industry, only impacted on the margins by alternative energy 
and conservation efforts in the more advanced global Western European economies. In view of
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the President of Russia’s LUKoil, because of the underlying macro-economics, the “first” or 
“developed” world has lost control of its economic destiny:
. desp i t e  the benefits of a more interconnected world economy, this new era of 
globalization and development is not without its own consequences. .W o r ld  energy 
consumption is growing rapidly, by an average of 20% per decade over the last 30 
years.. .Indeed.. .if governments continue present policies, global energy demand in 2030 
will be 50% higher than it is today. Developing economies will account for 74% of the 
growth in demand, with China and India accounting for 45% (Alekperov 2011, iv).
3.2.1 Price of hydrocarbons and relation to demand
Writing in 2016, with crude oil prices having precipitously fallen from what had been a 
several year plateau above $110 a barrel in early 2014, to what has steadied to a $40-45 a barrel 
range (Investmentmine 2016), the viability of many pioneering Arctic offshore and 
unconventional hydrocarbon projects has been shaken. Investment strategies based on a $90-110 
a barrel benchmark range by IOCs, NOCs and governments in frontier northern offshore regions 
have been impacted (Koranyi and Fouche 2014). Clearly the “current” or near term price of 
hydrocarbons influences investment development decisions. Balance sheets matter. But the very 
long timelines required to progress from exploration to profitable production for massive 
offshore frontier projects requires strategic analysis. The gamble for the O&G industry is on 
assessing the future market decades away, as well as the nature of the coming global political- 
economic system; not the price of a barrel of oil the next quarter.
Current market conditions certainly influence short-term investment decisions and 
impacts the capacity to invest for the long term; but arguably are not the critical uncertainty for 
strategic planning generally imagined. The O&G industry uses market price in their investment 
strategies with methodologies like” Monte Carlo” modeling, which contribute valuable detail and 
directly impact project investment decisions (Downey 2009). The difficulty of oil price 
forecasting is demonstrated by the impact of interest rate differentials. For example, a rise in US 
interest rates has been shown to correlate to an appreciation of the US dollar and thereby 
influence a lowering of global oil prices (commonly traded in dollars). But lower interest rates 
on a global scale also correlates to more available capital for marginal or risky investments in
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frontier hydrocarbon projects (Oil and Gas 360 2016). Because of this complexity, at the 
strategic level, global supply of oil not the price, may be a more useful variable to assess. 
ExxonMobil began focusing on supply as a key driver or variable in their strategic planning as 
far back as 2000. Forecasting the future price of oil was determined just too volatile a variable to 
add value. Looking backward from the year 2000 at the Exxon forecast 20 years before (done in 
1980) it was evident they had achieved some success in one of the most tumultuous oil markets 
in the last half century. They accurately projected supply within in one percentage point. But 
they were off the mark in predicting price:
They had been wildly off, however, in forecasting oil prices.. .they had badly 
underestimated the pace at which technological improvements.. .would make it easier 
over time to find new deposits of oil, increasing the global supply and tamping down 
p r i ces . .  geopolitical disruptions played such an important role in the price of oil that 
normal forecasting based on supply and demand equilibrium was not realistic to pursue 
(Coll 2013, 306).
Many energy economists argue for the primacy of new oil production from previously 
unexploited reserves as the causal factor for the sustainability of the existing global economic 
system. The system model that has brought prosperity to the developed world, and that has 
offered hope for the less developed, is increasingly unsustainable from this world view. Oil 
production has already passed its “peak oil” under Hubbert’s Law or Curve in most of the 
world’s known reserves and therefore the supply of oil will increasingly be unable to meet 
demand (Reynolds 2011). Thus a supply shortage of traditionally recoverable crude oil, coupled 
with the diminishing reserves owned and controlled by the biggest IOCs, like ExxonMobil, who 
also have the greatest technological capacity, argues that oil exploration and production in new 
frontier regions like the Kara Sea, over the long term, is more likely to be on an upward rather 
than a downward trend. But increased efficiency, technique and conservation efforts can flatten 
and delay the predicted decline cycle.
The Hubbert Curve is a useful contribution for an analysis of Kara Sea hydrocarbon 
futures. Modern enhanced recovery techniques can and does impact predicted “peaks” and 
especially the rapidity of decline. But arguably, the real value of the theory is not by providing
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mathematical certainty that the world is indeed going to run out of oil, but rather, to accentuate 
that global oil supply is a better indicator and key driver for planning than is attempting to 
forecast market price. There are significant other factors that impact hydrocarbon activity, such 
as national laws, and in some cases, international treaties and regulations. Bridge and Le Billon, 
in their political economy study, Oil, articulate a different world view than that envisioned by 
many energy economists. They contend that international, cooperative political “suppression” of 
demand can be a significant variable in the coming decades (Bridge and Le Billon, 2013). 
Acceptance by 155 nations in the December 2015 Paris Agreement to limit CO2 emissions 
(attributed to a human-induced component of climate change) lends supports to their argument 
(United Nations 2016).
3.2.2 Difference in oil and gas markets
Natural gas, unlike oil, is not traded as a global market commodity; rather, it is sold at a 
regional market price. This is due to the much higher transportation costs incurred. If the 
demand, the consumer, is not relatively close to the region where the gas is produced, it has been 
historically uneconomical, generally dramatically so, to transport, unlike its much denser crude 
oil cousin which has been shipped around the world at very competitive cost for a century. 
Pipelines are used to transport NG within regions. These pipeline networks have been the 
backbone of Russia’s energy exports in Eurasia. But pipelines are highly capital intensive and 
non-mobile. Both producer and consumer are bound with significant sunken investments. 
Therefore, the price of NG, unlike oil, can be dramatically different across the globe. The NG 
market also remains constrained by long-term supplier-consumer contracts to protect the 
investments on both sides of the market chain (Yergin 2012).
Liquid natural gas technology and its growing markets, in theory, offers an opportunity 
for Russia to broaden gas exports to a global consumer base and a global market outside of a 
regionally fixed pipeline system. New LNG supplies have added uncertainty to the market, and: 
“Markets will remain segmented, with prices fluctuating from one region to another and this will 
stimulate world LNG trade (International Gas Union 2014, 5).” Natural gas meets 25% of 
global energy consumption, and of that, 10% is met by the LNG market (LNG thus accounts for 
2.5% of current global energy demand). The LNG share of the gas market has been steadily
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growing. Qatar by far is the current world leader in LNG exports with a 77% (Russia’s is 10%) 
market share though Australia is projected to take the lead by the end of the decade based on new 
projects (International Gas Union 2015). But the global LNG market is also largely one tied to 
long-term contracts just like the regional NG pipeline market. The physics and the costs of the 
required transformative energy process (from NG to LNG and back to NG) will likely prevent 
LNG from ever truly paralleling the market liquidity of oil:
.L iquefaction  is a process of super-cooling the gas into a liquid state at minus 260 
degrees Fahrenheit which condenses its volume to one six-hundredth. LNG tankers, 
which are insulated so that the LNG stays cold, can then crisscross the world’s oceans 
like oil tankers and transport the natural gas to any destination on the globe. Once the 
tanker arrives at its port of call, it unloads the LNG. The gas is then heated up to ambient 
air temperature, re-gasifying the liquid into natural gas. At this point, the natural gas is 
injected into pipelines and sent to wherever it’s needed. This has allowed vast reserves of 
stranded conventional natural gas to become economically available to world markets 
(Reynolds 2011, 164).
Offshore success in the Kara Sea very likely will be based on the proven quantity, density 
and marketability of its crude oil. There is every indication that its gas reserves are vast even on 
a global scale. But there are also high quantities of gas available around the world, and 
regionally on or near offshore the Yamal Peninsula, which can be produced for many years at 
less cost. However, continued investment and success in the Yamal hydrocarbon LNG project 
could lead to the creation of a supporting infrastructure that could reduce the cost of Kara Sea oil 
extraction.
3.2.2.1 Impact of non-traditional recovery
The shale oil and gas fracking innovations, as well as other non-traditional recovery 
methods that have manifested in the North American hydrocarbon industry within the last five 
years are dramatic in the short term, and are widely believed to have significantly contributed to 
the market price collapse of oil in mid-2014. Though the supply “glut” the last two years has 
significantly hurt stability and investment in LNG projects; as well as new North American 
wildcat and exploratory drilling, once in production, those operations have proved more resilient
40
and cost effective than initially expected. For the long term though, other factors are more likely 
to impact the spread and success of these techniques globally. At least in Europe, the geological 
potential for gas fracking is not optimal. In general, shale hydrocarbons “plays” are smaller, 
deeper and with less favorable clay content (Stevens 2012). In addition, there has been strong 
NGO and domestic political opposition that has contributed to the curtailed planning of major 
projects within the EU. Another long-term potential of continued buyers’ market (relatively 
inexpensive) “gas” (NG and LNG) is for it to undermine the political will to invest in more 
expensive alternative energy sources, such as solar and wind. It is significant to note that non- 
traditional hydrocarbon techniques have much shorter production cycles (longevity) and lower 
Energy Return on Investment (EROI) than traditional methods. Booked reserves susceptible to 
traditional crude oil techniques will remain the gold standard for the O&G industry for that 
reason.
3.2.3 Transportation costs
The great value of crude oil, and why it has been the supreme energy source for the 
global economy for the last century, has been its EROI, and especially so, for the cost 
component of transporting it globally to market. Coal and NG are both much costlier, outside of 
their region of origin, to deliver to the consumer. The core physics underlying the logistics of 
transport has yet to be surmounted by economically viable technology, and very likely never 
will. But the LNG market offers new mobility and opportunity to exporters and importers of gas, 
though it is difficult for LNG to compete in geographical regions which have their own NG 
reserves and production.
Once delivered via LNG tanker to the consumer, generally, LNG processing plants pipe 
the reconverted NG into a fixed  pipeline grid to distribute out into the regional market. However, 
strategic security reasons, not just market economics, induce some large industrial nations with 
high energy import requirements, e.g. Japan and China, to seek diversity in supply. Over short 
distances onshore pipelines of NG economically outperform offshore NG pipelines; both 
outperform LNG transformation + transport out to a distance from  production to customer o f  
about 2,000 to 3,000 miles (depending on diameter of the pipeline) as Figure 3.1 below 
demonstrates.
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ILLUSTRATIVE 2012 C O ST S  OF GAS, OIL 
AND CO AL TRANSPORTATION 
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Figure 3.1 Transportation cost comparison
Source: JAI-Energy, 2012, slide provided directly by creator, James Jensen. Copyright 
permission granted (Appendix C).
3.2.4 Regulatory environment for IOCs in Russia
International Oil Corporations operating in Russia have much experience in a difficult 
regulatory environment. ExxonMobil’s earlier experiences as an operator with Rosneft in the 
Sakhalin-1 project go back to the 1990s, at the time the most complex project the corporation 
had ever undertaken, and one they were legally muscled into renegotiating in Rosneft’s favor. 
Currently, ExxonMobil has a pending lawsuit against the Russian central government claiming it 
overpaid over $500 million in taxes. That case is expected to be heard no sooner than 2017 (RT 
News 2016). Shell, BP and ConocoPhillips also have all had contracts “restructured” or 
“renegotiated” since the 1990s, sometimes at great loss under Putin’s reign, but they still remain
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or return and continue to invest.
3.2.5 Corporate social responsibility
International Oil Corporations, with diverse shareholders and national compliance 
standards, are susceptible to adverse international or domestic opinion from an oil spill or any 
other environmental mishap in the Arctic. Populist opinion or legal directives from IOC host 
countries could continue to limit or prohibit continued participation in Russian JVs in the Kara 
Sea or other frontier hydrocarbon regions. These influences on IOC practices have emerged in 
the last 20 years, and are outside traditional O&G business practices or diplomatic statecraft:
Increasingly shareholder value is tied to a company’s performance on environmental and 
social grounds: the BP Deepwater Horizon explosion, for example, decreased the market 
valuation of BP by [U.S.] $100 billion.. .The business of producing oil has been 
increasingly entangled with broader social issues like climate change, human rights, and 
financial speculation (Bridge and Le Billon, 2013, 62).
An IOC’s environmental record can impact competiveness in acquiring new licenses. Corporate 
Social Responsibility (CSR) standards are now integral to operational planning at ExxonMobil 
and the other major IOCs as well as acceptance of the Extractive Industries Transparency 
Initiative which seeks, especially for the poorest and less developed hydrocarbon exporting 
states, to allow more political transparency of the uses of earned revenues from IOC extraction 
(Coll 2013). Therefore, international opinion as well as domestic in specific populations where 
IOCs are based, could significantly limit their continued participation in Russian projects to 
include the Kara Sea.
3.2.5.1. If disaster strikes?
Negative environmental impacts of a hydrocarbon extraction mishap in the Kara Sea or 
other Arctic offshore regions would likely have international political ramifications independent 
to a degree of actual quantifiable environmental degradation, e.g. a massive oil spill. Failure by 
the Russian state and O&G industry to mitigate damage to what is a fragile and critical Arctic
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habitat, would likely render hydrocarbon extraction in other frontier regions, significantly more 
difficult for IOCs as well as for Russia. The responsibility for administering and developing the 
response plans for oil spills in Russia falls to the Unified State System of Emergency Prevention 
and Response (USSEPR). It is expected that industry operators have contingency plans in place. 
Should their plans fail to contain an incident, the Ministry of Emergencies would initiate their 
own contingency plans. Russia’s capacity to handle a major Arctic hydrocarbon mishap on its 
offshore Arctic shelf is generally assessed as not robust: “ .  available resources are insufficient 
for adequate and rapid response to emerging threats and risks in the Arctic region (Bambulyak, 
A. Syndes, and M. Syndes 2015, 82).” However, the same assessment would likely hold at the 
time of this writing (2016) in most every other potential circumpolar hydrocarbon extraction 
region. The distances are vast and the infrastructure is “currently” woefully inadequate for 
responding to offshore emergencies among all the littoral Arctic nations, with the possible 
exception of Norway, which benefits from less severe oceanographic and meteorological 
conditions and a more concentrated, overwhelmingly sub-Arctic offshore enterprise. What will 
likely matter is the character of steps taken to mitigate hydrocarbon extraction risks before a 
response operation is necessary. Short of central leadership survival, such as a regime 
threatening war, a major hydrocarbon environmental disaster could likely be a showstopper for a 
significant period of time. In that unfortunate event, it would be probable that Russian authority 
would retain sovereign control to any disaster off its shores within its EEZ, to a greater extent 
than other AC members, even if it increases the likelihood of negative impacts for its own 
people, e.g. the 2000 Kirov submarine disaster when foreign deep sea recovery assistance was 
refused. It would be out of character if  Russia did not seek to control every aspect of any 
mitigation efforts within its territory, with high importance given to avoiding regime 
embarrassment to an even greater extent than is the norm for sovereign states. Responsibility 
and accountability for environmentally safe practices in offshore hydrocarbon extraction is also 
not solely a Russian matter as foreign IOCs are integral to the success of their Russian partners. 
British Petroleum’s 2010 disaster in the Gulf of Mexico demonstrated that there is measurable 
leverage on IOC activity, and therefore, leverage on their operations wherever they operate, to 
include the Russian offshore.
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3.3 Arctic strategies
Though international forums, NGOs and a shared global environmental consciousness 
have had increasing influence on offshore hydrocarbon extraction plans, sovereign states remain 
the most important policy actors in the Arctic. Though there is a long history of exploration, 
strategic military positioning, resource extraction and regional commerce, the Arctic’s relative 
priority in national strategies is relatively new. This has been highlighted by Russia, the US, 
Norway and others releasing “Arctic” specific policy documents and policies. A security 
“perception” of threat is a component shared by the Arctic nations, including Russia, the US and 
Norway, but it is a broader more holistic concept, more inclusive of the social and human aspects 
of security in the Arctic region (Hoogenson Gj0rv and Goloviznina 2014), than the Cold War 
construct. That is not to conclude that traditional realism and competition between nation states 
is antiquated, only that it is not emphasized in the strategic documents.
Table 3.1 Comparative Arctic priorities as evident in respective current strategy
Arctic strategic priorities
Russia US Norway
Strategic defense Med Med Low
Sovereignty Med Med Med
Security: law-safety-domain awareness High High High
Regional people Med Med High
Indigenous people Med High Med
Environmental stewardship Med High High
Resource extraction High Med High
Russia: Strategic Development of the Arctic Zone of the Russian Federation and the National 
Security, 2013.
US: National Security for the Arctic Region, 2013.
Norway: New Building Blocks in the North, 2009.
Comment: Clear in the above comparison is the similarity of declared Arctic policy objectives.
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3.3.1 Russian Arctic strategy: cooperative security or strategic zero sum game?
Energy, particularly offshore hydrocarbons and the need to expand development, is the 
strategic centerpiece of Russia’s Arctic 2013 strategy (Chapter 2) and also influences discussion 
of other priorities, such as economic hardships endemic to its indigenous peoples. Cited as key 
factors influencing socio-economic development are; the harsh climate, localized nature of 
industrial and economic development, dependence on other regions for supplies, and instability 
in the Arctic ecological system. The main “risks” in the social sphere are the effects of negative 
demographics, poor social support services and the low quality of life of the indigenous peoples. 
As means to improve its Arctic social and economic development, state support of infrastructure 
development and resource extraction, is very much at the top of the list.
3.3.1.1 Russian strategy and international cooperation
Strategic policy for the Russian Federation’s Arctic Zone (or region) is outlined in 
documents signed by the President. These strategy documents are central to the strategic 
planning of the central government and are approved by the Russian Security Council, which 
consist of the key state leaders, including the President, Prime Minister, Ministers of Defense, 
Interior and Foreign Affairs, as well as key directors, such as the FSB (legacy successor of KGB) 
(Zysk 2010). The energy-specific detail in the current Russian Federation Arctic strategy likely 
benefited from a lesser Ministry of Energy strategy that candidly recognized the disproportionate 
dependence on energy exports (Energy 2010). The Presidential Administration has by far the 
most influence on strategic objectives with limited direct input from the Ministry of Natural 
Resources, however, the major O&G firms have their own access to the President’s inner circle 
and therefore a means to advance their interests (Laruelle 2014a).
The modern post-Soviet “era” for Russian Arctic policy is considered to have begun well 
before the USSR’s actual demise, by Gorbachev’s 1987 Gorbachev Murmansk speech, in which 
he proposed six cooperative goals for the Soviet Union's Arctic policy (Gorbachev 1987). The 
2013 Arctic strategy document, Strategic Development o f  the Arctic Zone o f  the Russian 
Federation and the National Security, is an update from the 2008 Arctic strategy, The 
Foundations o f Russian Federation Policy in the Arctic until 2020 and Beyond (a short 
redefinition of the Arctic Zone was released in 2014). Both the 2013 and 2008 Arctic strategies
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continue a softening trend with less of the Soviet style bombastic nationalistic tone. Russia’s 
traditional strategic geopolitical security interests are detailed sparingly. It is a forward looking 
document covering a broad range of security, social and economic objectives: “Implementation 
of the Strategy will provide a comprehensive building [of] competitive advantages of the Arctic 
zone ... in order to strengthen the position of the Russian Federation in the A rc tic , as well as 
increased international cooperation (Strategic 2013, 22-23)” .
Though active and accepting of the AC’s eight member states, Russia views the maritime 
Arctic, in a legalistic sense, foremost a sphere of the five littoral Arctic States (itself, US,
Canada, Norway and Greenland-Denmark). There is a noticeable maturing of Russia’s vision for 
developing its offshore Arctic oil and gas reserves in the 2013 strategy. Whereas in 2008 it 
intended to “initiate.. .the process of mastering natural gas and oil reserves in the Arctic zone 
(Foundations 2008, 100),” by 2013 there was an acknowledgement that Russia does not have the 
means internally to exploit its Arctic offshore hydrocarbon resources, implying they must seek 
assistance from abroad. In 2008 a necessary implementation step, set for 2011-2015, was the:
“ .  delineation of the internationally-recognized exterior border of the Arctic z o n e .  and 
realization on this b a s is .th e  competitive advantages of Russia in the extraction and delivery of 
energy resources (Foundations 2008, 105).” In the newest strategy, discussion of international 
borders has been reduced, likely influenced by the 2010 maritime delimitation settlement for the 
Barents Sea with Norway (Larulle 2014a). There is a clear overall cooperative tone in the 2013 
strategy. Enhancing participation in international scientific and regional forums is stated as an 
objective, as is recognition of the impact of climate change. Looking beyond sovereign borders 
Provision 17 highlights the need for bilateral and multilateral cooperation in the region to further 
Russia’s objectives:
. . a )  [by]providing a mutually beneficial bilateral and multilateral cooperation between 
the Russian Federation and the Arctic states on the basis of international treaties and 
agreem ents. increasing the efficiency of foreign economic activity; b ) .  protecting] 
Russia’s national interests and implementing acts under international rights of the coastal 
states in the Arctic region, including issues relating to the exploration and exploitation of 
the resources of the continental shelf.(S trateg ic 2013, 15-16).
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3.3.1.1.1 Russian cooperation in the Arctic
Russian cooperative engagement with Arctic nations on issues specific to the Arctic has 
been significantly more conciliatory than on geopolitical issues elsewhere. Even in the darkest 
days of the Cold War, in specific regulatory spheres, such as Arctic fisheries management and 
scientific endeavors, cooperation between Arctic states (including the US) were tangible and 
identifiable. This characterizes the “Putin era” as well, evidenced by agreement among the 
Arctic states to utilize the AC to facilitate the 2011 Arctic SAR (Russia and US co-led) and the 
2013 Arctic Oil Spill and Response Agreement (Russia, US and Norwegian led).
In addition to the AC, Russia is also an active member in the Barents-Euro Arctic 
Council (BEAC) as well as in Barents 2020, where it has generally worked in a more cooperative 
and conciliatory manner than in broader “global” international forums. This is arguably because 
areas of contention such as sovereignty claims, strategic military issues, economic or energy 
policies are excluded as are active and full participation by nations outside the Arctic and 
Barents Sea regions (it should also be noted that the charter of the BEAC does not encompass 
any offshore zone). Unlike the AC however, the BEAC is inclusive of collective component 
layers below the central state, and therefore, in theory, can influence collaborative norms in those 
lower layers of government. The collaborative Norwegian and Russian Barents 2020 project, 
which focuses on uniform Arctic offshore hydrocarbon technical environmental and safety 
standards operating in the Barents Sea, may have more promise for influence Arctic wide, in part 
by the specificity of the industry standards approach (Nesheim 2012).
Russia had also consistently supported the legitimacy of United Nations Convention on 
the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) as the means to resolve Arctic sovereignty disputes and 
participated as well with the other four Arctic littoral states, in the signing of the 2008 Illulissat 
Declaration committing to diplomatic resolutions under the provisions of UNCLOS in the Arctic 
Ocean. Russian cooperation, in specifically Arctic affairs, has generally held up even after the 
downturn in Russian relations with the West over geopolitical differences resulting from the 
Crimean, Ukrainian and Syrian crises; though negative impacts on exchanges and collaboration 
are obvious.
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3.3.1.2 Russian concepts of security in their Arctic strategy
For Russia, long before there were specifically crafted strategy documents, the Arctic has 
been a core strategic interest and not simply a peripheral or tangential region of concern. Nearly 
half of the circumference of the Arctic Circle is a Russian coastal and maritime zone; and that 
zone is being impacted by climate change trends creating both a perception of economic 
potential and an increased security threat (Zysk 2011). While “security” is typically at the 
forefront of US strategic policy, for example, the US 2013 National Strategy fo r  the Arctic 
Region, line of effort 1 reads: “Advance United States Security Interests (US President 2013, 2).” 
In Russia’s 2013 Arctic strategy however, security it is not discussed until well into the text, and 
then primarily phrased in terms of sovereignty, similar to the Canadian concept. Strategic 
military deterrence is buried deep in the body of the text of provision 18- b. The 10 Russian 
coastal SAR stations alongside Russia’s NSR which has been heavily reported in the press, is of 
little “strategic” military concern to the balance of Arctic power. This type of security rebuilding 
can also be seen as more of a positive development for safe Arctic transit, emergency response as 
well as contributing to more environmentally sound resource extraction.
Adjustments in Russia’s Arctic strategy over the last 15 years have evolved to a 
significantly more cooperative international approach. But these changes have taken place in a 
relatively short period of time and it is not established that they truly reflect a revised vision of 
Russia’s place in the world (Zysk 2011). Foreign policy actions and statements from the central 
government since 2014 indicate they may be merely tactical in nature; temporary maneuvers 
aimed at achieving old and new goals with different tools. There is substantial reason to believe 
that Russia’s top leadership hold a strategic view, that Russia’s path to remain a global power is 
through maximum exploitation of its natural resources, especially oil and gas. To exploit those 
resources is the primary objective. There is a nuance however, that makes this ambition different 
than the Cold War. Though increased revenues, in turn, increases military potential and 
capacity, it is not clear that an all-powerful military is the desired end state. More apparent is 
that the Kremlin views “power” or Russian Federation “state capacity” derived from its Arctic 
hydrocarbon reserves as enough in itself. In this view, Russian strategy in its core essentials is 
not far removed from the constants of a traditional “realist” global power struggle; however,
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unlike the USSR of old, Russian strategic objectives are not ideological or necessarily military 
driven ones.
3.3.2 US Arctic strategy
Over the last decade the US Arctic strategy has evolved to better align and focus all 
aspects of national policy with a more synergistic Arctic focus. President Bush’s Homeland 
Security PD 25 & National Security PD 66: Arctic Region Policy, released before he left office, 
was a step towards this governmental synergy (previously “Arctic” specific policy was largely 
seen as a research guidance matter). This was followed by President Obama’s 2013 National 
Security fo r  the Arctic Region and the Implementation Plan in 2014. The US’s strategic 
documents are developed in an interagency process which drives the development of supporting 
strategies and implementation plans throughout government. For example, the Military Strategy 
o f the United States is derived from the US National Strategy which in turn guides a series of 
supporting, programmatic and distribution of funds directives that have a very real and direct 
impact on what weapons are actually procured.
This regional focus to frame a matrix of Arctic specific issues by a series of strategic 
guidance documents is a new approach for the US. Though the Arctic has long had great 
geostrategic significance, it has not necessarily been a distinctly Arctic specific “regional” one. 
During the Cold War the US invested greatly in Arctic nuclear strategic defense infrastructure as 
part of its containment policy of the USSR. However, it did not consider its Arctic coast 
necessitated the same investment in conventional maritime or tactical forces. Polar ice and 
climate was thought more than sufficient to contain Soviet expansion. Preeminence during the 
Cold War was placed on strategic aerospace and submarine launched missile deterrent strategies 
that essentially bypass the physical limitations of Arctic operations by making use of other 
spatial mediums (Antrium 2011). It is worth noting that strategic nuclear war plans, preparation, 
and real world posturing are still key components of the national defense strategy for both Russia 
and the US; though they are discussed less. From a “security” perspective, what is clearly 
discernable in the last series of US Arctic strategic documents is much greater emphasis on the 
specifics of the region as distinct, from what for the US, must remain a truly “global” vision. 
Unlike Russia, and certainly Norway, the U S’s center of gravity is the world; and not specifically
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hinged on the “North.” Nonetheless, there are key lines of effort that can be much improved by 
developing synergy in US policy for the region. The prominence of the Arctic as a “region” for 
US policy is also illustrated by President Obama’s participation in the 2015 GLACIER 
conference (the first visit by a sitting president to Alaska), meant to highlight the importance of 
climate change and the role of the AC and international community in buttressing the coming 
Paris Accords coming later that year (Welch 2015).
All three of the framing “lines of effort” for US Arctic policy, security interests, 
stewardship, and international cooperation, emphasize soft security issues and awareness of the 
specific environmental conditions of the Arctic in a regionally collective manner. Significantly, 
it also highlights in a “public” document accession to UNCLOS (long stalled in the US senate) as 
an objective (US President 2013). The 2014 Implementation Plan emphasizes the building of a 
collective international array of infrastructure improvements in communications, functional 
knowledge based systems such as domain awareness --- as enablers for environmentally 
sustainable resource use (to include hydrocarbon extraction) (US President 2014). The key 
points detailed are to improve security by preparing for increased activity in the maritime Arctic: 
by enhancing Arctic domain awareness with a better communication infrastructure: international 
cooperation (especially through the AC); adjudicating boundary issues; international scientific 
cooperation; maritime transport and safety implement a mandatory polar code through the 
International Maritime Organization (IMO); environmental protection; and economic 
development to include hydrocarbon extraction. The US Navy’s Arctic Roadmap 2014-2030 
also approaches security in an all embracing manner anchored in the specific geography of the 
Arctic (US Navy 2014). What none of the US Arctic documents provide is a framework for 
unilaterally addressing any concerns with Russian development of its offshore hydrocarbons in 
the Kara Sea, or anywhere else: declaratory US intent is to work regionally and internationally to 
address such issues.
3.3.3 Norwegian Arctic strategy
Norway has the good fortune of benefiting from a relatively “friendly” Arctic climate due 
to the warming effect of the Gulf Stream. Permanent ice is far from shore and hydrocarbons 
closer to markets than Russian offshore areas such as the Kara Sea. It also has the good fortune 
of a relatively well developed educational base and a historical economic infrastructure in its
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Arctic region that predates hydrocarbon development. Norway’s current Arctic strategy, New 
Building Blocks in the North, 2009, updates the High North Strategy of 2006. More than any 
other nation: “Arctic affairs are an integral part of Norway’s foreign policy (H0nneland and 
Jensen 2015, 462).” Norway’s concept of “arctic” is also a more geographically regional 
concept than Russia’s strategic concerns for a continental littoral or the US’s matrix of concerns 
and issues which are essentially framed in terms of their global or universal import. For Norway, 
the focus for its strategy is its own “High North,” (essentially a domestic term and focus); the 
relationship with its Russian neighbor—particularly in regards to the shared border region of the 
Barents Sea; and the international promotion of high standards of environmental stewardship.
Norway details seven strategic priorities: develop knowledge about climate change and 
its environmental effects; improve maritime monitoring and emergency response; promote 
sustainable use of offshore hydrocarbon resources; promote offshore business in Norway’s 
North; infrastructure improvement in the North; exercise sovereignty while also strengthening 
cross border cooperation with Russia; and safeguarding Northern and indigenous cultures (New 
2009). Region building for Norway has been much more a theory; it has been integral to its 
approach to all aspects of international policy, especially with Russia, and especially in the 
region of its shared maritime border in the Barents Sea. In addition to continuing to emphasize 
the AC, BEAC and an emerging Arctic Economic Council, as the core institutions to address its 
multinational objectives, its Foreign Ministry has also recently outlined a follow on to Barents 
2020, a new Arctic 2030 (Norway’s 2014). Norway also is working on developing international 
standards for petroleum operations in the Arctic and expanding its effort on space based 
communications in high latitudes (75 degrees North). Unlike the US or Russia, for Norway, the 
Arctic and hydrocarbon strategic policy, in a sense, is its “foreign policy.”
3.3.3.1 Effectiveness and limits to Region Building
“Region Building” has provided a common conceptual base, especially by Northern 
Europeans, to address concerns with Russia in the Arctic and is central to Norway’s Arctic 
policy. Region Building concepts are also implied and encouraged in US Arctic policy. From 
the perspective of this dissertation’s focus on Russian offshore hydrocarbon development on the 
Kara Sea, engagement with Russia at levels below the state to state stratum is highly relevant,
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though not perhaps to the same extent as the Russian projects to its west in the Barents Sea 
where a maritime border is shared with Norway. As discussed previously, Region Building 
efforts have been of special notice in the Western Arctic since the end of the Cold War. Writes 
Lassi Heininen in the Arctic Human Development Report: “ .  the collapse of the Soviet Union 
permitted a dramatic change in the circumpolar North .W h e n  we include cooperation in 
environmental protection, indigenous peoples’ affairs and science, this trend can be described as 
region building (Heininen 2004, 209).”
It could be argued that Russia perceives itself as the de facto dominant player, exclusive 
of non-regional rivals, and therefore champions the role and functions of the AC and BEAC. 
Also, neither the AC nor BEAC are chartered to engage on energy or security policy, which 
might be another reason they are the forums of choice for Russia to address Arctic matters, rather 
than the United Nations (UNCLOS process being an exception). However, Russian participation 
in these regional forums can be subdued. Bjorn Hassler describes lassitude, in his study of 
Russian participation in a collective aerial reconnaissance monitoring regime for oil spill 
violators in the Baltic which resulted in the expenses falling to the Swedes, Germans and Poles 
(Hassler 2011). Writes Elana Rowe a Norwegian researcher:
In the cooperative settings that continue to flourish, Russia is not an active agenda-setter 
and remains primarily oriented to the safest zones of low political cooperation and 
coordination. The reasons for this low-key engagement may be that these regional 
multilateral arrangements are not seen as prestigious fo ru m s . .and more generally, 
because Russian representatives tend to be skeptical about the possibility of achieving 
desirable outcomes in any multilateral setting. Furthermore, such northern cooperative 
forums, more or less, explicitly exclude politically and economically problematic issues 
(Rowe 2011, 3).
The focus of these geographically exclusive forums is collaborative Region Building or 
“constructivist” policy agendas to establish environmental controls, safety and scientific study. 
But the Kara Sea shares no international borders. Therefore, it would be difficult to imagine for 
this exclusively Russian region, open and collective participation by an international element; 
perhaps even harder to duplicate as a cross level entirely domestic one. There are other limits
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though to what can be expected from cooperative and collective approaches to matters of great 
importance to Russia, especially within its borders. Russia is the predominant power, certainly 
in the Euro-Asian sphere of the Arctic, and demonstrates little intent to restrict unilateral action 
at the core of its interests, though recognizing that interdependence in the Arctic region is both 
defined by global economics and geography. In an information age update to their global 
interdependence neoliberal theory, Keohane and Nye, identify two areas where interdependence 
had not seen much change; and likely still has not:
Military force still plays a significant role in relations between states, and in a crunch, 
security still outranks other issues in foreign policy.. .the world of states is not a world of 
complex interdependence. In many areas, realist assumptions about the dominance of 
military force and security issues remains valid (Keohane and Nye 1998, 3).
Region Building’s effect on Russian policy for the Kara Sea is therefore likely to be 
marginal. Hydrocarbon extraction policy choices in the Kara Sea are likely to remain a Russian 
strategic level concern for the very top of its central leadership.
3.4 Sanctions and direct policy action
The potential for influencing the character of Russian Arctic offshore development by 
leveraging Russia’s lack of capacity is evident. That Russia needs foreign technology and 
investment to succeed, and that it is a component of its Arctic strategy, is significant. But 
transforming lack of Russian capacity into international policy leverage will be complex as it is 
IOCs that have the desired capital and technology, not governments. The current sanction 
regime established in 2014 by the US, Japan, Norway, Switzerland, the EU and other nations, 
have targeted the Russian oil and gas sector as a means to induce different Russian foreign policy 
choices for Crimea and the Ukraine; not fo r  a sustained and sound Arctic hydrocarbon 
development policy. The sanctions implemented by the West are a direct action impacting 
Russian energy policy fo r  a global geopolitical purpose; not a specifically Arctic one. Nor are 
they economic embargos that negatively impact Russian offshore oil projects in a general way; 
they specifically target those projects. Hit by US sanctions (and thereby prohibiting engagement 
by any corporations or individuals subject to US law, e.g. ExxonMobil) are Russian O&G 
corporations, specific individuals and banks/investment firms. The list includes: Rosneft and its
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CEO; NOC rivals Gazprom, LUKoil, Surgutneftgas; and major banks such as Sberbank (US 
Treasury 2014).
Initially, the drilling of the first Universiteteskaya well [Univeristy-1 in the Kara Sea] 
slipped through sanction restrictions because all the equipment had been contracted 
before the August 1 deadline [2014]; but the loophole was closed.. .on 12 
Septem ber. .Those new orders introduced a series of tougher sanctions that appeared to 
be aimed at undermining the future development of the Russian oil sector . . I n  
particular, it tightened the rules on US company involvement of projects involving the 
development of resources in the Arctic, deep-water o ffsho re .and  shale 
o i l .  .Furthermore, US companies were given a 26 September deadline to cease all 
activities in areas identified (Henderson and Loe 2014, 33).
To that point, sanctions in September 2014 shutdown Rosneft and ExxonMobil’s JV in 
the Kara Sea. Russian critical need for capital investments, technology and management 
expertise from abroad to develop its reserves of Arctic hydrocarbons have been enduring and 
will likely remain so. The potential for Western sanctions to target the Russian hydrocarbon 
capacity in the offshore Arctic was not a historically unique event and should not have hit the 
Russian leadership as a total shock. Similar reactions to Russian - Soviet foreign policy, 
especially by the US, is within a historical pattern. Thirty-five years ago offshore Sakhalin 
Island drilling in the Pacific sub-Arctic was targeted by US sanctions:
. t h e  project proved vulnerable to US sanctions in 1981-2, because of the large 
component of American technology. The sanctions seriously reduced drilling 
capacity .from  an expected five wells with an American drilling ship to two with a 
Soviet replacement vessel (0streng 1987, 25).
European Union sanctions also focus on Arctic, tight oil and offshore O&G projects but 
differ in detail. Any EU company or investors must also cope, like US firms, with the possibility 
of a continuation or expansion of sanctions. At a minimum, the sanction regime has created 
great investment instability. “As a result it would seem that any Arctic activity planned by 
European companies with Rosneft or other Russian partners is unlikely to proceed any more 
rapidly than Exxon’s undertakings in the Kara Sea (Henderson and Loe 2014).”
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Russia has and can be expected to continue to attempt to mitigate the impact of sanctions. 
One such aspect has been the recent compensation of the corporate and banking “victims” of the 
sanctions. And unlike 2008 or the late 1990s, the Russian central government in 2014 was in a 
stronger position, with fiscal reserves of near half a trillion dollars as well as having a more 
developed business acumen (STRATFOR 2014). Nonetheless, Russian fiscal reserves have been 
rapidly dissipating. The impact of sanctions on Russia’s energy sector, coupled with the 
continued drop in the price of oil led to official recognition of a recession for 2015 by the 
Russian Finance Ministry (Abromov 2014). The recession continues with Russian GDP 
contracting 3.7% in 2015 (Tully 2016b).
Indications are, as should be expected, that Rosneft with support from the central 
government will continue efforts without its US current JV partner, ExxonMobil if  necessary, 
seeking other partners. A shift to partners in China or Venezuela, for example, has featured 
heavily in the press. But ExxonMobil is generally considered the most proven of the super­
major IOCs in bringing together the best in technology and management for the world’s biggest 
industrial projects (Coll 2013). Therefore, if  sanctions curtail ExxonMobil’s long-term 
commitment to Russian offshore joint ventures, there should be a discernible negative impact, 
even if mitigated by other IOCs or even NOCs. The capacity of alternative hydrocarbon industry 
partners to replicate the Western super-major IOCs in Russian Arctic extraction objectives, in a 
sustained sanction regime, is a critical uncertainty for the midterm.
But the desirability to invest capital and effort in Russia by IOCs has been historically 
driven by relative global scarcity of marketable hydrocarbons elsewhere; and still remains the 
case. Russia has a critical need for investments from abroad to develop its reserves of Arctic gas 
and oil as its capacity for government assisted funding has declined; and it also needs specific 
high technology. But this leverage should not be overstated. Russia has experienced sanctions, 
state collapse---and going back further, revolution, genocide, invasion, extreme tyranny---and 
throughout that hundred and twenty years or so the international O&G industry has been in, out, 
in, and out again. There is not sufficient evidence to conclude that pattern will not re-establish in 
a recognizable form.
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Chapter 4 Methods, tools and research components
4.0 Overview
This dissertation incorporated three different tools to address the complexity of the 
research questions. After an initial literature review and strategic policy analysis, a survey- 
interview of experts was designed to narrow identification of key drivers and critical 
uncertainties to those most applicable to the development of Russian Arctic offshore 
hydrocarbons and the Kara Sea. Supporting research and academic engagement continued in 
concert with the execution, processing and analysis of the survey-interview. A dedicated 
workshop was also added to the research process. This workshop conducted at the University of 
Alaska Fairbanks, with over 30 participants, explored key drivers circumpolar wide, as a 
supplemental and external input to assist in the creation of four plausible futures for Kara Sea 
hydrocarbon development. The flow of the complete PhD research program is represented by 
Figure 4.1 below.
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4.1 Qualitative methods
The overall research approach was qualitative for a holistic interdisciplinary study 
(Creswell 2014). The intent was to identify and differentiate between key drivers and critical 
uncertainties and then to build plausible future scenarios for Kara Sea hydrocarbon development.
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These scenarios were designed to allow different drivers to interact in structured, complex, but 
plausible narrative futures. A geographically delimited intensive research design was used to 
ground, isolate and enrich the detail of the data (Clifford, French, and Valentine 2010), but not to 
arbitrarily limit the research as most of the key drivers ranged across political and geographical 
borders. Rather, the intent was to enrich a regional backdrop for the employment of the study’s 
research tools; a survey of experts (Chapter 5), workshop and scenario development (Chapter 6 
and 7). Though data collection was as detailed as could be plausibly incorporated into analysis, 
early in the effort a judgment was made to approach the research questions with a top-down 
approach. A mechanical bottom-up manipulation of the data driven by an incremental 
economics model, or assessing and quantifying, even with the most rudimentary simplistic 
method just the economic variables, such as future rents and revenues, cash flows, hydrocarbon 
market pricing and the influences of supply and demand, just could not be proven with scientific 
method. A judgment was also made that it would also not be achievable to develop realistic 
probabilities (Scott 2014). The applicability of qualitative scenario methods for this 
dissertation’s research objectives is supported by Swart, Raskin and Robinson: “The distinction 
between quantitative (modeling) and qualitative (narrative) should be underscored 
.Q uantita tive  modeling is...appropriate for simulating well-understood systems over 
sufficiently short t im e s .  as complexity increases and the time horizon of interest lengthens, the 
power of prediction diminishes (Swart, Raskin, and Robinson 2004, 140).”
4.2 Complexity
Key drivers or variables that impact hydrocarbon development; global and regional 
energy markets, climate change effects and technological advancement, interact in a complex 
framework with varying speeds, and in a non-linear manner. The same is true of the 
effectiveness and influence of strategic policy, regional governance and the other social-political 
variables, as well as those specific to the Kara Sea region. Analysis of how key drivers might 
interact within scenarios for hydrocarbon extraction still had to embrace the challenge of 
different time scales for the multiple drivers of the future. Complex Adaptive System theory was 
deemed useful as a means to ground this interplay, taking into special account the capacity for 
shared learning and change overtime; especially with social-political drivers (Levin et al. 2012, 
12). Complex adaptive systems have strong roots in archeology where rules of the natural
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sciences do not always bind research parameters as information is shared within the data set, and 
direct modifications must be accounted for (Barton 2013). Even the simplest human societies 
and their components are complex because of this relatively rapid adaptability and capacity to 
share and learn. Often policy recommendations derived from the very best research and analysis 
assume linear dynamics, marginal change, and do not account for adaptive system learning.
4.3 Scenarios method
4.3.1 Origin of the scenario method
Scenario method has strong roots in strategic planning, and the O&G industry 
specifically. Early pioneers in the 1950s and 1960s at Royal Dutch Shell, including Jimmy 
Davidson and Ted Newland (Amer, Daim, and Jetter 2013) contributed much to institutionalize 
rigor in a process that is distinctly different from economic forecasting or military style 
deliberate planning. The fundamental approach of the “scenario” method is that there is no 
intent to predict or determine probability of future events. Rather, the objective is to identify the 
variables, usually termed drivers, and assess how they might interact within a complex system to 
produce plausible outcomes or narratives. Scenario futures are not attempts to forecast or predict 
linear projections into the future; rather they are created to best prepare future decisions makers 
for uncertainties. Scenarios narratives use storyboards, much like a novel or a screen play, but 
the intent is to construct plausible narrative futures to enrich future decision making, not simply 
entertain or build a timeline for the captivating or sensational. Rare events can and do have great 
impact, but by definition they are also improbable within the time frame of effective human 
decision. These rare but impactful possibilities termed “wildcards” or if  especially cataclysmic, 
“black swan” events, are identified in the process, but kept aside and not incorporated into 
analysis. Highly improbable but cataclysmic astronomical events and strategic nuclear war, for 
example, would both usually fall in this category. A philosophical foundation for coping with 
these rare, but dramatic potentials on the future, as well as the impossibility of predicting them, 
is provided by Nassim Taleb
The Black Swan is about consequential epistemic limitations, both psychological (hubris 
and biases) and philosophical (mathematical) limits to knowledge, both individual and 
collective. I say “consequential” because the focus is on impactful rare events, as our
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knowledge, both empirical and theoretical, breaks down with those---the more remote the
events, the less we can forecast them, yet they are the most impactful (Taleb 2010, 330).
The “intuitive” approach to scenarios has also been used by Herman Kahn and the Rand 
Corporation as early as the 1960s. No mathematical algorithms are utilized and the focus is on 
identifying causal processes, decision points to improve decision making processes. Pierre Wack 
contributed to “adaptive” scenario planning, while at Royal Dutch Shell, by leading the process 
in 1972 that developed a set of plausible “stories” that envisioned an interruption in global oil 
supplies. This corporate scenario work gave Shell a leg up among their peers in reacting to the 
1973 Arab oil embargo and related dramatic pressures on market supply (Amer, Daim and, Jetter
2013). If a forensic re-assessment proved available in the future to look back and score a 
scenario project, it would not be the eventual actual outcomes themselves of scenario narratives 
that validate their value, but how they assisted decision makers in best preparing for necessary 
decisions along the way. This approach has strong roots in industry, particularly oil and gas, but 
has also been applied in government. Most notably it was use as a tool for “transformative 
planning” in early post-apartheid South Africa in what are known as the Mont Fleur series of 
scenario exercises; but has also used by Singapore’s Ministry of Defense and in the US, such as 
the Commission on National Security / 21st Century report in 2000 (Wilkinson and Kupers
2014).
Peter Schwartz, who also worked at Royal Dutch Shell, helped codify this approach in 
the pioneering The Art o f  the Long View. A scenario is defined as “ . a  tool for ordering one’s 
perceptions about alternative future environments in which one’s decisions might be played out 
(Schwartz 1991, 4).” Schwartz further refined this methodology at Global Business Network 
(GBN), a private consulting firm. The intent is to identify and differentiate between key drivers 
(causal variables) that can influence future change from the predetermined elements (variables 
that might also be causal) but can be assumed to hold relatively constant within the scenario 
timeline, as well as the unmasking of critical uncertainties (hypothesis development). If a key 
driver is best assumed to be relatively certain, or a pre-determined element, it has less inherent 
value in enriching decision as it is unlikely to be altered or influenced. To be valid, scenario 
narratives must be internally plausible, consistent and relevant. They should also be different
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and broad enough in range to be of value for that purpose (Schwartz 2001). The GBN scenario 
methodology, which was utilized for the production of the Arctic Council’s Arctic Marine 
Shipping Assessment (AMSA), was the approach deemed most useful to manage the complexities 
of the different drivers for hydrocarbon development in the Kara Sea, as well as to explore their 
interconnectivity; and therefore was adopted for use in this dissertation.
4.3.2 Quantitative and mixed method scenarios
The scenario method described above and adopted for this dissertation is fundamentally 
qualitative and intuitive. There are other noteworthy schools of scenario development that are 
better suited for narrower research questions in shorter time frames. These include the 
“probabilistic modified trends” methodology, which uses the matrix based tools of “trend impact 
analysis” and “cross impact analysis.” Another is the “prospective thinking,” or French School 
model, initially presented by Gaston Berger that does not pre-suppose that the future is pre­
determined by its drivers, but rather, can be modified and shaped. Quantitative methodologies 
are more generally applied to public or infrastructure development policies and planning, e.g. 
Carl Steinitz and his use of a wide range of sources and stakeholder perspectives to develop 
scenarios for use in landscape, and public resource planning (Steinitz et al. 2002). Mixed 
methodologies have also found a place in Royal Dutch Shell’s own studies to enrich with 
statistical models the qualitative method they themselves pioneered to assesses topical futures as 
diverse as climate change, biodiversity, demography, migrations and transforming states (Shell 
2005).
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4.4 Other tools used: survey-interviews and workshops
4.4.1 Survey-interview
A survey-interview focused on delineating or “fleshing out” a likely set of key drivers 
identified in preliminary research was incorporated into the research design. The timing of the 
creation and execution of the survey-interview was January through September 2014, amidst 
much foreign policy turmoil over Russian foreign policy actions in the Crimea and Ukraine, and 
the resulting imposition of international punitive sanctions on the Russian Federation that 
targeted its Arctic offshore hydrocarbon enterprise. There was also a concurrent precipitous drop 
in the price of oil as depicted in Figure 4.2.
Figure 4.2 Research timeline compared to crude oil price
Source: Graphic created by researcher. Oil prices interpolated with rounded data 
(Ycharts 2016)
Due to the statistically small number of participating experts, the diversity of 
backgrounds and perspectives, as well as the social engineering tools used to form the sampling
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pool, the study should be characterized as a series of targeted (not random) interviews; over the 
phone, in person, written and sent via email; hence the term survey-interview is used to 
differentiate from more suitably quantifiable models. The survey-interview was purposely a 
“survey” of experts in Arctic affairs and, especially to the extent possible, the offshore O&G 
industry. All responses were for non-attribution and data de-identified. A snowballing effect 
was desired to further identify experts in the relatively narrow niche of the Russian offshore 
hydrocarbon extraction expertise (Yin 2011). The construct of the survey-interview, in 
consideration of the senior level of many of the desired participants, was purposely kept brief 
and consisted of 15 multiple choice questions, on 14 pages, with the opportunity to add further 
detail to questions encouraged (Converse and Presser 1986). An open ended venting question 
(Rea and Parker 2005) was also incorporated into the design. Of the approximately 100 survey- 
interview forms distributed, 28 were completed and processed (Chapter 5).
Responses were tabulated and represented graphically, but scoring statistical techniques 
were not used due to the small size of the sample population as well as its non-random nature 
which hindered quantification. The survey-interview results were incorporated into assessing 
key drivers and were to some extent “validated / or not validated” within the dynamics of the 
scenario development process which followed. The project was submitted for ethical 
considerations to the University of Alaska Office of Research Integrity and was exempted from 
further review by the Institutional Review Board.
4.4.2 Workshop
As a means to augment dissertation research with additional expert input, and to add a 
measure of external validity to the identification of key drivers to Arctic offshore hydrocarbon 
development, a workshop was planned and also incorporated into the research design. The 
session was not of sufficient duration to achieve all the steps of a scenario development. 
However, the uniquely diverse group of 31 participants, from academia, the O&G industry, 
government and other Arctic stakeholders, was able to identify and rank 54 drivers to help frame 
further analysis. Its relatively large size makes it best to consider it a facilitated “working group” 
rather than a “focus group” (Stewart and Shamdasani 2015). Much useful work has emerged in 
the last 10 years by the inclusion of decision theory and creative metrics to tease out participant
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group dynamics, such as institutional bias, where the “group” is the data source as much as the 
substance (White et al. 2010). However, due to time and resource constraints, but primarily the 
substantive objective, the workshop was straight forward, with professional opinion recorded and 
considered at face value.
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Chapter 5 Expert survey-interview project
5.0 Overview
With the geopolitical influences from events in Crimea and the Ukraine as well as the 
slide in the price of oil in the background, an expert survey-interview project was designed and 
initiated in March 2015. The intent of the project was to add insight from experts into the key 
drivers for hydrocarbon extraction in the Kara Sea region. Also targeted were the drivers 
impacting the Russian Arctic offshore in general and any other global or regional factor that best 
characterize the strategic prospects of Russian success or failure in their strategic intent.
5.1 Survey-interview method and design
The research approach was a qualitative survey of experts in Arctic affairs and the 
offshore O&G industry. The construct of the survey-interviews, in consideration of the senior 
level of many of the desired participants, was purposely kept brief and consisted of 15 questions. 
A blank representation of the survey-interview format and questions used is included in 
Appendix A.
Eighty-five survey-interviews were sent by email. Another dozen paper copies were also 
distributed and attempts to coordinate contact with key individuals via the Linkedin social 
network. About one third of those targeted were individuals this researcher had met and 
obtained the contact’s business card. The rest were contacts made and business cards obtained 
over the previous year, specific to the O&G industry or Arctic experts with a focus on offshore 
development in Russia. About half of the 28 participants were from the O&G industry, 
including three of the major IOCs. Experts from academia and within government as well as 
journalists also contributed by completing the survey-interview and providing data. Participation 
was very much from around the world to include the US, Canada, Russia, the Nordic countries, 
Central Europe and Asia. All respondents were provided a copy of the draft results.
Overall the questions themselves seemed understandable to participants and triggered the 
desired information in the responses. Due to the non-random, and at times specifically selected 
nature of the target population, as well as its small numbers, detailed statistical analysis was
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determined to be not viable and potentially misleading. The survey’s reliability rests on its 
capacity to enable qualified participants to accurately provide their insights and expertise to a 
significant aspect of the O&G industry; with global strategic implications. The answers provide 
a refinement of the key drivers for hydrocarbon development in the Russia’s Kara Sea. Simple 
scoring to the questions were tabulated as well as substantive findings, summarized in the 
following results section, which can serve as points of departure for further discussion (Litwin 
2003, 45-50). Note: The survey-interview project went through review for ethical considerations 
by the University of Alaska Office of Research Integrity and was exempted by the Institutional 
Review Board; it is also included in Appendix A.
5.2 Survey-interview results
5.2.1 Self-characterization by participants
The first four of the 15 survey-interview questions were designed to characterize the 
participants. Much of the detailed information on working with the Russians resides in the oil 
industry which has had an enduring relationship with Russian partners for over a century. 
Therefore, much effort was placed on gaining input from within that industry. Experience fell in 
two general categories; O&G industry (to include major IOCs, service support and regulation) 
and academic-research expertise (though there is much overlap of individual experience in those 
categories, e.g. an academic consulting for industry). Results were roughly split with 12 
participants primarily associated with industry (to include government positions engaged in 
regulating or monitoring the industry) and 16 with academia (of those predominantly within 
social sciences, but also petroleum engineering, oceanography, economics and geoscience). The 
majority of participants were in senior positions, whether in academia, industry or government 
with expertise in the offshore Arctic and / or the Russia O&G enterprise. The questions and 
tabulated results for questions 1-4 are included in Figure 5.1 below.
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1. Would you characterize your expertise and insight into hydrocarbon exploration and production in 
Arctic offshore regions as:
11 A Extensive and specific to the offshore oil and gas industry in the Arctic
7 B Within broad professional scope but not necessarily Arctic focused
7 C Solid grounding in Arctic issues but not necessarily specific to hydrocarbon extraction
4 D Other and/or further comment:
Researcher comment: Generally solid, and/or rare hands on expertise by a majority (one respondent provided  
two positive responses).
2. Would you characterize your experience in working with Russian firms in the oil and gas industry or 
regulatory authorities as:
6 A Extensive
6 B Somewhat tertiary
12 C Little experience
4 D Other and/or further comment:
Researcher comment: Boring down, about ha lf the respondents have at least some experience engaging Russian 
oil industry firm s and regulators, but ha lf do not.
3. Would you characterize your expertise and insight into hydrocarbon extraction efforts in the Kara Sea 
as:
2 A Specific and extensive for that region
16 B Well informed, but not in high detail for that specific region
10 C Other and/or further comment:
Researcher comment: M ost consider they are well informed on the relevant issues but not to a high degree o f  
detail and specificity when further discriminating to a Kara Sea focus.
4. Do you have previous experience in partnering or otherwise had a working relationship with Russian
011 and gas corporations or supporting service companies in Arctic offshore areas?
3 A Yes, significant engagement
9 B Yes, but tertiary or to a minor extent
11 C No
5 D Other and/or further comment
Researcher comment: Three self-identify with significant experience in this subset, with a majority indicating at 
least some experience.
Figure 5.1 Tabulated results for self-characterization questions
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5.2.1.1 Highlights of self-identified expertise
These highlights are abridged, edited and arranged to give a sense of participant 
expertise.
Hydrocarbon exploration and production in the Arctic offshore
-  Offshore O&G work in Alaska’s Beaufort Sea and Greenland
-  Shipboard service in the Beaufort Sea and off Newfoundland, Labrador, Baffin Island, Baffin Bay and
Northwest Greenland
-  Embarked research on Russian icebreakers in Arctic waters
-  Oversight of research on Arctic energy
-  Geology and geophysics of O&G offshore exploration and production
-  Interaction between O&G companies and indigenous Russian people
-  Expertise on the ice and ocean conditions of the Kara Sea and the neighboring Pechora Sea and the Gulf
of Ob
-  Work in the Russian Arctic shelf
-  Subsurface mapping of hydrocarbon systems
-  Environmental, socio-economic, traditional knowledge and ice issues
Engagement with Russian/FSU O&G industry
-  Employment with TNK/BP (until 2008)
-  Employment with TNK/BP (until 2008)
-  Research on Russian oil and gas firms
-  Support for oil projects on Sakhalin, ENI and consulting with US companies on operations in the 
Russian Arctic
-  Work with Russian engineering colleagues engaged on Russian proj ects
-  Work with Russians regulatory agencies and the Northern Sea Route (NSR)
-  Engagement with Russian companies and regulators as an NGO activist
-  Familiarity with Russian with Rosneft’s offshore projects
-  Interviews with Russian hydrocarbon companies
-  Experience with Sakhalin and Kara Sea operations
-  Work with US companies to set up Joint Ventures (JV) in Russia
-  Work with Gazprom Naft and discussions with Rosneft
-  Work with a team supporting Western O&G companies in the Kara Sea
-  Work with maritime icebreaking operators supporting Russian O&G industry
-  Work with Surgutneftegas input to support contributions to aboriginal / indigenous peoples’ budgets
Arctic affairs expertise
-  Arctic legal studies researcher
-  Northern Sea Route researcher
-  Participant in Arctic Council forums
Figure 5.2 Offshore, Russian industry and other Arctic experience
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5.2.2 Substantive questions
The substantive questions were designed to gain insight from what the participant experts 
considered to be the key drivers impacting Russian success in the Arctic offshore. Explored 
were the capacity of Russia to incorporate the most advanced industry expertise and the specifics 
of the necessary technology. Also targeted were the character of the business details in 
partnering with Russian firms for these projects and the impact of international sanctions on 
Russian Arctic offshore hydrocarbon objectives. In a macro sense, what can influence Russian 
offshore developments and adherence to standards outside direct JVs with the IOCs? Also of 
interest were views on the long-term impact of sanctions and to get a sense from this expert 
group of their own views of the drivers of hydrocarbon development in the Arctic offshore. 
Specifically, what degree is the current drop in the price of oil inhibiting strategic investment in 
Arctic offshore oil and gas exploration? What other source or change in market dynamics will 
reduce demand for the development of offshore Arctic hydrocarbons? More than one response 
was permitted for each substantive question (5-14) as was not answering a question. Question 
#15, the final question, was simply a catch all to allow for open venting and recommendations 
for research sources. The following results are not stand alone “facts” but data from uniquely 
knowledgeable respondents to help guide further research. The findings listed below for each 
substantive question are edited and not correlated to individuals. Neither are the comments 
prioritized or presented in hierarchical form.
5.2.2.1 Tabulated results and (substantive questions 5-15)
The substantive comments are edited, highlights for each question to ensure the raw 
results were de-identified as required by IRB exemption.
Question # 5. Among the International Oil Companies (IOCs), such as ExxonMobil, which 
strengths would you consider best complement Russian corporations such as Rosneft, in joint 
venture efforts in Arctic offshore regions?
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IOC Strengths
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25 High-Technology 
21 Managerial expertise 
17 Inve stment capital 
6 Other and/or further comment:
Researchers comment: Of value to note that “capital” does not trump all in these results.
Figure 5.3 IOC strengths
Question #5 Substantive Comments:
• Technology and management expertise is the key. Capital can come from elsewhere, 
like India and China.
• ExxonMobil has strengths in all areas to include high tech, investment and offshore 
project management expertise which is of importance & direct relevance to Rosneft 
and other Russian oil and gas companies. Management of a large Arctic project 
requires unique expertise that ExxonMobil has (and Rosneft does not). Western 
technology & knowhow are essential to development of the Russian Arctic offshore.
• Technology management and capital are all important, but also important is the 
confidence to carry out exploration and development. Russia has everything it needs 
and/or could buy or borrow but lacks confidence. IOCs are less threatening to 
existing oligarchy within Russia who tend to believe they can control IOCs; whereas 
they cannot control upstarts like Yukos (Khodorkovsky’s).
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• IOCs add expertise in risk management to include environmental protection. 
Especially significant are the capacity to contribute to wildlife monitoring and marine 
mammal safety before, during and after operations.
• The overriding key strength that select IOCs bring to a joint venture is a safety culture 
mindset.
Question #6. Among the National Oil Companies (NOCs), such as only one example, Petroleos, 
do you see adequate strengths, which could replicate IOC participation and assistance to Russian 
hydrocarbon objectives in the Arctic offshore regions?
4 A Yes
10 B No
9 C Yes, but to a limited extent
4 D Other and/or further comment:
Researchers comment: Unclear if ExxonMobil can be replicated in the Kara Sea, but perhaps telling 
that no named alternative is offered that is not also following a sanctions regime such as Norway’s 
Statoil. Only three participants have a strong position that IOC contribution could be replicated.
Figure 5.4 Do NOCs have adequate strengths?
Question #6 Substantive Comments:
• Of the NOCs, only Statoil could really help the Russians (and Norway’s
regulatory policy closely adheres to EU sanction criteria). Pemex, PDVSA and
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Petrobas for example, do not have experience or expertise in Arctic operations. 
None of the NOCs, especially Venezuela’s Petroleos, have the technical expertise 
and experience to operate in the Arctic. Some such as Brazil’s Petrobras are 
embroiled in scandal and controversy; others such as Saudi Aramco and Sinopec 
do not have the relevant technology or Arctic expertise to assist the Russians 
without IOC expertise in the Arctic, the NOCs would not do well financially or 
technologically in the region, at least in the short and probably mid-term. The 
Chinese NOCs could reasonably replicate much in the long term (10-15 years) but 
could help in the short and mid-term with economic trade-offs and capital.
• Very few NOCs have the required Arctic expertise and technology portfolio for 
Arctic conditions. Statoil is in a position to explore safely, responsibly and 
manage joint ventures to a high standard.
• Among service O&G companies, Halliburton and Schmalberg could provide 
much of what is needed in Kara Sea development (but not on same scale as the 
major IOCs).
• Other NOCs have limited experience in Arctic specific operations. Overall there 
is little such experience in the world and a large percentage is with Western IOCs 
or Western consulting firms.
• Russia is committed to continue. At the highest levels, Russia will soldier on, 
with or without the US (and Western IOCs currently restricted by sanctions).
Question #7. Do you feel the impact of international sanctions on cooperation with Russian 
corporations in Arctic offshore hydrocarbon projects will have a continued significant impact on 
suspended, curtailed or new cooperation even if they were lifted?
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Will sanctions have long term impact?
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I  Y e s -  in long term
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9 A Yes, in the short term (two years)
13 B Yes in the mid-term (two to five years)
4 C Yes, likely to have an impact for a decade or more
1 D No
2 E Other and/or further comment:
Researchers comment: A Majority believe that there will be a lingering “sanction effect” but 
disagreement on how long.
Figure 5.5 Long-term impact of sanctions
Question #7 Substantive Comments:
• Corporations big enough and competent enough to work offshore in the Arctic 
will not prematurely risk renewed sanctions until they are sure they will not 
return. And it will take time to reschedule shipping and service contracts. Should 
sanctions remain in place over an extended period of time, there may be long-term 
effects from new companies, such as from Asia, coming to the Arctic and 
replacing Western ones. If they do, these new players will not go away just 
because sanctions are lifted. Markets will be restructured.
• The larger companies, like ExxonMobil, will get back in the saddle very quickly 
in an attempt to recover some of their losses inflicted as a result of the sanctions. 
Smaller companies have always been reluctant to enter the Russian market. That 
market is for the large IOCs that can offset the risks of operating in Russia. The
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select few Western IOCs that had joint ventures with Rosneft or Gazprom before 
the sanctions should be able to re-establish a similar degree of cooperation.
• The longer the sanctions are in place the longer the delay of application of the key 
technology and Arctic expertise needed to fully develop the Kara Sea offshore 
fields.
• The Russians cannot develop these fields without foreign investment and 
technology. That investment will remain to some degree dependent upon political 
stability and credible guarantees of long-term contract enforcement.
• Both Rosneft and ExxonMobil want to continue. However, Russian leadership 
has stated publically that it is not certain it can any longer trust the US in terms of 
continuity and stability in commercial sense. There may be a continued 
geopolitical impact on business contracts.
• Russia looks at economics differently from the west. They have a history, going 
back to the Soviet era, of massive investment on questionable economic viability, 
if  for a greater strategic policy objective, and perhaps economically sound in the 
long term as well (the development of Western Siberia in the 1960s for example). 
Development of its offshore hydrocarbon reserves is at the center of the Russian 
Federation’s Arctic strategy and effort will continue without Western 
engagement, though not as rapidly.
• Sanctions need to be put in a larger context. Russian anger with the West may 
persist for years, but the Russians will likely be happy to welcome back IOCs. 
Money will help make animosity disappear. It is largely dependent on how long. 
If only another year or so of sanctions, things will likely bounce back pretty 
rapidly. However, if  longer than more difficult. So it is a function of time.
Question #8. Do you feel hydrocarbon extraction governance structures and compliance with 
international safety and environmental standards in Russian Arctic offshore regions will be 
impacted by a curtailment/reduction in engagement with IOC partners?
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14 A Yes, significantly
7 B No, not significantly
7 C Other and/or further comment:
Researchers comment: The majority, but not all, see a negative effect for the environment.
Figure 5.6 IOC impact on HSE standards
Question #8 Substantive Comments:
• Environmental and safety standards have probably improved since Western IOCs 
began working in Russia (Sakhalin, Pechora and Kara Sea). Standards could 
lapse significantly during the period of sanctions.
• Russian Health Safety and Environment (HSE) standards are generally perceived 
as lax and poorly enforced. Corruption and bribery were seen as common despite 
regulations that looked good on paper. Flaring incidence was noted as very high 
though illegal in Russian regulation. In contrast, Western companies, especially 
the larger IOCs, operate HSE in Russia in common with international global 
practice.
• Compliance in Russia must be tied to enforceable and meaningful penalties. If 
it’s less painful to do it right than it is to pay the penalty and cut corners, 
exploration and production in Russia’s offshore region will be done within 
international best practice standards. This will be a challenging goal. Sound,
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formal international standards should be adopted worldwide, including Russia, to 
ensure the best HSE standards are applied to ensure risk mitigation.
• Some reduction in standards may apply. However, it would be surprising if 
Russian Gazprom Neft or Rosneft would be able to operate in these areas without 
any participation of the IOCs. If they would be, Russian laws would apply to the 
projects, meaning a deviation from international standards in the areas of 
insurance policies (value taken out of project budgets such as occurred at 
Gazprom’s Prirazlomnoye drill site in the Pechora Sea), which possibly might 
lower the adherence to HSE standards.
• IOCs contribute expertise in environmental protection, ice management in 
addition to risk and project management, and oil spill prevention. Examples 
include; ice-monitoring and management, safe drilling and reservoir management 
expertise (subsurface geo-pressure management); environmental impact 
assessments, risk assessments and mitigation measures.
• There will likely be a moderate impact on HSE standards compliance if IOC 
partners remain outside and/or are curtailed. The IOCs certainly bring the latest 
Western HSE standards and knowledge of sustainability to the Russian Arctic. 
However, Russian companies must meet many of the same international standards 
with or without IOC involvement. There is a key question of enforcement by the 
Russian government authorities who may be more proactive when there is IOC 
presence within an Arctic offshore project. There would be some pressure to bear 
within the Arctic Council (which is solely focused on cooperation in sustainable 
development & environmental protection) if  Russia took a ‘go it alone’ approach 
to offshore safety/environmental protection issues.
• Most large international companies working in this difficult part of the world 
realize that any break of governance compliance will have a negative collective 
effect on all players in the region.
• It may also depend, especially with continued sanctions, on the safety technology 
of Asian companies that may serve as replacements for Western IOCs on projects. 
Safety culture in Russia is weak, but it may be improved under international 
pressure in the Arctic.
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• It depends on who the new joint venture partners are. Not all large IOCs have the 
highest safety and environmental standards built into their operations.
• IOCs can help in harmonizing standards and reducing geopolitical tensions.
• Partnerships and relationships with international reputable organizations are also
an important consideration factor (note: point being that it is not solely IOCs who 
can influence the nature of standard working practices).
Question #9. Is the current drop in the price of oil inhibiting strategic (long-term) investment in 
Arctic offshore oil and gas exploration?
18 A Yes
6 B No
3 C Yes, and to a greater degree in Russia than other Arctic offshore regions 
3 D Other and/or further comment:
Researcher comment: Though a large majority say yes, and the wording of the question is clear, 
comment responses seem to indicate a short-term focus.
Figure 5.7 Is the low price of oil inhibiting investment?
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Question #9 Substantive Comments:
• In the short term, and possibly mid-term, low oil prices are inhibiting 
development in terms of cash flow and capital budgeting, Arctic oil, and 
especially gas, presently are off the table. But there is an understanding that the 
multinationals need large reserve of traditional crude oil that are available 
nowhere else in the world. The competition for oil reserves will continue, 
regardless of price, as long as oil is the primary power source. Nonetheless, the 
low oil price will delay activities in the Russian Arctic because of tight cash flow.
• However, IOCs with strong balance sheets will continue to explore in the Arctic 
because the Arctic may be the only area that is able to give them a large reserve 
find. Exploration of energy reserves in the Arctic is a very long-term endeavor 
and not likely to change exploration long term. For example, ExxonMobil is more 
of a long strategic thinker among oil companies because of its size and looks to 
replace reserves in a 10-15 year cycle. If development starts now, the long lead 
times necessary to bring on new crude oil production from the Russian Arctic 
would coincide with a long term expected decline of world production. This 
varies though among O&G IOCs dependent on their need for revenue. Some 
IOCs are slashing budgets for the Arctic.
• The impact is dependent as well on how long oil prices stay low. It is a safe bet 
investment will continue, but at a slower rate, if  prices remain depressed for a 
long time.
• In general, another distinction may be that current oil prices have had more of an 
impact on IOCs, as they are driven by economics, than Russian NOCs, which 
have more of a national strategic perspective. Low oil prices impact investment 
in Russia by Russians less than in other countries.
• From the sovereign state perspective Russia and Norway also have long-term 
strategies for developing Arctic offshore oil and gas. Arctic frontier exploration 
today will likely yield economic production some two decades out, so this 
exploration/investment is strategic in practice.
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• Fracking, particularly in the US will have short-term (10-15 years) implications 
for Arctic hydrocarbon development. But large Arctic finds (especially for oil) 
will still be significant contributors to the global hydrocarbon economy.
Question #10. If legal restrictions on working with Russian oil and gas enterprises were lifted, 
how confident are you with partnering with Russian joint ventures compared to other potentials 
on the globe?
5 A Highly confident and comfortable (limited-to research in one case)
15 B Somewhat reserved 
4 C Not confident
5 D Other and/or further comment:
Researcher note: Measured after effect of sanctions seen by significant majority.
Figure 5.8 Confidence in engaging in Russia
Question #10 Substantive Comments:
• High risk high reward, not unlike many countries. The question of whether more 
so in Russia than elsewhere depends on whether the ‘elsewhere’ is, for example, 
North America or Greenland?
• BP made a lot of money in Russia, but it was very difficult, and the legal system 
was corrupt. Russian laws can change without much notice. But there is big
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money to be made. Lots of risks, but potentially big rewards. The biggest 
detractors are that the economics of a project are not robust enough and lack of a 
firm and transparent legal framework.
• Russia has a history of realigning or turning over companies. An example is with 
Shell in the Sakhalin-2 project. Under the best conditions, Russian companies are 
difficult to trust.
• Large companies with a lot of clout should have no problem. Smaller companies 
(sub-contractors) may be more easily treated poorly from a regulatory and 
immigration point of view. Joint Ventures between the major Russian oil and gas 
companies can be re-established with the Western IOC with whom they partnered 
before the sanctions and will likely be evaluated on a case-by-case basis.
• There are always many questions regarding the Russian banking and court 
systems... .and the many roles of the Russian government in such joint ventures. 
No JV can feel comfortable working with the Putin regime in power. However, 
the importance of Russian Arctic oil and gas to Russia’s economy (GNP/GDP) 
means that many partnerships can be robust. The vastness and great potential of 
Russian Arctic offshore oil and gas cannot be overlooked by Western companies, 
so JVs will proceed again, if  cautiously, in the most promising regions.
• The IOCs tend to use internal expertise where possible and then contract to 
Russian companies for local requirements.
Question #11. How much influence has your answer to question (10.) been impacted by the 
series of sanctions targeting Russia begun in 2014?
6 A Significantly influence
15 B Not been a significant influence
7 C Other and/or further comment:
Researchers comment: The substantive comments for this question were incorporated within other 
responses elsewhere; neither were the results graphed as it became clear, on late review, that question 
#11 did not have standalone significance.
Figure 5.9 Influenced by sanctions
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Question #12. Do you believe the offshore Arctic hydrocarbon regions are the most quantifiably 
significant undiscovered and economically recoverable energy reserves within the next 30 years?
Is Arctic offshore most strategically siginficant reserves?
17 A Yes
 4_ B No
7 C Other and/or further comment:
Researcher comment: Clear majority see strategic value of Arctic hydrocarbons in global context.
Figure 5.10 Is the Arctic offshore the most strategic reserve?
Question #12 Substantive comments:
• Offshore Arctic and very deep water (like 10,000 feet) are significant and will 
likely undergo continued development during the next 30 years; both are also very 
difficult and expensive. But the onshore reserves in the Arctic regions are also 
significant and likely more recoverable in terms o f  cost, environmental impact 
and mature technology than offshore options.
• People, companies, even major IOCs can be intoxicated by the size of the prize 
before the economics are there. Sakhalin and Hibernia both took about 22 years 
to reach production in “normal” times (no sanctions). There needs to be high 
resource density, especially offshore because of the much greater cost of offshore 
drilling in Arctic conditions.
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• The Kara Sea, like much of offshore Arctic can appear lucrative in presentation 
graphs and bar charts, but the economics are not always there for production. A 
major impact on profitability often undervalued in analysis is the significance of 
the density of an oil field. Particularly for the difficult Arctic offshore region, 
broad expanses of even very large fields that are thinly spread require many 
hugely expensive wells. This geological but also “economic” factor has been 
under-valued. Nowadays, simply “booking reserves” for stock value purposes is 
a bit obsolete, it is also about whether the reserves are economical to produce.
• The Kara Sea is a bit like the Chukchi Sea in the sense that Shell (off Alaska) in 
2015 was hitting (exploring-drilling) a wide but thinly spread field. The most 
expensive component in the production chain is the “wells.” It will take many in 
such areas. Deposit may be too thin to be economical. In the Arctic offshore 
wells cost 8 times more offshore than onshore. Chukchi and Kara Sea wells 
would be about $400 mil each (by comparison a well at Prudhoe would be $60 
million).
• While the Arctic region holds the most hydrocarbon potential, the Arctic does not 
necessarily have the greatest energy reserves. There is the potential in solar 
energy in tropic and temperature regions as solar cells become more competitive. 
It is unknown how rapidly alternative energy will develop, but it may well 
compete and delay very expensive Arctic projects.
• Another unknown is where fracking will be 10 years from now. There could also 
be Russian shale oil or African shale oil projects coming on line with the 
technology recently developed in North America.
• The Arctic offshore region is undoubtedly a significant frontier for oil and gas 
exploration and development. However, most of the Arctic offshore is a gas 
province with only several key pockets of offshore oil likely; off Alaska and the 
Russian Arctic.
Question #13. What other source or change in market dynamics will reduce demand for the 
development of offshore Arctic hydrocarbons?
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5
13
12
12
A
B
C
D
Dramatic reduction in overall energy demand through conservation efforts or otherwise 
Rapid rise in the macro-economic viability of alternative energy sources (other than 
hydrocarbons)
Significant change in the macro-economic viability of non-traditional hydrocarbon supply 
Other and/or further comment:
Researcher comment: Few of the experts believe global supply/demand can be altered dramatically by 
political decision. Greater weighting was given to alternative energy (both hydrocarbon and non­
hydrocarbon) than the possibility of dramatically changing overall global demand.
Figure 5.11 What can reduce strategic demand?
Question #13 Substantive comments:
• Conservation can help, and already has helped. A contributing factor for 
conservation is the increased awareness and international collaboration on 
preserving Arctic ecosystems, and the potential international agreement to limit 
oil and gas extraction on that basis. Some alternative energy, like wind, are “real 
technologies” (not fantasies) and can reduce demand for gas. But liquid 
hydrocarbons will run the planet for a long time. As long as hydrocarbons are the 
cheapest alternative for fuels the majority of the developing world will use them. 
The International Energy Agency (IEA) projects that oil and gas will constitute 
74% of the global energy mix in 2040. This takes into account conservation 
efforts and the continued growth of renewable energy technologies. Furthermore,
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the IEA states that by 2040, the renewable energy sources will constitute 5% of 
the global energy mix (http://www.worldenergyoutlook.org/).
• A downturn or lack of growth in world economy due to shortage of other raw 
materials could force hydrocarbon conservation.
• Market economics will trump political decisions which have proven expensive 
and unreliable. War is a game changer—otherwise they will be developed. 
Conservation cannot keep pace with economic growth.
• As long as market dynamics keep the oil price low, below break- even prices, 
development projects in the Arctic will be limited. In the short term, current 
pricing/oversupply by OPEC and others will challenge Arctic development. 
Additionally, non-traditional hydrocarbon supplies from hydraulic fracking, 
particularly in the US, will have key, near-term negative implications for Arctic 
frontier offshore exploration and development. However, in the longer-term the 
potential of the Arctic offshore, especially for o/7, is very high and exploration 
will intensify. It remains much more unclear how Arctic gas will be explored and 
developed due to the regional nature and volatility of global gas prices. There are 
serious competitors to Arctic gas such as the Australia offshore (principally in 
Western Australia) which has a close major market in China. But oil is king in 
the Arctic offshore and if found is a much more valuable commodity on world 
markets with a much greater likelihood of being produced.
• The O&G industry and the international community need to be ready for big 
changes at a moment’s notice for something like the sudden explosion of the 
fracking revolution. There will be some alternative energy sources that may 
spread wildly that will significantly reduce the need for the amount of 
hydrocarbons we use today, even in the third world.
• There is a trend in O&G companies to disinvest from hydrocarbon alternatives.
• The immense magnitude of global energy needs is often difficult to comprehend. 
Every day consumers around the world use more than 92 million barrels of oil and 
liquid. A helpful perspective is the example from the Hebron development 
offshore eastern Canada. Hebron is among the largest engineering projects 
underway anywhere in the world and after five years of construction at a cost of
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$14 billion is scheduled to start up in 2017. The immense facility is expected to 
produce oil for three decades. This energy project is expected to produce about 
700 million barrels of oil over the course of 30 years. That total amount of oil 
Hebron will supply is equivalent to about eight days o f  current global oil 
requirements.
Question #14. Do you feel the greatest obstacle to developing Russia’s offshore hydrocarbons 
is?
Greatest obstacle to developing Russia's offshore?
14 A Geopolitical (such as current sanctions, but also in a broader perspective)
11 B Technological
10 C Economic viability (compared to alternative sources)
6 D Competiveness of other hydrocarbon investment opportunities 
3 E Uncertainty in forecasting the Arctic offshore environment (patterns of climate change)
3 F Other and/or further comment:
Researcher note: Geopolitics stood out in tabulation. Technological and economic viability also all 
weighed as significant for most.
Figure 5.12 What is the greatest obstacle to developing the Russian offshore?
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Question #14 Substantive Comments:
• The technology needed exists or can and will be developed. In the long term the 
Russians will be not be deterred by international opinion or Western influence. 
Climate change may potentially make it easier with increased open water seasons 
and access.
• The economics are the biggest challenge and current sanctions have made it even 
more difficult. But if  they can come up with sound economics—it will be done. 
Sustained high oil prices will be required, which is an unknown, and the biggest 
risk.
• Trust in the reliability and stability of partners and the ruling political regime is 
lacking. Your partner could currently be in favor with the government, but then, 
unpredictably, have licenses blocked once it has fallen out of favor. Even in the 
best of times Russian laws and regulations governing the O&G industry are 
complex, often unclear and open to uncertain interpretation and implementation.
• A stable long-term arrangement in terms of governance, royalties, etc. is essential 
to permit long-term strategic partnerships needed for Joint Ventures; oil prices 
need to be sufficient to attract private sector investments, but even if prices are 
relatively low, it may be possible to develop i f  the fields are large enough. 
Fracking has made tight oil a strong competitor; shale gas made Schtockman 
project non-viable by depressing NG prices. Very low oil prices could have a 
similar effect. Presently shale oil costs are high but new technology to reduce 
shale oil costs could have a significant effect.
• It is all about economics of global commodity prices and the competition of other 
oil and gas investment opportunities. There is fair certainty that the Russian 
Arctic offshore contains a bonanza of oil and gas and is potentially one the last 
and great frontier hydrocarbon regions on the planet. The geopolitical and 
technological challenges can be overcome and will not dominate (drive) the 
plausible futures/scenarios. The changes in Arctic sea ice and other 
environmental factors (due to anthropogenic global warming) will provide greater 
marine access and potentially longer seasons of exploration but these changes are 
not the primary drivers of investment and development.
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• The economic viability of Arctic development is challenged by operating 
conditions and the need for updated regulations that reflect arctic conditions. The 
arctic environment poses some different challenges relative to other oil and gas 
production areas, but is generally well understood, especially in the shelf areas 
with current interest. The O&G industry has a long history of over ninety years of 
successful operations in arctic conditions enabled by continuing technology and 
operational advances.
Question #15. Please feel free to provide any additional insight that you feel might contribute to
this study and/or suggested resources (e.g. studies, analysis, documents released to the public).
Comments:
• Developments along the Northern Sea Route (NSR) will also provide 
infrastructure and vessels (e.g. icebreaker, support vessels, etc.). These strategic 
investments will also support potential developments of offshore oil and gas.
• There was no mention of indigenous peoples, who are affected by offshore 
developments when onshore facilities and pipelines are constructed, as well as 
when operations, transportation and pollution affect fisheries. Campaigns relating 
to Indigenous Peoples’ rights can affect a company’s ability to operate, aside from 
the fact that companies should respect and be aware of the indigenous and local 
populations living in an area of operations.
• The Circum-Arctic Resource Assessment (CARA) effort needs to be redone with 
better data to reduce uncertainty. The error biases are huge.
5.3 Consolidated observations - key findings
(1) IOCs provide critical technology, investment and management. ExxonMobil specifically 
can provide unique capacity in very large and complex offshore projects undertaken in 
Arctic conditions.
(2) IOCs also bring expertise to Russian projects in risk management a safety mindset. 
Examples include; ice-monitoring and management, safe drilling and reservoir 
management expertise (subsurface geo-pressure management); environmental impact
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assessments, risk assessments and mitigation measures. Also significant are the capacity to 
contribute to wildlife monitoring and marine mammal safety.
(3) The larger companies, like ExxonMobil, will get back in the saddle very quickly in an 
attempt to recover some of their losses inflicted as a result of sanctions. Smaller companies 
have always been reluctant to enter the Russian market. That market is for the large IOCs 
that can offset the risks of operating in Russia. The select few Western IOCs that had JVs 
with Rosneft or Gazprom before the sanctions should be able to re-establish a similar 
degree of cooperation.
(4) Of the NOCs, only Statoil could really help the Russians in the short to mid-term (and 
Norway’s regulatory policy closely adheres to EU sanction criteria). None of the other 
NOCs have the technical expertise and experience to operate in the Arctic on a large scale. 
But the Chinese and other NOCs may be able to replicate much in the long term.
(5) Russia is committed to continue. At the highest levels, Russia will soldier on, with or 
without the US (and Western IOCs currently restricted by sanctions). The effort will 
continue without Western engagement, though not as rapidly.
(6) Corporations big enough and competent enough to work offshore in the Arctic will not 
prematurely risk renewed sanctions until they are sure they will not be reinstated. Should 
sanctions remain in place over an extended period of time new companies, such as from 
Asia, could replace Western ones and restructure markets.
(7) Russia looks at economics different from the West. They have a history, going back to the 
Soviet era, of massive investment on questionable economic viability, if  for a greater 
strategic objective (the development of Western Siberia in the 1960s for example).
(8) Russian HSE standards are generally perceived as lax and poorly enforced in this study. 
Corruption and bribery were seen as common despite regulations that looked good on 
paper.
(9) Environmental and safety standards have probably improved since Western IOCs began 
working in Russia (Sakhalin, Pechora and Kara Sea) and could lapse significantly during 
the period of sanctions. Compliance in Russia as elsewhere in the world must be tied to 
enforceable and meaningful penalties.
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(10) Most IOCs working in this difficult part of the world (Arctic) realize that any break of 
governance compliance will have a negative effect on all players in the region. IOCs can 
be a factor in harmonizing standards and reducing geopolitical tensions.
(11) In the short term and possibly mid-term low oil prices are inhibiting development in terms 
of cash flow and capital budgeting. But the multinationals need large reserve adds that are 
available nowhere else in the world. The competition for oil reserves will continue, 
regardless of price, as long as oil is the primary power source. Nonetheless, the low oil 
price will delay activities in the Russian Arctic.
(12) IOCs with good balance sheets will continue to explore in the Arctic because the Arctic 
may be the only area that is able to give them a large reserve find. Exploration of energy 
reserves in the Arctic is a very long-term endeavor. For example, ExxonMobil is more of a 
long strategic thinker among oil companies because of its size and looks to replace reserves 
in a 10-15 year cycle. If development starts now, the long lead times necessary to bring on 
new crude oil production from the Russian Arctic would coincide with a long term 
expected decline of world production. But this perspective varies though among IOCs 
depending on their need for revenue.
(13) Another distinction may be that low oil prices may have more of an impact on IOCs as they 
are driven by economics more than Russian NOCs who have more of a national strategic 
perspective. Low oil prices impact investment in Russia by Russians less than in other 
countries.
(14) Fracking, particularly in the US will have short-term competitive implications for Arctic 
hydrocarbon development, but large Arctic finds (especially for oil) will still be viable to 
the global hydrocarbon economy. It is unknown where fracking will be 10 years from now. 
There could also be Russian shale oil or African shale oil projects coming on line with the 
technology recently developed in North America.
(15) The Russian Arctic offshore is high risk high reward, not unlike the O&G business in many 
countries. The question of whether more so in Russia than elsewhere depends on whether 
the ‘elsewhere’ is, for example, North America or Greenland? Investment will remain to 
some degree dependent upon global comparative political stability and credible guarantees 
of long-term contract enforcement.
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(16) The offshore Arctic hydrocarbon reserves and very deep water (10,000 feet) are significant 
globally and will likely undergo continued development during the next 30 years; but both 
are also very difficult and expensive. The onshore reserves in the Arctic regions are also 
significant and may be more recoverable in terms of cost, environmental impact and mature 
technology than offshore options.
(17) People, companies, even major IOCs can be intoxicated by the size of the prize before the 
economics are there. Sakhalin and Hibernia both took about 22 years to reach production 
in “normal” times (no sanctions). There needs to be high resource density $offshore 
because of the much greater cost of offshore drilling in Arctic conditions.
(18) The Kara Sea is a bit like the Chukchi Sea in the sense that Shell (off Alaska) in (2015) was 
hitting (exploring-drilling) a wide but thinly spread field. The most expensive component 
in the production chain is the “wells.” It will take many in such areas. Deposit may be too 
thin to be economical. In general, the Arctic offshore wells cost 8 times more offshore than 
onshore. Chukchi and Kara Sea wells would be about $400 mil each (by comparison a well 
at Prudhoe would be $60 million).
(19) While the Arctic region holds the most hydrocarbon potential, the Arctic does not 
necessarily have the greatest energy reserves. There is the potential in solar energy in 
tropic and temperature regions as solar cells become more competitive. It is unknown how 
rapidly alternative energy will develop, but it may well compete and delay very expensive 
Arctic projects.
(20) The Arctic offshore region is undoubtedly a significant frontier region for oil and gas 
exploration and development. However, most of the Arctic offshore is a gas province with 
only several key pockets of offshore oil likely in the Alaska and the Russian Arctic 
offshore regions.
(21) Conservation can help reduce demand for Arctic hydrocarbons. A contributing factor for 
conservation is the increased awareness and international collaboration on preserving 
Arctic ecosystems, and the potential international agreement to limit oil and gas extraction 
on that basis. Some alternative energy, like wind, are “real technologies” (not fantasies) 
and can reduce demand for gas. But liquid hydrocarbons will run the planet as long as 
hydrocarbons are the cheapest fuel alternative; especially true for the developing world.
The International Energy Agency (IEA) projects that oil and gas will constitute 74% of the
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global energy mix in 2040. This takes into account conservation efforts, and the continued 
growth of renewable energy technologies. Furthermore, the IEA states that by 2040, the 
renewable energy sources will constitute only 5% of the global energy mix.
(22) In the short term current pricing / oversupply by OPEC and others will challenge Arctic 
development. However, in the longer-term the potential of the Arctic offshore, especially 
for oil, is very high and exploration will likely intensify. The market viability of Arctic 
offshore gas development remains much more unclear.
(23) The immense magnitude of global energy needs is often difficult to comprehend. Every 
day consumers around the world use more than 92 million barrels of oil and liquid. For 
perspective the Hebron development offshore eastern Canada is among the largest 
engineering projects underway anywhere in the world. After five years of construction at a 
cost of $14 billion is scheduled to start up in 2017. The immense facility is expected to 
produce oil for three decades. The project is expected to produce about 700 million barrels 
of oil over the course of 30 years. That total production over a 30-year span will supply the 
equivalent of eight days of current global oil requirements.
(24) The Arctic environment poses some different challenges relative to other oil and gas 
production areas, but is generally well understood, especially in the shelf areas with current 
interest. The O&G industry has a long history of over ninety years of successful operations 
in arctic conditions.
(25) Infrastructure developments along the Northern Sea Route are strategic investments that 
will also support development of offshore oil and gas.
(26) Campaigns relating to Indigenous Peoples’ rights can affect a company’s ability to operate, 
aside from the fact that companies should respect and be aware of the indigenous and local 
populations living in an area of operations.
(27) The Circum-Arctic Resource Assessment (CARA) effort needs to be redone with better 
data to reduce uncertainty.
5.4 Conclusions from survey-interview
Russia has and can be expected to continue to attempt to mitigate the impact of sanctions
by seeking capital investment and managerial offshore expertise elsewhere. If sanctions are
lifted, indications are that Russia’s Rosneft will rebuild efforts with its US Joint Venture partner
91
ExxonMobil. A necessary shift to other partners, such as from China or Venezuela, has been 
featured heavily in the press. This survey provides data that highlight the complexity and 
difficulty of a “shift of partners.” Technology and management expertise is key. Expertise is not 
as liquid as capital, especially in the short term and mid-term. Though a clear majority of 
respondents believe the offshore Arctic hydrocarbon regions are the most quantifiably significant 
global undiscovered and economically recoverable energy reserves there is reason for caution (in 
an investment sense). It can perhaps be overly optimistic to focus on the magnitude of Arctic 
offshore reserves and underestimate the economic risk and complexity of forecasting market 
demand. The need for high resource density, especially offshore, is a factor often overlooked.
This survey of experts indicated that a majority believed hydrocarbon extraction 
governance structures and compliance with international safety and environmental standards in 
Russian Arctic offshore regions would be negatively impacted by a curtailment of engagement 
with IOC partners. Historically, distinctions that characterize the Russian hydrocarbon industry 
are a relative lack of the most-advanced offshore techniques (compared to the best of the IOCs) 
and in general a lack of adherence to a steady and consistent legal enforcement standards and this 
was reinforced by the study. It remains in a definitive sense unclear if  ExxonMobil and other 
IOCs capacity to assist Rosneft and Russian State objectives in the Arctic offshore can be 
replicated, but perhaps telling that no named alternative was offered that is not also following a 
sanctions regime (Norway’s Statoil). Only 4 of 28 participants had a strong position that IOC 
contribution could be replicated.
Among respondents, a very clear majority of the experts believe that the current drop in 
the price of oil is inhibiting current strategic investment in Arctic offshore oil and gas 
exploration; but as could be expected, less certain is the long term investment trend. Some IOCs 
are still investing long term, but others are slashing budgets for the Arctic. The impact will 
depend on how long oil prices stay low. Geopolitical factors stood out in the survey as a 
significant driver for Russian Arctic offshore hydrocarbon development---though technological 
and economic viability all weighed as significant for most. Global hydrocarbon demand can be 
dramatically shaped by war, disaster or technological breakthroughs by energy alternatives; 
political agreements can impact demand but are not seen as the equal of the former. It is not a
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certainty that Russia’s strategic objective of developing its offshore Arctic hydrocarbon reserves 
will progress on the pace necessary to provide the GDP backbone to sustain geopolitical 
ambitions. Potentially, other elements in energy market dynamics could significantly delay that 
development, or even in the short to mid-term, mitigate its criticality to the Russian economy, 
such as a boom in the economic vitality of other extractive techniques in its onshore oil and gas 
fields. But achieving the production potential, particularly of traditional crude oil, from its Kara 
Sea reserves, remains a viable harbinger in assessing the capacity of Russian central state to 
finance its mid-century national strategic ambitions.
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Chapter 6 Circumpolar offshore Arctic hydrocarbon scenario development
6.1 Scenario workshop
As a means to augment this dissertation’s research with additional expert input into the 
scenario development process, a workshop was planned and incorporated into the research 
design. In collaboration with the University of the Arctic (UArctic) Extractive Industries 
Thematic Network PhD program, augmented by participants from the Institute of the North’s 
2015 Arctic Energy Summit, the “Scenario Offshore Development Workshop” was conducted by 
University of Alaska Fairbanks Graduate School on the 27th of September, 2015. The session 
was not of sufficient duration to fully develop or achieve all the steps of a scenario development 
process. However, the uniquely expert group of 31 participants, from academia, industry and 
government, was able to identify and rank 54 drivers to help frame further analysis.
A short presentation on the theory and history of scenario development was provided as 
an introduction to the session by the facilitator, Dr. Lawson Brigham (this researcher’s 
committee chair). The intent of the scenarios process is to identify and differentiate between key 
drivers that can influence future change from the predetermined elements that are assumed to 
hold relatively constant azimuths. Scenario futures are not attempts to forecast or predict linear 
projections into the future. Rather they are to best prepare future decisions makers for the range 
of uncertainties that can influence the future. The methodology developed by the Global 
Business Network (GBN) and utilized for the Arctic Council's (ACs) Arctic Marine Shipping 
Assessment was provided for background and context along with examples from that ground 
breaking process. Dr. Brigham outlined the parameters of the workshop and provided some 
basic rules. The discussion would be facilitated; it was not free ranging open discussion. Each 
participant was given the opportunity to nominate at least one key driver or uncertainty that they 
envisioned would significantly impact (or drive) the prospects of Arctic offshore hydrocarbon 
development. The scenario parameter of 25 years (2040) was utilized as it is a good general 
benchmark for a large offshore hydrocarbon project in Arctic conditions to cycle from an 
economically viable discovery to full production. What are the key drivers, forces and 
uncertainties for future Arctic offshore hydro development? Those nominated were recorded on 
butcher block (posters) and visible to all in the conference. The group identified 54 drivers and
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then had the opportunity to vote (maximum 10 votes per participant) on which were the most 
significant.
It is important to emphasize that the working group’s guidance was to consider 
circumpolar wide offshore hydrocarbon development, and was not limited to the Kara Sea. Both 
the researcher and Dr. Brigham determined a Kara Sea focus too narrow for this specific forum. 
The intent was to develop an Arctic wide scenario process to set the stage as well and to enrich 
subsequent and specific Kara Sea alternative futures (Chapter 7). It was believed an initial or 
baseline circumpolar framework of prioritized drivers formed by a group of experts external to 
the researcher’s own analysis would contribute a measure of validity. Participation and 
affiliation in the workshop is provided in Appendix B.
6.2 Workshop results
The 54 drivers of Arctic offshore hydrocarbon development identified and ranked by the 
workshop group are listed in the table below
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Table 6.1 Raw driver results and ranking by votes
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8. 
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
Power, safety issue — State power (12)
Ability of industry to foster best practices (11)
Global need for hydrocarbons (10)
Advances in technology (9)
Major oil spill accident (9)
Sea ice extent -  marine access (9)
Global price of oil (8)
Demonstrated failure of alternatives (8)
Greater knowledge of Arctic -  less development (8)
New discovery of hydrocarbons (7)
Newly discovered fields in easier location -  Gulf of Mexico (7)
Global political situation (e.g. Ukraine) 34. 
(6)
Environmental political pressure -  NGOs 35.
(6)
Russia-China conflict/friction (5) 36.
Indigenous sovereignty issues (4) 37.
Fresh water needed from Arctic for 38.
elsewhere in world—requires use of 
energy (4)
17. Regulatory environment (4) 39.
18. Infrastructure availability and 40.
development (4)
19. Economic growth in non-developed world 41.
(4)
20. Renewable growth energy growth (less 42.
hydrocarbon development (4)
21. Cost reducing technology for arctic 
hydrocarbons (4)
22. Technology in oil and gas industry (4) 44.
23. Native corporations (Alaska) (3) 45.
24. Global price of gas (3) 46.
25. War in Mideast (3) 47.
26. Industry access to capital (3) 48.
27. Future US-Russian relations (3) 49.
28. Social media evolution (small group 50.
influence) (3)
29. Increase in arctic populations -  more 
demand (3)
30. Emerging market-energy growth (2) 52.
31. World pop growth (2) 53.
32. End of shale gas rev (2) 54.
33. Continued of US EU sanctions (2)___________
Saudi policies in oil markets (2)
Regulatory speed (2)
Arctic land grab-seabed (2)
Food security (2)
Piracy and terrorism, more sensible/safer than 
elsewhere (2)
Carbon taxing in major economies (2) 
Leadership in oil in gas industry (2)
Insurance industry underwriting arctic (2)
New energy technologies--(e.g. fracking (1)
43. Large NGO protests (1)
Risk prevention capacity-ability (1)
Shift oil to NG globally (1)
Energy security access (1)
Political cooperation (1)
Ability to close knowledge gap through 
cooperation (1)
Securitization -  military (0)
Pope-religious leadership (0)
51. More arctic tourism (0)
CAN-US Keystone pipeline decisions (0) 
Long reach drilling-OCS (0)
Changes in employment in oil and gas—  
access to skilled employees (0)
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6.3 Workshop conclusion and refinement of drivers
The workshop concluded on 27 September, 2016, with the preceding combined list of 
ranked key drivers and uncertainties. Utilizing this initial phase as a framework, this researcher 
further refined the analysis borrowing from a process developed by GBN and utilized for 
AMSA's, The Future o f  the Arctic Marine Navigation in Mid-Century (GBN, 2007).
Other substantively relevant scenario projects were reviewed, particularly for 
applicability of method. The World Economic Forum’s Scenarios fo r  the Russian Federation 
(2013), The Future Availability o f  Natural Resources: a New Paradigm fo r  Global Resource 
Availability (2014) and Future Oil Demand Scenarios (2016) were all stimulating for 
envisioning detail and future indicators. The scenario method employed for “Barents Sea Oil 
and Gas 2025 (0verland et al. 2015),” was the closet reviewed to the GBN methodology 
employed in this dissertation, and also closest to the regional and thematic focus of this 
dissertation’s objectives. A notable difference in “method” was that the Barents’ scenarios did 
not employ the cross-axis approach of framing focused quadrants (as a tool for differentiating the 
narratives to follow) with the most relevant critical uncertainties; a step, derived from GBN, 
which this researcher considered a valuable process contribution.
The drivers previously identified in Table 6.1, were further tightened in wording to best 
meet the inferred intent of the workshop by this researcher. Those that were similar were 
combined and those with few votes parsed but not eliminated as they still have value for scenario 
narrative detail. For transparency, this refinement step is presented in Table 6.2.
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Table 6.2 Refining key drivers
#1 Power, safety issue — State power (12 votes) was reworded to State sovereignty (12
remains 12 votes). Note: wording was refined to best reflect expressed intent in group 
discussion.
#3 Global need for hydrocarbons (10 votes) + #8 Demonstrated failure of alternatives (8 
votes) = Global demand for hydrocarbons (combined 18 votes). Note: Refined driver best 
captures impact for a 25-year end state.
#9 Greater knowledge of Arctic -  less development (8 votes) + # 11 Environmental 
political pressure -  NGOs (6 votes) was reworded to = Environmental activism (17 votes 
combined).
#10. New discovery of hydrocarbons (7 votes) + #11 Newly discovered fields in easier 
location -  Gulf of Mexico (7 votes) = Discoveries in non-Arctic regions (14 votes 
combined).
#4 Advances in technology (9 votes) + #2 Cost reducing technology for Artic 
hydrocarbons (4 votes) + #22 Technology in oil and gas industry (4 votes) = Advances in 
extraction technology (17 votes combined). Note: Best captures scenario end state of 
driver.
#5 Ability of industry to foster best practices (11 votes) was reworded to Industry best 
practices for brevity (votes remain at 11).
#10 Global political situation (e.g. Ukraine) (6 votes) + #27 Future US-Russian relations
(3 votes) + # 33 Continued of US EU sanctions (2 votes) + #14 Russia-China
conflict/friction (5 votes) = were reworded and combined to form new driver; Geopolitical 
Influences (16 combined votes). Note: From a 25-year scenario perspective combined 
driver best weighs and captures sentiment.
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The refined top 10 key drivers are listed in Table 6.3 below. The remaining drivers 11 
through 46 were utilized to help stimulate detail in the creation of the scenario narratives 
(Chapter 7).
Table 6.3 Results of driver refinement
1. Global demand for hydrocarbons (18)
2. Environmental activism (17)
3. Advances in extraction technology (17)
4. Geopolitical Influences (16)
5. Discoveries in non-Arctic regions (14)
6. State sovereignty (12)
7. Industry best practices (11)
8. Major oil spill accident (9)
9. Sea ice extent -  marine access (9)
10. Global price of oil (8)
11. Indigenous sovereignty issues (4) 29. Food security (2)
12. Fresh water needed from Arctic for 
elsewhere in world—requires use of 
energy (4)
30. Piracy and terrorism, more sensible/safer 
than elsewhere (2)
13. Regulatory environment (4) 31. Carbon taxing in major economies (2)
14. Infrastructure availability and 
development (4)
32. Leadership in oil in gas industry (2)
15. Economic growth in non-developed 
world (4)
33. Insurance industry underwriting arctic (2)
16. Renewable growth energy growth (less 
hydrocarbon development (4)
34. New energy technologies--e.g. fracking 
(1)
17. Native corporations (Alaska) (3) 35. Large NGO protests (1)
18. Global price of gas (3) 36. Risk prevention capacity-ability (1)
19. War in Mideast (3) 37. Shift oil to NG globally (1)
20. Industry access to capital (3) 38. Energy security access (1)
21. Social media evolution (small group 
influence) (3)
39. Political cooperation (1)
22. Increase in arctic populations -  more 
demand (3)
40. Ability to close knowledge gap through 
cooperation (1)
23. Emerging market-energy growth (2) 41. Securitization -  military (0)
24. World pop growth (2) 42. Pope-religious leadership (0)
25. End of shale gas rev (2) 43. More arctic tourism (0)
26. Saudi policies in oil markets (2) 44. CAN-US Keystone pipeline decisions (0)
27. Regulatory speed (2) 45. Long reach drilling-OCS (0)
28. Arctic land grab-seabed (2) 46. Changes in employment in oil and gas----
access to skilled employees (0)
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6.3.1 Wildcards
Also identified by the researcher were “wildcards,” or drivers that have a low probability 
of happening, but if  they did occur, would have a dramatic causal effect. Therefore, in keeping 
with the scenario design parameters they were excluded.
• Strategic global war
• War in the Mideast (on the scale of dramatic regime changes or other severe instability to 
global core suppliers forcing withdrawal from the global oil market, e.g. Saudi Arabia)
• Disease, plague or other pathological occurrence of a global magnitude that rewrites 
energy demand; outside even the most modest expectations of economic growth
• Rapid change in global currents on a macro-level with enough effect to significantly 
change market dynamics
• Unpredicted cataclysmic atmospheric or geological event
• Discovery of a now unknown strategic energy source
6.3.2 Framing and defining linear endpoints
Endpoints were also identified for 10 linear axes shown below (Figure 6.1 and 6.2) from 
a 25-year perspective. For example, axis #1 global demand for hydrocarbons has endpoints 
defined by “decreased demand” and “global scarcity.” These endpoints help frame the later 
stage of narrative creation. This assessment process incorporated the methodology utilized by 
GBN in the AMS A project. Future importance and uncertainty for circumpolar Arctic offshore 
hydrocarbon development.
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1. Global demand for hydrocarbons
Decreased demand
(Alternatives become competitive, dramatic 
rise in efficiency)
Global scarcity
(More accessible reserves no longer- available. Arctic offshore 
“last place on earth” decline in global economy)
Development of the offshore Arctic regions is highly sensitive to global hydrocarbon demand. Though not as 
volatile as the “price” of oil, global energy demand, and specifically hydrocarbon demand approaching mid­
century, is central to the course of our civilization. As a driver of offshore Arctic hydrocarbon development, 
absent a wildcard or black swan event.
2. Environmental activism 
< ►
High sensitivity Tertiary regard
(Arctic uniqueness preserved) (Arctic development driven by market and nation-state
objectives)
Environmental awareness and its impact on Arctic and offshore development has demonstratively been a driver in 
the 21st century beyond the moral or ethical. It can, and has, derailed some of the largest extraction projects. But 
it is also dependent on the overall stability o f the international system.
3. Advances in extraction technology 
<--------------------------------------------------------------------------------►
Not economic Cost effective
(Advances in Arctic offshore hydrocarbon (Technology available and viable)
extraction technology not completive or as
competitive for the Arctic offshore)
The necessary technology to extract the hydrocarbons in the Arctic offshore to meet the mid-century strategic 
objectives of some of the largest IOCs and Arctic States exists. But it is not necessarily available at an 
economically competitive cost or shared in a collaborative manner across corporations and States.
4. Geopolitical influences
« *
Zero sum game International governance
(Unstable world order, high competiveness, (Stable, prosperous, orderly offshore development)
little industry integration)
War or peace? Perhaps the ultimate uncertainty. What is more assured is that the geopolitical drivers that will 
impact hydrocarbon extraction in the Arctic offshore, such as an internationally stable, collaborative, or even 
cooperative political structures---will be driven by global variables more than regional ones.
5. Discoveries in non-Arctic regions
New global reserves discovered No alternative
(New hydrocarbon discoveries reduce (The Arctic offshore is the last bastion of crude oil)
viability or cost-competiveness of Arctic
extraction)
Traditionally extracted crude oil is the primary driver. Gas extraction may follow in parallel however, 
economically viable, by being anchored with the infrastructure necessary to produce the crude oil. Twenty-five 
years is not necessarily a long time for energy based strategic planning. Projects of the scale needed to produce 
hydrocarbons from new reserves, such as in the Arctic offshore regions, in “good” times take about that much 
time (25 years) to bring into full production. Therefore, the likelihood of economically viable discoveries that 
will displace the value of the predicted but unproven Arctic offshore potential is assessed as low.
Figure 6.1 Framing the key drivers
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6. State sovereignty
Low maritime security Enforceable EEZs
(Strength of State sovereignty in the Arctic (Environmental regulations and internationally agreed standards 
offshore is weak) are rigorous)
The sovereignty axis of uncertainty implies a synergistic relationship with international standards, enforcement 
regimes and capacity to regulate. Enhanced sovereignty effectiveness is dependent on resources and 
infrastructure (paying for it), and determined need.
7. Industry best practices 
A ►
Weak standards Rigorous
(Ad hoc and regional variations) (International standards adhered to in all of Arctic offshore)
Corporate social responsibility is implied on this axis as well. High standards require high capital investment. The 
IOCs generally have the capacity to employ best practices commensurate with their technology, management and 
financial mass. NOCs have a more varied track record. Industry employment of best practices in the offshore 
Arctic is therefore measurably dependent on the degree or ratio of their involvement with the NOCs (particularly 
in Russia) which control the predominate share of the reserves. Another unknown factor is to what degree new 
emerging hydrocarbon capacity, in Chinese NOCs for example, can or will replicate current IOCs now operating.
8. Major oil spill accident 
A ►
Severe environmental damage Successfully contained
(International indignation) (Offshore development set a milestone for effective and
responsible development)
There is significant potential for a moratorium on offshore development in the Arctic if response to a major oil 
spill is ineffective. This could well hold true even if the hydrocarbon accident occurred elsewhere in the world 
with a project with no industry ownership or nation-state ties to the Arctic. This axis is also impacted by the 
stability of international, especially Arctic nation and industry, relations. The more stability, the more 
cooperative engagement in forums such as the Arctic Council, to have and to mature mitigation measures.
9. Sea ice extent -  marine access 
<--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- ►
Access remains difficult Seasonal access dramatically improved
(Little change in the next 25 years and/or (Arctic maritime transit and access much opened with
erratic weather patterns) lengthened summer season)
This axis focus is limited to hydrocarbon extraction in the Arctic offshore regions. Climate change impacts, such 
as an extending and predicable ice transit season, implies less economic extraction costs. However, the 
oscillations in the speed and variance of climate change for the maritime Arctic is difficult to predict.
10. Global price of oil
<--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- ►
Low High
(Low price, makes investment in Arctic (Arctic worth the cost of investment)
offshore development unviable)
The duration of oil prices is arguably as significant as the actual price. Strategic oil development for the mega 
projects needed are made on long-term projections of rate of global economic growth, geopolitical stability and 
other market variables---not simply “price” which has a symbiotic relationship with supply and demand.
Figure 6.2 Framing the key drivers continued
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6.3.3 Matrix development: assessing the critical uncertainties
The next phase of analysis assessed both the future importance and uncertainty of the key 
drivers for circumpolar Arctic offshore hydrocarbon development in the next 25 years. To 
progress to scenario narrative creation in Chapter 7, the critical uncertainty of a key driver was 
deemed of most value for the creation of matrices and to define quadrant outlines. If a driver 
was relatively certain, it was determined to have less inherent value in enriching future decision 
making processes. Various combinations of axes from the proceeding analyses of the top ten key 
drivers were crossed in pairs and evaluated for their utility in framing a set of future narratives. 
“Criteria for choosing the (final) matrix included plausibility, divergence, relevance and 
challenge—as well as the ‘right’ level of external forces” (Global Business Network 2007, 15). 
Six candidate matrix combinations were created by pairing and crossing the axes defined and 
developed in Figures 6.1 and 6.2.
Of the six matrices depicted in Figure 6.3, the two that were assessed as most critical and 
uncertain were #4 Global demand for hydrocarbons - Geopolitical influences; and #5 Global 
demand for hydrocarbon - State sovereignty. It was further assessed that while #5 (demand and 
sovereignty) could be incorporated as a subset into a scenario storyline framed by #4 (demand 
and geopolitics), the reverse was less the case. With the judgement that it promised the most 
utility for progression, the crossed matrix pairing of Global demand for hydrocarbons with 
Geopolitical influences was chosen for defining the four quadrants; the next and final step 
before narrative creation (Chapter 7). (Note: that for graphic display purposes the axis “Global 
demand for hydrocarbons” has been shortened to Demand for hydrocarbons.)
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Figure 6.3 Candidate matrix evaluation and final selection
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6.3.4 Framing of narrative quadrants
The final matrix (Figure 6.4) framed the assessed, two most critical uncertainties, to 
allow for an exploration of how causal factors (drivers) might interact in four closed complex 
systems. In each quadrant an overview of the causal factors (drivers) for a circumpolar offshore 
Arctic hydrocarbon future has been sketched out as well.
Figure 6.4 Scenarios for circumpolar offshore hydrocarbon development
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Chapter 7 Scenario narratives
7.1 Scenarios: alternative futures for hydrocarbon development in the Kara Sea
The results of the analysis in the preceding Chapter 6 included key driver analysis, 
identification of critical uncertainties, and matrix development for circumpolar offshore Arctic 
hydrocarbon development. Building on that effort, with the incorporation of details and key 
findings from the survey-interview effort presented in Chapter 5, more specific to the Russian 
offshore and the Kara Sea, the geographic context of the scenarios was narrowed. It was readily 
apparent with this step that no future model could focus on the Kara Sea, or even the Russian 
offshore region in isolation, and therefore, the regional centerpiece adopted was the western 
Russian maritime Arctic. The matrix and its four framed scenario story lines deemed most 
illustrative at the conclusion of Chapter 6’s analysis, Figure 6.4 “Scenarios for circumpolar 
offshore hydrocarbon development,” was the basis for this narrowing transition. Table 7.1 below 
represents that refinement. The framing uncertainties (axis) and their endpoints remained the 
same; Geopolitical Influences crossed with Hydrocarbon Demand. Figure 7.1 was the resultant 
and last process step for the four scenarios which follow.
Table 7.1 Circumpolar offshore tightened to western Russian maritime Arctic
Arctic Coast, 
Ltd
High hydrocarbon 
demand, cooperative 
geopolitical setting
Western Arctic 
Maritime Union
Feudal Arctic High demand and unstable governance Kara Industrial Security Region
Arctic Ronin Low demand in an insecure political 
environment
Special Export 
Zone Kara
Managed North Low demand market in a cooperative 
international system
Arctic Shelf 
Ecological Park
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Figure 7.1 Scenarios on Kara Sea offshore hydrocarbon development
7.2 Future for Kara Sea offshore hydrocarbon extraction
7.2.1 Western Arctic Maritime Union (WAMU)
2016-2025...Beginning from the end
The preceding decade was geopolitically the most turbulent for relations between the 
major world powers since the Cold War; and Russia was in the center of that disruption. The
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Georgian six-day war in 2008, followed by the annexation of Crimea and war in the Ukraine in 
2014, were not distant proxy confrontations but featured direct military engagement by the 
Russian Federation and sovereign states on its border---disrupting the seemingly peaceful 
progressing assumptions of decades of diplomacy. In a great part of the developing world long- 
festering global divisions remained energized with no predictable resolution to critical matters 
such as, e.g. Iranian re-entry in the international system and the balancing of severe social 
demand with regime objectives and capacity. And in 2014 the strategic hydrocarbon extraction 
plans of the world’s largest and most capable International Oil Corporation (IOC), its Russian JV 
partner, and the Russian Federation itself came to a highly visible abrupt halt in the Kara Sea. 
There, the first exploratory drilling of arguably the world’s greatest remaining undiscovered and 
recoverable strategic oil reserve showed initial high potential---then was shut down immediately 
by targeted, punitive, Western sanctions on the critical capacities needed by Russia for its Arctic 
offshore strategic plans. Despite much speculation of an early collapse, the political will of the 
united West held fast and Russian sanctions remained in place. But it was the parallel market 
crash in the price of oil that provided the coup de grace for the rest of the decade to investment in 
Russian offshore oil. By 2020 Russia’s once robust Reserve and National Wealth Funds were 
completely depleted and the Federation’s reserves returned to the same red ink not seen since the 
dark budget crisis days of 2008. Initially Russia’s lower middle class, the Orthodox Church and 
the media, remained loyal to newly re-elected (2018) President Putin as did the great majority of 
the regional governments. Allegiance to the officially propagated tenants of “mother Russia” 
and nationalism still held with help from the security apparatus. Though significant dissent in 
the upper middle classes reemerged as in 2011, in Moscow and St Petersburg, there was no 
significant organized revolt.
But what did prove politically decisive for Russia was a dramatic schism within the 
ruling elite itself brought on by an ironic cataclysmic, re-privatization of the “Crown Jewels” of 
Russia’s extractive industries, Rosneft and Gazprom —the oil and gas sectors most powerful and 
government majority controlled corporations. In an inverse of Chubais’ relic “Shares for 
Vouchers” auctions of the Yeltsin era, it was the derisively dubbed new “Shares for Dachas” 
plan that brought an end to the Putin era. Introduced by the Kremlin itself, amidst a lingering 
glut in oil supply as an attempt to duplicate the highly successful Initial Private Offering (IPO) of
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20% of Saudi Aramco, the world’s largest National Oil Corporation (NOC), Russia’s re­
capitalization plan triggered an unexpected shattering of the cooperative pact within the Russian 
elite—the leaders of the Central State, Siloviki (security services) and the new generation of 
industry oligarchs who could no longer continue to “get rich together.” Though the largest 
segment of the population remained relatively reconciled to a diminishing Russian economy, the 
wealthiest of the industrial leaders and a small but highly energized budding entrepreneur class 
came to understand that true reinvestment by global capital could not be energized with only the 
participation of Eurasian, pariah and fringe participants. Real value for corporate shares that was 
needed to re-start the economy and preserve the individual portfolios of Russia’s wealthiest few 
had to come from an open competitive market. With a secure very golden nest egg, and a 
mechanical, heavy handed, but nonetheless achieved international recognition of Russian great 
power interests from the ebbs of the Post-Soviet collapse—President Putin reached an agreement 
with his own business elite and served out a final term.
Russia’s parliament became more efficient once outside Putin’s shadow and over time the 
beginnings of a measured media opening and re-emergence of political parties became 
discernable—all in a modest and very much traditionally Russian form. Very significant for the 
domestic economy, with sanctions gone, Russia began reintegrating into global oil and gas 
markets by 2025 enabling investment timelines to begin reconsidering once again the big 
hydrocarbon projects ahead.
2025-2040...Kara Sea right place and the right time...barely
The global supply and demand balance had absorbed the re-entry of Iran and a stabilized 
Iraq and Libya, but for Russia, the Saudi Arabian experiment in privatization remained as the 
biggest market damper for revival of the mega-offshore Arctic projects envisioned in the 
millennium’s first decade. Part of the earlier allure to the Russian frontier regions was the 
attraction of new “reserves” IOCs like ExxonMobil could list on their ledger sheet and boost 
share values. The market opening of privatization of NOCs, initiated on a large scale by Saudi 
Arabia, followed by Mexico, Nigeria, Brazil and other Gulf States also mitigated the super-major 
IOCs strategic plans and investment in exploration. Nonetheless, an increase in oil demand 
continued to be driven by an even more globalizing economy in the less developed nations
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coupled with continuing appeal of Natural Gas (NG), especially from within the politically 
revitalized European Union (EU), which had mandated coal elimination by 2030. China and 
India, in the spirit of the 2015 Paris Climate Accords, continued their incremental transition from 
coal to NG. It was also evident by then that alternative energy sources, despite great advances in 
pure research, e.g. alternatives for lithium batteries which promised to make the sodium 
alternative much more viable---would not be marketable on a global scale until mid-century.
It was in this economic and market environment of 2030, when the hydrocarbon supply 
and demand dynamic was once again favorable for global industry, that the Barents-Kara Sea 
region found itself positioned for emergence into an integrated powerhouse of Arctic 
hydrocarbon development. This was attributable to the magnitude of the initial anchor offshore 
“elephant” or very large, dense and economically viable fields, and the economics of scale 
afforded by broad regional investment. This allowed for a continued rolling out of the 
exploration frontier to less promising, but viable satellite fields --- when they could be linked to 
the infrastructure established for the anchor fields. But it was political developments, both 
international and regional, that enabled the regions potential to reach fruition. Geopolitical 
rivalries had stabilized as the Putin era drifted to an anti-climactic close and IOCs continued a 
measured re-engagement in Russia’s offshore Arctic regions, still considered the world’s largest 
unexploited reserve. What had long been absent in Russia, a regulatory maturity allowing for 
sustained business integration of best practices in technology and management---had reached a 
tipping point. With oil demand again on track for another long run of out stripping marketable 
supply, the economic benefit to Russia of increasing but also stabilizing the greatest source of the 
nation’s export earnings was grasped by a new class of “third estate” leaders who had built their 
careers and fortunes usurping the benefits of disequilibrium. A firming of the rule of law could 
now benefit, if  not a wider segment of Russia’s population, a newer group without a tradition of 
authority and wealth. It had long been understood and unambiguously transparent in Russia 
strategic policy documents that future wealth and prosperity depended on refurbishing its Arctic 
infrastructure and bringing into production its undeveloped resources, primarily hydrocarbons. 
But the unresolved dilemma, was equally well understood; Russia needed the very best in 
petroleum extraction technology, managerial capacity as well as investment from an industry 
largely based in foreign states that more often than not were geopolitical adversaries.
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The international region building efforts dating back to the previous century had 
preserved its roots and the Arctic Council’s capacity expanded beyond consensus making into 
new areas of soft law and even collaboration on funding allocations to support a mutually agreed 
landmark “Code of Indigenous Rights.” With the real price of a barrel of oil steadying above the 
high mark of 25 years earlier, Russia and its Arctic partners were ready now to engage in 
regional economic, but also social and political, forums necessary to build in the Arctic a 
competitive zone of commerce centered on the legacy infrastructure in the North Sea combined 
with frontier developments in the Barents and Southern Kara Seas. Politically, the Western 
Arctic Maritime Union (WAMU) foundation was the earlier but long dormant framework of the 
Barents-Euro Arctic Council (BEAC) and the Barents 2020 initiative.
Plausible conclusion...towards a universal global perspective
The WAMU’s rapidly progressing economic synergy in the very first year of its 
implementation in 2035 provided the new Kremlin leadership confidence for further cross­
sovereign border regional integration. Using the WAMU as model, real regional integration 
proposals were being negotiated for Western Asian and the Caucuses as well, the key facilitating 
driver being a sufficient, achievable and clearly identifiable---competitive mass in the global 
economy---in these cases all fueled by hydrocarbons. The massive NG reserves ashore and 
underlying the Barents and Kara basins, normally marketable on the margins, proved lucrative 
when tied to newly developed clustered infrastructure built for crude oil extraction. A global 
political maturity had also finally resurrected the broken dream of a spot market for Liquid 
Natural Gas (LNG) advancing the WAMU’s Sabetta NG and Northern Sea Route (NSR) on the 
Yamal Peninsula into an Arctic energy hub o f  commerce. Continued “climate transition” on the 
warming earth significantly extended the seasonally navigable portions of the NSR allowing for 
more predictable risk for insurance underwriters and firmer scheduling of extractive destination 
shipping. This further contributed to the competiveness of the WAMU. Massive cross sovereign 
border projects which mandated high international safety and environmental standards, such as 
those that proved necessary to form and make the WAMU competitive, had the money to 
significantly contribute to regional welfare, which to a large degree, neutralized the more 
extreme environmental groups—especially in the region. It is not an understatement to conclude 
that had there been a longer period of supply glut, and suppressed oil prices, the investments
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necessary would never have been in the large capitally intensive Arctic offshore projects, that 
came on line just in time to allow for a resurgent global economy consuming, by near mid­
century, 140 million barrels a day. Russia, progressing more firmly than ever before into 
inclusive systems of economically based, but politically integrated institutions, would by mid­
century be characterized by foreign policy choices reflective of the collective benefit of its 
regional partners.
7.2.2 Kara Industrial Security Region (KISR)
2016-2025...Progression or Return to a Mercantilism?
By 2020 Russian foreign and energy policy, the symbiotic core of the Central 
Government’s (CG) political economy, with few other options, continued a bid to alter the global 
power sharing status quo. And in that context, offshore hydrocarbon exploration and production 
in the Russia’s Western Arctic remained tied as much to foreign policy as energy export 
objectives. President Putin, now entrenched in his fourth presidential term, savored his carefully 
crafted role as the geopolitical front man for the BRIC nations (Brazil, Russia, India and China) 
and all those who sought the end of the Bretton Woods institutions that had reigned all powerful 
for 75 post WWII years. It remained unclear what would emerge to replace the free market, 
multi-lateral trade agreement and treaty structures that rested on the International Monetary Fund 
(IMF) and World Bank (WB); but Russia with the quiet backing of China, India and much of the 
developing world, were making gains in breaking the comparative institutional advantages long 
held by the US and its status quo allies. Significantly, the timing of an institutional disunion 
agenda coincided with nationalist resurgence within a devolving European Union (EU).
Western solidarity for punitive sanctions on the Russian energy sector had collapsed in 
2017 when Germany, Italy and Greece broke ranks with EU Energy Ministry. Germany had pre­
warned diplomatically for some time their approval of the Nord-Stream 2 pipeline which would 
bring directly into its borders Natural Gas (NG) on very favorable long term contracted prices 
from Russia’s Gazprom—but the joining in of the Adriatic States shocked ministers in Brussels.
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Italy’s ENI corporation further eroded coordinated EU control by its JV partnership with the 
National Iranian Oil Corporation (NIOC). Parallel to the fracturing of energy policy harmony 
the EU political union was shaken as well by the violent turn of the independence movement in 
Spain’s Catalonia region.
Oil prices remained low early into the 2020s as the Saudis appeared on the verge of 
finally winning the” war of supply.” Though the US production resurgence brought on by the 
shale oil and gas fracking revolution a decade earlier proved more resilient than expected, the 
strain on the financial structures that provided the critical venture capital for the North American 
wildcat pioneers collapsed, and with it, the US production peak. The re-entrance and integration 
of Iran Heavy Crude into the global marketplace also contributed to a sustained market 
downturn. But it was the challenges to the foundation of the global political economy of 
progressive free trade that would define the next epoch.
2025 to 2040...Towards regional energy fiefdoms
In the previous decade a regional pipeline infrastructure had grown to fruition in Africa 
with the benefit of Chinese and International Oil Corporations (IOCs) capital linking South 
Africa to NG in Mozambique and in the west from Angola for South Atlantic export. The 
Uganda-Kenya crude oil pipeline provided a new alternative for export passage in the Indian 
Ocean without the potential threat of naval interdiction, in event of war, of the Strait of Hormuz 
(SOH) maritime chokepoint. Investment in Liquid Natural Gas (LNG) had peaked before 2020 
as muted global economic growth had hindered investment. Nonetheless, some large projects in 
Western Australia and Qatar continued where mercantile conditions of comparative advantage in 
LNG were the strongest. Likewise, Russia’s Sabetta LNG on the Yamal Peninsula in the Kara 
Sea also made headway with the use of national “strategic” funds and equally long sighted 
investment from capital sourced in China and India. The Northern Sea Route (NSR) saw 
continued infrastructure developments as Russia sought to refurbish Cold War era ports and 
maritime underpinnings.
Hydrocarbon production from the North Sea halved by 2025 and flowed at only 800,000 
barrels a day. Norway turned north to her Arctic shelf and Barents Sea with new leases for
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exploration and investment incentives, but Britain turned east. In what proved the final blow to 
the never realized “consistent and centralized” EU energy policy, Britain joined with Russia’s 
Gazprom in a Nord-Steam 2 pipeline extension all the way to the shores of the kingdom.
By 2030 the international order, in a lethargic equilibrium, was rocked by the seminal 
disaster of the new century off the coast of the Cotentin peninsula. The Atlantic Stork, a 4,000- 
ton British owned special purpose-built transport for High Level Waste (HLW) of nuclear 
reactor material, securely stored in 10 Type B casks, departed Cherbourg France en route 
disposal in Australia. The voyage was a routine transit done multiple times every year as part of 
a global nuclear energy system tightly regulated and monitored by the Internarial Atomic Energy 
Agency (IAEA). This type of routine event had occurred without major mishap since the first 
published standards and regulations in 1961. France, the global leader in nuclear generated 
electricity, had emerged as the unanticipated bedrock of the EU’s transition from the 
hydrocarbons as outlined in the 2015 Paris Accords, and since mandated by the union’s Energy 
Ministry. This nuclear capacity had provided needed time for the incrementally more efficient— 
but still more costly ---programmed wind, battery and solar alternatives. But the Atlantic Stork, 
though well designed for securing radioactive waste from navigational miscalculation or accident 
--- proved not hardened enough for a complex terrorist attack instigated from within its own 
onboard security detail. The attack began while still in French waters and before supporting 
assets could secure the cargo. The terrorists compromised the Class B casks before the firefight 
and succeeded in scuttling the ship. Contamination risk was real but containable in the open sea. 
However, a frenzied media response erupted around the world --- video of the coastal cliffs 
rising above the wreckage became the singular image and harbinger of the true collapse of the 
post WWII global independence era. Within a year after “Cherbourg,” the Netherlands, voted in 
referendum to follow Britain and withdrawal from the EU --- signaling a complete loss of faith, 
at its center, in a European security structure.
The previous 20 years had not proven lucrative for significant hydrocarbon exploration 
and development — especially on the geographic and technological frontiers. The global oil and 
gas markets had avoided roller coaster ups and downs for almost two decades. Stagnated world 
trade had contributed to a consumption rise of only a modest 110 million barrels per day, up
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from 100 million barrels. Infrastructure improvements and new pipelines in the developing 
world contributed to regionally entrenched, but stable, NG markets. All was well until it wasn’t.
In response to “Cherbourg” environmental protest rose to never before seen levels of 
political influence —  especially in Europe, North America and Japan. Presidents, prime 
ministers and parliaments had lost the initiative in implementing a coordinated strategic response 
to climate change first articulated in the Paris Accords in 2015 — and codified 10 years later in 
New Delhi. The German Bundestag demanded its newly formed government cease all nuclear 
derived electricity imports, contracted or not, as did newly empowered environmental activist 
parliaments across Northern and Southern Europe. With alternative energy sources not yet 
capable of meeting even a rationed consumption-demand; with coal long since banned; pipeline 
sourced NG already contracted at or near capacity — the LNG spot market took off in a manner 
reminiscent of historical embargo driven crude oil spikes.
Plausible conclusion: return to Westphalia?
Russia, though never realizing the great promise of offshore hydrocarbon investment and 
high technology transfers from the IOCs envisioned 25 to 30 years earlier, had nonetheless, 
developed its near shore oil and gas fields in the Southern Kara and Barents Sea, and in 
particular, had successfully completed what was now the world’s second largest operating LNG 
port at Sabetta on the shores of the Southern Kara Sea. Fortuitously, the LNG tanker fleet, 
overbuilt in 2020, was not scrapped as market analysts would have predicted, but held in reserve 
at central government cost for strategic reasons. Russia found itself well positioned to take 
advantage of the energy crisis of the late 2030s. The Russian Western Arctic, with the Central 
and regional governments full collaboration, was in a full bore gas boom. While industry 
competitors in the Norwegian and Barents Sea, in Alaska and off the Canadian and Greenland 
coasts, struggled through a regulatory maze to implement mothballed development plans --- no 
such delays hampered extraction in the less transparent Russian Arctic. Global environmental 
protests after Cherbourg moved past a nuclear energy ban agenda to a renewed and concerted 
effort to ban all Arctic extractive development. In response to a half dozen protest incidents 
along its western approaches, the Northern Sea Route (NSR) Administrative zone was further 
restricted to central government approved transits which became almost exclusively an extractive
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industry destination shipping on Russian or other specifically approved flag carriers, owners and 
crews---serving Russian or Chinese interests.
The Arctic Council had remained until now the one international forum where Russia 
remained a cooperative and engaged leader, though efforts to expand its charter mandate beyond 
and consensus building, on oil and gas industry operating standards and best practices, was an 
early casualty of geopolitical, rather than Arctic specific contention. But in the late 2030s 
another maritime incident would bring to an end even the Arctic specific mediation of the AC — 
and have lingering strategic consequences in a markedly new era.
In 2040, by fortune or misfortune, a Scandinavian national media film crew were on site 
in the Barents Sea when a mixed international indigenous rights and environmental activist 
group attempted a peaceful “slowdown” of a westbound LNG tanker transit by the use of 
inflatable barriers, a tactic that had worked successfully outside Rotterdam earlier in the year.
The barrier had been secretly positioned a mile inside Norwegian waters, nonetheless the 
privately contracted Russian security team responded with automatic weapons and a very visual 
loss of life of over 40 unarmed activists. Russia officially praised the shipboard use of force, and 
tone deaf to diplomatic condemnation, proclaimed a new Kara Industrial Security Region (KISR) 
encompassing their entire western Arctic Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) which was now 
considered sovereign waters. The other AC nations suspended interactions with their Russian 
counterparts. The Kremlin reiterated its position and superimposed its naval Northern Fleet over 
the Coast Guard and NSR in the newly formed KISR. War did not break out—but the 
interdependent era had taken a final turn to a sovereign regional one, and with it, a much 
weakened potential for Russian collaborative on policy adoption for climate or any other global 
challenges to come.
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7.2.3 Special Export Zone Kara_(SEZK)
2016-2025.. .USSR light
The latent major geopolitical power readjustment between US and China remained 
unresolved; as did an uncertain energy market. Global energy supply vs demand continued in 
relative equilibrium into 2020 as if on a linear forecasters PowerPoint slide. North American 
fracking production remained viable despite the Saudi led “supply war.” The price of oil 
steadied below a $60 per barrel threshold, the North American drill rig count and shale oil 
production leveled and remained constant, and moderately profitable; but entrepreneur “wild cat” 
new investment had virtually ceased. Hydrocarbon exploration in the Arctic offshore, as well as 
the Mexican and Brazilian deep water which required new and advanced techniques was even 
less economically competitive. Plateaued “supply” market prices simply could not sustain 
investment in the new mega projects necessary in pioneer regions that did not already benefit 
from an existing extractive infrastructure. The major International Oil Corporations (IOCs), such 
as ExxonMobil, BP and Shell had been the first to cut back in these capital intensive high risk 
ventures --- but even the major National Oil Corporations (NOCs) and their hybrid sovereign, 
state “majority” corporately controlled cousins, such as Norway’s Statoil, significantly slowed 
down new strategic mega developments by the early 2020s. The true consequence of these 
corporate - sovereign state decisions would come to fruition two decades later.
In Russia, the Central Government (CG) as dependent as ever on earnings from oil and 
gas exports, retained control of its weakening federation with increased suppression of 
ideological opposition, international academic exchange, and domestic media. By 2020 it was 
evident that the promise of an end to punitive Western sanctions had eroded as rapidly as had 
overall diplomatic relations. Russia was the unchallenged champion of the world’s rogue states. 
However, despite heightened anti-Western rhetoric, the Kremlin grasped that the totalitarian 
tools of Stalin’s USSR were not available. Nonetheless, with few options, a re-stocked and 
highly competent Russian Security Council moved forward with the logical conclusion of a 
Russian path for Russia’s future, or “Russia for Russians.” That path led to one last great central 
government directed gamble to harness all available aspects of bureaucratic power to regain
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economic momentum and strategic initiative. Development of the frontier regions in the Arctic 
zone became an immediate national priority — and one not directly correlated to current market 
conditions. The hydrocarbon extraction infrastructure and its supporting Northern Sea Route 
(NSR) received the last of the Federation’s reserve funds. Construction of a six modern 
icebreakers and six polar class LNG tankers for a national fleet was expedited. A massive new 
offshore cluster pipeline system was begun, centered on Nova Zemlya, interconnecting the 
offshore oil and gas fields in the Southern Barents and Kara Seas to an export tanker terminal. 
Also jolted rapidly forward was new funding for air and naval bases in the maritime coastal 
Arctic region. Poor international relations with the West were further exasperated by an 
expedient de facto suspension of environmental compliance with international norms of “best 
practices” in the Arctic development zone. Russian participation in scientific and industrial 
forums had suffered, as did proportionately, international influence on Russian offshore 
hydrocarbon practices and standards.
In 2025 a platform rupture in the Prirazlomnoye oil field released 75,000 gallons of crude 
oil into the Pechora Sea. Though minor in a global historical context, the tardy Russian 
response, absence of ready international coordination and a highly visible oil slick drift into the 
Norwegian Southern Barents Sea resulted in an environmental outcry. Public outrage in Arctic 
Council permanent member states, especially in Norway, resulted in an emergency suspension of 
engagement with Russian representatives. Though the ministerial protest action was only 
temporary---it was a blow from which the AC, as a cooperative forum, never fully recovered.
2026-2040...The rise of the regions
“Russia for Russians” had by sheer focus achieved some success, but eventually stalled, 
exasperated by the political and market friction. The cost of the control initially deemed 
necessary. The challenges that drove the Arctic investment strategy were fundamentally as 
internal to Russia as external--- and remained so. A decade after the Kremlin had gambled, at all 
costs, on a prodigious Arctic extractive investment strategy --- the “bills” came due. The 
resources needed to maintain the basic social welfare status quo in a stagnant economy had been 
sacrificed. Funding had been diverted away, from what little was available, to train and educate 
the national workforce. The small and medium business entrepreneurs needed for a viable
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domestic market economy remained stifled and the lower and middle classes become even more 
entrenched and reliant on personal networks for basic sustainment. With a few exceptions, such 
as arms exports, all that remained realizable was a raw material based economy --- and one 
evolving away from planned control. With little public capital, the capacity to link policy 
objectives to private investment declined. Direct investment from foreign private capital, 
especially from Asia, flowed unequally to specific Federal Regions further exasperating central 
cohesion and even superficial anti-corruption efforts. Siloviki bureaucrats (background in 
security services), themselves the new oligarchy class, maintained control of the Kremlin but 
were now reliant on chosen, or tolerated, Regional Government (RG) resource barons for 
maintaining a highly unequal social order and tax system. In the Arctic and offshore 
hydrocarbon heavy federal regions, special export zones were established to maximize revenue 
and maintain central government control. In the Western Arctic, the Special Export Zone Kara 
(SEZK) was established with an enforced exclusive maritime control not seen since the Cold 
War. Kremlin leadership were content harnessing wealth from the unequally prosperous 
regional districts— but they were no longer aspiring to truly “direct” Russia’s economic fate.
In hindsight, the context of the Kremlin’s challenge also proved to be much greater than 
competing against other sovereign states, or even a coalition or an alliance of states. The global 
market place had left the interconnected information stage behind and was now in a digitally 
“integrated” one by 2030. Differentiated global production meshed with the demand of highly 
specific regional service economies, dispersed and self- nurturing around the globe. With a 
political, economically enhanced motivation to divest away from hydrocarbons at the heart of the 
internationally agreed Carbon Tax accords of 2025 --- a shift to alternative energy sources had 
contributed to a regionalized international energy infrastructure. Solar power in North Africa, 
the Mideast and arid environments in Asia, the Americas and Oceana championed by the World 
Bank, coupled with infrastructure investment, such as China’s Belt and Rail initiative, 
contributed to this international regionalization.
Plausible con clu sion .. Special Export Zone Kara
By 2040, though the hydrocarbon markets had much changed, they were still integral and 
the single greatest component of global energy supply. Relative proportion in that market had
120
diminished by one third — but total contribution remained only slightly below 2015 levels. The 
maturing of economically integrated international regions had encouraged investment in capital 
intensive, geographically dedicated, parallel gas pipeline infrastructures --- lowering the 
projected impact of a global LNG market. However, Russia’s central government augmented 
early investment in the necessary infrastructure allowed Sabetta LNG to compete from the SEZK 
with Australian and Qatar LNG. Likewise, Russian gas pipelines, such as Gazprom’s Power of 
Siberia and other early strategic partnerships with China and India proved integral to Asian 
economic hubs. Global oil supply had kept pace with moderate demand. Advances in technique 
and methods had allowed the mainstay oil reserves in the Mideast to extend production levels. 
Demand relative to supply had again lifted prices to a projected incline able to justify the high 
cost of frontier oil, such as the Arctic offshore, on a limited basis—when an extractive 
infrastructure was already in place tied to a viable anchor field. This would prove to be the 
competitive advantage needed for the SEZK to incrementally expand to a portion of the 
geological potential of still the world’s greatest undeveloped but recoverable oil reserves in the 
Russian Western Arctic. However, the domestic political impact of future incoming export 
hydrocarbon wealth would prove unable to reverse Russian social and economic devolution 
away from Moscow and the central government. The structures to redistribute power sharing 
and wealth with the indigenous peoples of the Arctic regions, or anywhere in Russia for political 
or social purpose — had been atrophying for over 25-years. A ruling elite of very wealthy 
bureaucrat-oligarchs in Moscow would have significant funds available for new foreign policy 
adventures -- but unlikely on a transformative scale.
7.2.4 Arctic Shelf Ecological Park (ASEP)
2016-2025...Geopolitical shift
Fifteen years into the new millennium the Arctic was the unfortunate vanguard of a global 
transition to a warming climate. The observable physical impacts of this change were for a 
number of meteorological, oceanographic, geological and astronomical reasons accelerated in the 
high latitude maritime environment. There was strong scientific consensus that alterations to the 
earth’s ecosystem by man, especially since the industrial revolution began the hydrocarbon era,
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had contributed to a dramatic increase in CO2 emissions into the atmosphere. In Paris in 2015 
an international effort to limit the use of fossil fuels reached a milestone of cooperation with 
China, India and representatives from much of the developing world agreeing to establish a 
cooperative, monitored process to limit CO2 emissions, and with it, dramatically reduce the use 
of hydrocarbons as the primary energy source for the global economy. There was much 
deserved optimism after this diplomatic achievement, but also realization that substantive 
reduction in greenhouse gas emissions only impacted the rate of adding to an ecosystem 
dynamic, that more likely than not, was already set on a warming oscillation. Moreover, success 
in these environmental objectives relied on a sustained international common purpose in a global 
context—with significant and unequal economic cost to national economies. By 2020, 
geopolitical trends showed no signs of new emerging human paradigm towering above and 
setting right the many known flaws of man’s historical capacity to perfect a cooperative 
civilization.
The Russian Federation continued to slide into social-economic disequilibrium. 
Extractive exports, especially the most critical oil and gas sector, were locked at price levels 
below the minimal threshold for sustaining the social-political-economic-order. Demand for 
hydrocarbons had plateaued. There was no incentive for the investment risk needed to develop 
the frontier regions in the Arctic and very deep, distant offshore. The extractive industries, 
particularly oil and gas, relied even more heavily on a skilled core of Long Distant Commute 
(LDC) workers, with even less economic benefit spinning off to regional Arctic people.
President Putin remained at the helm of a limited autocracy directing his aggressive foreign 
policy as a series of hybrid, set-piece moves coined in the world press as “contained- 
brinkmanship.” In 2025, geopolitics far from the Arctic would again dominate its policy agenda 
as had Cold War posturing fifty years—and whaling fleets 400 years—before that. It would also 
bring change to the Kremlin.
Chinese naval and air power had systematically strengthened its capacity and could now 
legitimately threaten US naval supremacy in the Western Pacific as far as Guam and the 
Marianas. But it was a parallel maritime expansion into the South China Sea (SCS) that brought 
real conflict. With no obvious path to break out from a continuing economic slowdown, brought
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on by the necessary restructure from an export driven—to a domestic driven economy. China’s 
politburo continued to prioritize strategic resource objectives. A decade of military buildup in 
the SCS had persuaded even Vietnam to seek agreement on contested EEZ oil lease blocks, 
obliquely acquiescing to Chinese dominance. But a brazen Chinese naval exercise off the coast 
of the Philippine island of Palawan in the vicinity of the Balabac Strait brought to culmination a 
first order US-China military confrontation. Seemingly ignoring the declared exercise exclusion 
zone, the US flagged container ship M/V Maersk K ing’s Mountain transited right into the live 
fire exercise. The Chinese aircraft carrier Liauning continued with an orchestrated air wing 
cruise missile attack even though forewarned of the M/V K ing’s M ountain’s presence. Whether 
compounded navigational errors, purposeful intent, bellicose leadership or bad luck --- King  
Mountain was hit by multiple missile strikes --- killing the captain and first mate on the bridge 
and injuring half of its small crew. Such incidents had been very rare among great powers even 
during the Cold War. With US forces now ordered to a strategic worldwide readiness posture of 
DEFCON 2 (war imminent), in perhaps one last directed move by the new, Putin-anointed, 
Russian president, a P8 Poseidon US maritime patrol aircraft on a routine mission in the Baltic 
Sea was shot out of the sky by a Russian S-400 surface to air missile. These events far from the 
Arctic, nonetheless, would prove a key influence on its future.
2026-2040 . Unexpected cooperation
Six months from the edge of a nuclear confrontation---world diplomacy went to reset. 
There were a half a dozen more tactical engagements between Chinese and US forces in the few 
days that followed the missile strike on the M /V  King Mountain, but no ships were lost and a war 
was averted. Surprisingly, the Western European Union (WEU) emerged from NATO’s shadow 
and proved to be the key security structure capable of mediating a US-Chinese de-escalation of 
tensions. Sharing a moment together at the precipice—Chinese and US leaders—as did US and 
Soviet leaders following the 1962 Cuban missile crisis—worked to find mechanisms to avoid a 
repetition. But for the Kremlin, there was no soft landing. The US-Chinese confrontation had 
proved a geopolitical threshold beyond the reach of an opportunistic third party. After having 
faced a real threat to national survival, neither Beijing nor Washington looked to Moscow.
China, self-assured in its stand-off with the last superpower, rapidly reached agreement with a 
pragmatic Taiwanese leadership for political integration of a new autonomous Taiwanese region
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— with US acquiescence — and now turned inward for dramatic domestic structural and 
economic reform. An EU confident in the wake of it pivotal mediation in the SCS confrontation 
was back on track to complete a monetary and true “political” union. It also now had the 
diplomatic solidarity and momentum needed for an EU alternative energy and carbon emission 
vision to lead the world in a transition away from hydrocarbons. The EU led by example and 
committed the heavy capital investment necessary for marine current turbines and a new 
decentralized electric grid maximizing efficiency of dispersed wind and solar energy sources. 
The global crude oil supply proved capable of meeting modest increases in demand primarily 
with targeted investment in enhanced recovery techniques in the massive operating fields in 
Saudi Arabia and its regional neighbors. Costly frontier projects in the Arctic offshore were put 
on hold, though limited production from the more accessible areas of the Russian Barents and 
Southern Kara Sea, established in the 2020s with subsidized funding from the central 
government continued within marginal profit-loss parameters.
Russian foreign policy had gambled the previous two decades on exploiting the seams in 
a steadily fracturing world order — and lost. The central government had been unable to sustain 
economic progress with the erosion of hydrocarbon export earnings, but nonetheless, had 
persevered with strong populist support. After the 2025 China-US confrontation and the 
diplomatic humiliation in its aftermath, new leadership was engineered for the Kremlin by 
security and business elite. Transitory bureaucratic restructuring and a minor liberalization of 
the media were attempted, but the priority was on reintegration into an international political and 
economic system which had left Russia behind. By 2030 the Federation re-emerged marginally 
more transparent, and less corrupt in the international business sector, the crux of the reform 
effort, but remained burdened by even slower growth than its competitors. But in the Arctic, 
geography still afforded an opportunity to engage internationally from a position of relative 
strength.
Russia returned to more cooperative engagement in forums --- but especially in what had 
become for over a decade, a dormant Arctic Council. It took ownership in building consensus in 
the forum for a series of measures to codify regional standards on extractive industries and 
shipping. Under Russian Chairmanship in 2032, a breakthrough consensus was reached within
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the AC to support an updated International Maritime Organization (IMO) Polar Code, which 
included long needed integrated enforcement procedures that included a centralized 
multinational Arctic Environmental Enforcement and Response Center (AEERC) to be based on 
Russian soil with international funding. A key provision called for shared planning and 
operational exchanges among the coast guards and enforcement agencies of all eight Arctic 
permanent member states. Awareness of the environmental effects of climate change had 
become the global norm, and these effects were especially apparent in the Arctic. Activism with 
state support had proved highly effective in shutting down marginally viable oil and gas projects 
in the Arctic Norwegian offshore, but less so in Russia which continued to suffer population and 
social decline. Oil and gas rents, had historically provided little return to the Indigenous Peoples 
or regional governments, even less so in the fiscally restrained budgets of the previous 20 years. 
In 2034 a joint presentation by the Russian president and Norwegian prime minister announced 
the creation of the Arctic Shelf Ecological Park (ASEP), which included the Norwegian, Barents 
and Kara Sea EEZ outside a defined industrial coastal zone.
Conclusion...the protocol that worked
Future hydrocarbon exploration was limited to that industrial zone that included the 
modestly refurbished infrastructure of the Northern Sea Route (NSR) and the oil and gas 
production platforms put in place two decades earlier. The ASEP agreement was not binding on 
either nation, but nonetheless was seen as highly significant advancement in international 
environmental soft law. The park, it was also hoped, might add to an international tourism 
revenue stream for the impoverished Russian coastal region. Few in the first tumultuous decade 
after the Paris Accord of 2015 maintained optimism that the 2040 carbon reduction goals could 
be met at the agreed pace. But the unforeseen impact of geopolitical shifts; the fortuitous effects 
of low growth and manageable energy demand; and technological advancements and efficiencies 
created the necessary synergy. Even fewer foresaw that these goals would be a Russian policy 
objective.
7.3 Findings of narrative exercise
The preceding scenarios were initially framed with the key drivers and uncertainties 
derived from the more broadly scoped Arctic offshore hydrocarbon development UAF
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workshop. The key drivers were then assessed and refined in a deductive process which 
produced four different quadrants from the crossing of a high vs a low hydrocarbon demand 
future with a geopolitically stable vs unstable geopolitical environment (Chapter 6). A 
significant and purposeful component in the crafting of the four alternatives for Kara Sea 
hydrocarbon alternative futures and implications were the more regionally and technically 
specific findings from this dissertation’s survey-interview of experts (Chapter 5). Table 7.2 
which follows highlights and compares the core concepts underlying the four scenarios.
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Table 7.2 Scenario comparison table
I. Western Arctic 
Maritime Union
II. Kara Industrial 
Security Region
III. Special Export Zone 
Kara
IV. Arctic Shelf 
Ecological Park
Framing
Uncertainties 4* .•T. . t . 4-TV
High
Concept
•High hydrocarbon demand and 
cooperative internal governance 
allows for a competitive edge for 
the W estern Arctic offshore 
region.
•M arkets have regionally clustered 
across borders allowing shared 
access to capital and technology.
•High hydrocarbon demand drives 
unilateral development strategies.
•Russian projects are massive but 
not as successful without W estern 
industry engagement.
•  Nonetheless highly active with 
other partners.
•Low hydrocarbon demand fosters 
market driven decentralized 
strategies.
•Poorly coordinated Arctic energy 
proj ects rely on foreign funds with 
minimal transparency.
•M arket incentive for complex 
Arctic projects is low but 
development is nonetheless 
sustained in Russia.
•Low demand and international 
political consensus on high 
ecological standards curtail most 
extractive projects in Russian 
Arctic.
•Very limited Arctic hydrocarbon 
ventures but in compliance with 
high international social norms 
and standards.
Key drivers of 
Change
•Economic advantage to large scale 
strategic investment in anchor 
fields in the Southern Kara.
•Globalization is a catalyst to high 
technology and capital.
•Russian political reform driven by 
market necessity.
•Sovereignty reigns supreme.
•Russia leads pack to go it alone if 
necessary on large extractive 
projects in the Arctic.
•International social economic 
system drifts to a zero-sum game 
at the macro level.
•Russia continues supplying a flat 
lined hydrocarbon energy demand 
with exploitive extractive 
practices.
•Alternative energy proves viable 
for a slowed global economy.
•Lack o f economic capacity compels 
a Russian shift to more 
transparent governance and 
regulatory standards.
Primary
Implications
•Arctic hydrocarbon projects are 
competitive.
•Russia more integrated into a 
global economic and political 
system.
•Alternative energy is more
significant but does not dominate 
the energy market.
•Russian policy choices in concert 
with agreed international norms.
•Globally hydrocarbon market 
practices are regionalized along 
sovereign lines.
•High ecological and social 
standards in some advanced 
countries are dissipated globally 
by fractured geopolitical order.
•Russian policy is driven by 
unilateral great power ambitions
•Significant risk in Russian Arctic 
for ecological damage.
•Poor likelihood o f reducing rise in 
atmospheric temperature to 2 
degrees Celsius by 2040.
•Russia policy focuses on competing 
for wealth in disparate geographic 
regions.
•International environmental 
ambitions are achieved for 
protection o f the region—but 
there are few funds to adequately 
address social needs.
•Russian policy adheres to
international legal norms—but are 
lacking in control and executive 
capacity.
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Chapter 8 Conclusions
8.0 Overview
The outcomes of this dissertation’s research and survey-interview findings into Kara Sea 
offshore hydrocarbon development are grouped below into major themes and their sub-themes.
A discussion of the key drivers and their interplay (in the workshop, scenario development and 
narrative creation effort) has been integrated into the discussion. The complexity of the drivers 
and their collective interaction and adaptation were explored using the scenario narratives 
(accentuated, was the underlying influence of global hydrocarbon demand and stability in the 
international system as integral, and indicative, of overall success or failure for Russia to achieve 
its hydrocarbon development objectives in the Kara Sea).
8.1 Outcomes
8.1.1 The global crude oil market is a highly significant driver
The global crude oil market is the first or second most important factor (along with 
geopolitical influences) driving hydrocarbon development in the Kara Sea; and its future 
dynamics, at least until mid-century, are uncertain. It is the Kara Sea’s offshore traditional crude 
oil potential that is the necessary catalyst for the very high capital investment, over decades, that 
is required to bring the offshore Arctic region to production. There are ample natural gas fields 
ashore that could be exploited, and are being developed, at less cost, that can sustain Russia’s 
investment in the Sabetta LNG Project and Port for many years. Offshore drilling in the Arctic, 
such as at the University-1 Prospect at the limits of fixed to seabed rigs (approximately 100- 
meters depth), are on a magnitude of eight times as costly as drilling ashore. The LNG market is 
growing rapidly, but the biggest projected boom in export capacity this decade is in Southwest 
Asia and Australia, not Russia. Standalone offshore gas projects, in harsh environments like the 
Kara Sea, are not likely to be market-competitive for many years. Gazprom’s Shtokman JV 
project with multiple and changing IOC partners in the more benign central Barents Sea to the 
immediate west, continues to be put on hold, as the market just does not support the investment 
necessary. Therefore, global market demand for crude oil, but not gas (NG or LNG) will drive 
offshore development in the Kara Sea. Much of the hydrocarbon offshore assessments for 
Russia’s EEZ have a high gas to oil ratio. The southern Kara Sea lease area offers a regionally
129
optimal potential oil ratio (supported by the preliminary announced results from the 2015 
exploratory drilling). Bringing the southern Kara Sea into offshore production is also intended to 
serve as a technological and infrastructure bridge to the more challenging northern Kara and 
Laptev Seas.
Clearly, the market cost of oil very much drives investment in exploring and producing it. 
But future prices are volatile, influenced by investment forces not solely isolatable to supply and 
demand. Forecasting prices is a near and perhaps mid-term (5-10 years) gamble for profit 
margins for the O&G industry and highly dependent hydrocarbon export states (such as Russia). 
Demand and its relationship to supply however for hydrocarbons, especially oil, are used to 
anchor strategic investment decisions (20-30 years) by IOCs such as ExxonMobil and Shell. In 
essence, the massive long-term strategic investments are wagered based on an assessment of how 
much supply to bring online to meet global demand (not a forecast of price 20 years into the 
future). The prevailing O&G industry view is that alternative energy and conservation efforts, 
most affordable in the relatively wealthy states, will have difficulty in suppressing demand, 
driven by still-developing populations, to achieve a standard of living commensurate with those 
same wealthier states. Therefore, hydrocarbons will remain the optimal energy choice based on 
the underlying principal of Energy Return on Investment (EROI) until mid-century.
The four future scenario narratives that were created (Chapter 7) were intended to 
explore Russia’s Kara Sea ambitions by embracing the complexity o f future hydrocarbon 
demand, geopolitical influences, and their interplay with other key drivers within an Adaptive 
Complex System. What was clear in all four plausible futures is that for offshore development in 
the Kara Sea to proceed, significant scale, and increasing global hydrocarbon demand are 
required. But it also requires, especially for Russia, an international geopolitical environment 
that is cooperative and stable for greatest possibility o f success. Optimal conditions were 
demonstrated by the “Western Arctic Maritime Union (WAMU), ” where both these critical 
uncertainties were at high favorable thresholds. Market demand drove development effort into 
frontier regions like the Arctic offshore, and “stable ” geopolitical conditions allowedfor 
specific O&G technology, management skill and capital investment to flow freely across borders. 
The Kara Sea could compete with other hydrocarbon regions around the world because o f
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cooperative international integration o f infrastructure anchored on mega-projects in the highly 
productive regions o f the Norwegian and Russian Western Arctic littoral region. Critical was 
sustained (15-20 years) investment that could withstand the ups and downs of transient energy 
price fluctuations; at times assisted by state funds. However, Russian development objectives, 
even with high global demand but at low levels o f international cooperation, could achieve some, 
but significantly less unilaterally driven success, as demonstrated by “Special Export Zone Kara 
(SEZK). ” In the two scenarios that highlight low demand and both a cooperative and 
uncooperative geopolitical climate for Russia, little progress is made in Kara Sea development. 
In the former, international environmental concerns outweigh the very marginal potential for  
marketable development. In the latter case, an uncooperative international environment 
combined with a reduced Russian resource exploitation capacity, forces redirection to less 
capital intensive and complex projects ashore.
8.1.2 Impact of punitive sanctions
Russia has and can be expected to continue to attempt to mitigate the impact of sanctions 
on its hydrocarbon industry, as well as in all other aspects. Already evident has been an attempt 
to acquire necessary capital investment, technology and managerial offshore expertise elsewhere. 
The downward shift in the price of oil, largely independent but coincident in time (mid-2014) 
with the implementation of Western sanctions, has also hindered success in pursuing new 
investors in the Kara Sea as well as for other large new projects (though ashore Sabetta LNG 
continues forward with some significant, but minority share augmentation from new funds of 
Chinese origin). Now a necessity for Russia, a shift of IOC partners would be complex and 
difficult even without the current sanction regime in the short to mid-term (5-10 years).
Expertise in technology and management for very large offshore projects is key; and that 
offshore expertise in the Arctic is shared by very few. Corporations big enough and competent 
enough to work offshore in the Arctic will not prematurely risk renewed sanctions until they are 
sure they will not be reinstated. It is unlikely that suitable alternative partners for offshore oil 
exploratory drilling and initial development in the Kara Sea lease areas will be found within a 
decade or longer if sanctions remain firm and in the present form. Overtime, that field of 
capable expertise outside the existing dominant IOCs might develop as well as alternative market 
and supporting structures, particularly in Asia; if  hydrocarbon market demand also makes a
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significant and sustained upward recovery (this was already evident with gas contracts even 
before sanctions---but slowed with the global market).
In the scenario “Kara Industrial Security Region (KISR), " (high demand but low 
geopolitical stability and cooperation) Russia breaks out o f the restrictive sanction regime not 
through foreign policy compromise or improved relations with the US and the West, but by 
capitalizing on internal inconsistencies within Western nations and “their" institutions o f global 
order. By partnering with China and other states the Kara Sea offshore reserves are slowly 
developed (without IOC partnerships) as a “national strategic investment" not solely correlated 
to commodity markets (reminiscent o f the Soviet development o f Western Siberia in the 1960s), 
with just the pace and extent necessary to progress through an initial decade o f only modest or 
questionable marketability, to be in place when global demand begins to recover. Elsewhere 
around the w orld’s frontier hydrocarbon regions, new investment has much stagnated, and the 
Russian Federation is in a position to capitalize two decades later. The most relevant scenario 
to characterize a sustained continuance o f present conditions (characterized by low relative 
demand and low international stability), “Special Export Zone Kara (SEZK), " the Russian 
Federation returns even further to a “USSR light" hydrocarbon development policy. The Arctic 
offshore, and specifically the Kara Sea are also developed as “national" strategic priorities to 
an even greater extent than in the high demand “Kara Industrial Security Region (KISR) " 
future. The objective becomes, unlike the present day, development outside “global commodity 
markets. " By brute effort and an accepted sacrifice o f central government social, educational 
and institutional investment, offshore fields produce oil in the Kara Sea, destined for what 
develops over time to be regional markets. Like the USSR o f old, this singularity o f central state 
priority, though without the ideological rigor, eventually produces marketable oil but hollows 
and weakens the central institutions o f the Russian Federation. The Kara Sea oil rents arrive 
too late to save the integrity o f the state, and profits are distributed in what develops by near 
century, into a Western Arctic regional fiefdom.
8.1.3 Will IOCs return? Are they necessary for Russian strategic objectives?
The largest of the IOCs, such as ExxonMobil, should have no problem if sanctions are 
lifted returning to Russian projects; smaller enterprises and O&G service companies will likely
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have greater difficulty. The great capacities the IOCs bring to the Arctic, are not necessarily as 
needed elsewhere in the world by NOCs where conditions are not as severe or demanding. Most 
ongoing exploration and production outside the Arctic and sub-Arctic does not need the most 
advanced Western technology. The IOCs need new reserves for their own strategic futures. 
Long-term scarcity of new fields not already under a state or NOC’s control likely makes it worth 
the risk of doing business, again, with President Putin’s Kremlin or whatever Russian leadership 
might be in the future if the market supports development and if the economics of the business 
arrangements add up. What could be a showstopper for international O&G involvement in the 
Kara Sea, but not necessarily for Russia, are the still unknown true extent of the oil vs gas 
reserves as well as their density. There is a high degree of certainty the hydrocarbon reserves of 
the region truly are vast; but it will take a large magnitude of “oil” that is markedly extractive to 
push IOC engagement to risk development into the offshore region. Success in one exploratory 
well does not “anchor” necessarily or prove the massive investment in infrastructure to be a 
worthwhile investment. Prudhoe Bay for example, which drove the O&G industry to take high 
risk on constructing the Trans Alaska Pipeline System was anchored by Prudhoe Bay, which was 
an “ashore” field of truly huge and dense magnitude that needed few satellite wells to extract 
(initially estimated at ten times the announced findings of West Alpha’s 2015 exploratory 
drilling (Miller 2010)), though in the Kara Sea many other fields are anticipated but not proven 
in the vicinity. But the more wells necessary, especially offshore, correlates to much higher 
expenses to extract.
As the Russians well understand themselves, the scale of investment and expertise 
necessary to bring into production the offshore lease areas in the Kara Sea, to be followed later in 
the century by development of even more demanding regions to the north and the Laptev Sea in 
the east, will require IOC engagement to bring into production; at least within the next decade 
and a half. Distinct from investment in long haul pipelines ashore and the Sabatta LNG Port and 
Project, there are no indications Chinese firms or NOCs have either the current capacity, or the 
ambition, to replicate ExxonMobil’s strategic offshore partnership with Rosneft. Nor are there 
any other capable partners not honoring the sanctions regime.
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In the high hydrocarbon demand -  stable geopolitical system scenario, the Western 
Arctic Maritime Union (WAMU), offshore Arctic regions such as the Kara Sea re-emerged as 
competitive in the global market. Nonetheless, the complexity, high capital demands o f these 
projects, but also significantly the strategic need to rapidly reengage with suspended projects 
drove Russia to renewed engagement with the most capable o f the IOCs, such as its pre-sanction 
partner ExxonMobil. In an unstable international geopolitical system with a nonetheless high 
market demandfor hydrocarbons, as demonstrated in the Kara Sea Industrial Security Region 
(KISR), alternatives for Western IOCs were found within a decade, but they could not replicate 
the scale and market success achieved by re-engagement with Western IOCs.
8.1.4 Significance of Kara Sea success on Russia’s capacity as a state
Russia’s successful development of its Arctic hydrocarbon resources is strategically vital 
to Russia which remains extraordinarily dependent, for a traditional major state, on extractive 
exports, especially oil and gas, to fund basic central government. The trend since the Medvedev 
presidency has been a regression rather than a progression in diversifying the Russian economy 
away from resource dependence and continuing symptoms of the “Dutch disease.” The Kara Sea 
holds special importance in this context, not only for the magnitude of its resources, but as a 
threshold crossing indicator for Russia’s capacity to harness the industrial might necessary to 
secure its economic future. For the current regime, that also implies the continuation of a 
resurgent Eurasian “great power.” Russia will still matter; if  they fail, but will have to further 
rely on formal or informal alliances with other states and have less capacity for independent 
policy action. Failure to advance oil production into frontier offshore areas like the Kara Sea, 
will very likely leave Russia with less capacity for unilateral foreign policy action in 2040 than 
they enjoyed in 2014.
All four scenario futures developedfor this dissertation are indicative o f the central role 
hydrocarbon extractive expansion into new frontier regions, and the Kara Sea specifically, is 
and will remain, for the stability o f the Russian Federation. High demand (and a correlated high 
price) o f Russian hydrocarbon exports, sustained by progressive development o f new reserves in 
the Arctic and especially its offshore regions within a cooperative international environment, the 
“Western Arctic Maritime Union (WAMU) " future, by definition, implies a Russian central
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government interacting in a global economic international order. The WAMUfuture offers the 
highest potential for Kara Sea development, utilizing the best o f IOC capacities in project 
management, drilling technology and response to environmental mishaps or accidents. Capital 
flows freely across borders and is driven by international market dynamics. But it is not the win 
-  win future for all that it implies. Russian Federation leadership may not, as it does not 
presently appear, value international cooperation at any cost, even if  it is critical for its 
economic future, when it threatens other policy objectives o f the central leadership, as 
demonstrated by the policy choices taken in 2014 in Crimea and the Ukraine. Both o f the low 
geopolitical stability scenarios (KISR and SEZK), whether in a high or low hydrocarbon demand 
global market, indicate a reduced, but nonetheless existent capacity for the Russians to 
persevere over the long term with more modest development objectives; but neither o f these 
scenarios provide a return to the fu ll vision o f their 2013 Arctic strategy.
8.1.5 Circumpolar impacts: environmental sound development?
International cooperation is a driver for Russia’s success in its offshore development 
objectives and was recognized as such in their strategic documents well before the impact of 
sanctions demonstrated. Russia can ignore world opinion, but not its consequences. However, 
that leverage should not be overstated. The current sanction regime targets the Russian oil and 
gas sector as a means to induce different Russian foreign policy choices for Crimea and the 
Ukraine; not for environmental good stewardship. Environmental and safety standards have 
probably improved in the Russian Arctic offshore regions, as elsewhere in Russia, with the 
influence of cooperative partnerships with Western IOCs. Standards could lapse significantly 
during period of sanctions or lack of interaction. Much of the core of Norway’s Arctic strategy 
is to engage, specifically with its Russian neighbor, to influence common best practices and 
standards for the offshore O&G industry. Cooperation on oil spill response plans, as well as 
search and rescue has been and remains an objective of all the Arctic states, to include the US 
and Russia, and has resulted in recent agreements. Nonetheless, there is a historical legacy for 
unilateral Russian O&G development to not prioritize high environmental standards, even when 
legally mandated.
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The narrative future “Arctic Shelf Ecological Park (ASEP) highlights a Kara Sea in a 
low demand, but highly cooperative internationally integrated system which results in “park" 
status for both the highly coveted offshore hydrocarbon reserves in the Barents and Kara Seas. 
This development derives from a low demand market where a weakened Russian state looks to 
engagement for funding support. However, such a future also envisions few funds available for 
social and educational investment in the region, as well as for legal enforcement o f  
environmental and maritime standards in the ASEP itself.
8.1.6 Arctic and strategic policy implications
Russia’s current Arctic policy is very much a reflection of its President’s; an enabling 
objective to ensure continued Russian domestic control and prestige on the world stage. But 
though Kremlin policy choices may echo an earlier time of balance of power realism, there is 
also an awareness in those policies of global market and political interdependence (even if 
undesired). Strategic realignment outside the Western order looks to building new foundations 
with partners, even with more powerful states then themselves, like China, as well as “rogue 
states;” but not to complete isolation. The military “build up” in the Russian Arctic (distinct 
from the more aggressive military-strategic operational tempo the last decade) “could” be seen as 
a constructive positive and practical development, as it is generally focused on “soft” security 
that improves Russian capacity to respond to safety and environmental mishaps, as well as legal 
sovereignty; all for the good of sound Arctic stewardship. However, when combined with 
aggressive rhetoric from the Kremlin and blunt geopolitical challenges elsewhere in the world, it 
does not enhance a benign international perception. Russian leadership has retained a measure 
from its Soviet legacy, of approaching economic enterprises, especially massive industrial ones, 
differently than the West. Investment decisions based on questionable economic viability to 
achieve a strategic policy objective are routine. They can also evolve into being economically 
sound in the long term as well e.g. the development of Western Siberia in the 1960s.
The improbable or unforeseen does, can, and well may happen; but by definition are also 
improbable. Events to come that hugely impact human society periodically have occurred over 
the last several thousand years, even in the last century. In terms of the likelihood of 
development of the Kara Sea offshore hydrocarbon reserves, any catastrophic event that impacts
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energy demand (economic or human health collapse of high magnitude, wars approaching the 
scale of the ones 75 and 100 years ago, or driven by any other reason) will negatively impact 
expansion of hydrocarbon into the Russian offshore regions as they would to similar energy 
mega-projects around the world. A great economic and social breakthrough energizing growth 
and prosperity in the very poorest and heavily populated regions of the world would have an 
inverse effect. Alternatives to hydrocarbons that can provide the energy to meet global 
economic demand before mid-century may develop. But they are not now discernable in 
magnitude and cost that would support a “global” transition to a standard of living known in the 
most advanced regions.
8.2 Final assessment
If the Russians can achieve their objectives in the Kara Sea they should also be capable of 
success in other demanding frontier regions and on a path to meeting their strategic energy goals. 
It is unlikely any other effort at hydrocarbon extraction would have the same “sustained” 
significance for Russia’s economy, and thereby the stability and capacity of the central state, for 
the rest of this century. But they are off to a poor start. Geopolitical events blocking 
collaboration with Western IOCs and market conditions have probably set the clock back a 
decade. Were they to resume exploratory drilling next year, 2017 (not planned and highly 
unlikely), it would be well into the 2030s before the Kara Sea would see full production.
Does a case study approach to Kara Sea offshore hydrocarbon development foretell or 
assist in projecting overall Russian offshore Arctic hydrocarbon development? The results of the 
research indicate the model is viable; but does not necessarily drive or indicate future 
development elsewhere in Russia (outside the broader offshore region in proximity). The 
scenarios demonstrate the complexity of the drivers of hydrocarbon extraction in Russia’s Kara 
Sea; and that they can adapt and interact in a non-linear manner.
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U N I V E R S I T Y  O FA L ASK A
F A I R B A N K S
Your participation in a non-attribution survey of experts examining Russian 
capacity to develop its offshore oil reserves in the Kara Sea would be most 
appreciated. This survey is part of a larger dissertation project. This survey should 
take as little as 10 minutes, though as much follow up and detail as you could 
accommodate would be welcome. The survey can be sent via email to be 
completed at leisure, returned in person, or can be conducted over the phone at a 
later time at participant discretion. I f  a phone call, email or direct interview is 
used to complete or fo r  follow up questions (at the willingness ofparticipants) 
identifying criteria will not be included with the data, tabulations or reporting. A 
copy o f the findings will be provided to all participants who so desire.
Jon A. Skinner
Commander, US Navy, (Ret)
MA and MS (Strategic Planning and Intelligence)
Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA 
University of Alaska Fairbanks 
Interdisciplinary PhD student: Arctic Geography and Policy 
j skinne6@alaska.edu 907-441-9186
* If you have questions or concerns about your rights as a research participant, you can contact the 
UAF Office of Research Integrity at 474-7800 (Fairbanks area) or 1-866-876-7800 (toll-free outside the 
Fairbanks area) or uaf-irb@alaska.edu.
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Survey context: The size of the Kara Sea hydrocarbon fields is arguably great 
enough to impact the progression of the Russian economy. They likely represent 
the largest unexploited traditional crude oil reserves remaining. But there are 
undercurrents of skepticism that Russia may not achieve production at the scale 
envisioned. The technological sophistication, level of cooperation and integration 
needed between Russian and foreign oil corporations as well as capital investment 
remains critical. This survey will assist in identifying the underlying 
predetermined elements, critical uncertainties and key drivers.
Please indicate which response you feel best answers the question. Further 
comment or insight is encouraged.
(1-4)Experience profile and background questions (non-attributive)
1. Would you characterize your expertise and insight into hydrocarbon 
exploration and production in Arctic offshore regions as:
 Extensive and specific to the offshore oil and gas industry in the Arctic
 Within broad professional scope but not necessarily Arctic focused
 Solid grounding in Arctic issues but not necessarily specific to hydrocarbon
extraction
Other and/ or further comment:
2. Would you characterize your experience in working with Russian firms in 
the oil and gas industry or regulatory authorities as:
 Extensive
 Somewhat tertiary
 Little experience
Other/and or further comment:
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3. Would you characterize your expertise and insight into hydrocarbon 
extraction efforts in the Kara Sea as:
 Specific and extensive for that region
 Well informed, but not in high detail for that specific region
Other/and or further comment:
4. Do you have previous experiencing in partnering or otherwise had a 
working relationship with Russian oil and gas corporations or supporting 
service companies in Arctic offshore areas?
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Yes, significant engagement
Yes, but tertiary or to a minor extent
No
Other and/or further comment
Please indicate which response(s) you feel best answers the question. More 
than one answer may be appropriate in this section (5-14). Further comment or 
insight is also encouraged.
(5-15) Substantive _ judgment questions (non-attributive)
5. Among the International Oil Companies (IOCs), such as ExxonMobil, which 
strengths would you consider best complement Russian corporations such as 
Rosneft, in joint venture efforts in Arctic offshore regions:
 High-T echnology
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Managerial expertise
Investment capital
Other and/or further comment:
6. Among the National Oil Companies (NOCs), such as only one example, 
Petroleos, do you see adequate strengths, which could replicate IOC 
participation and assistance to Russian hydrocarbon objectives in the Arctic 
offshore regions?
 Yes
 No
 Yes, but to a limited extent
Other and/or further comment:
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7. Do you feel the impact of international sanctions on cooperation with 
Russian corporations in Arctic offshore hydrocarbon projects will have a 
continued significant impact on suspended, curtailed or new cooperation even 
i f  they were lifted?
 Yes, in the short term (two years)
 Yes in the mid-term (two to five years)
 Yes, likely to have an impact for a decade or more
 No
Other and/or further comment
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8. Do you feel hydrocarbon extraction governance structures and compliance 
with international safety and environmental standards in Russian Arctic 
offshore regions will be impacted by a curtailment/reduction in engagement 
with IOC partners?
 Yes, significantly
 No, not significantly
Other and/or further comment
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9. Is the current drop in the price of oil inhibiting strategic (long term) 
investment in Arctic offshore oil and gas exploration?
 Yes
 No
 Yes, and to a greater degree in Russia than other Arctic offshore regions
Other and/or further comment
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10. If legal restrictions on working with Russian oil and gas enterprises were 
lifted, how confident are you with partnering with Russian joint ventures 
compared to other potentials on the globe?
 Highly confident and comfortable
 Somewhat reserved
 Not confident
Other and/or further comment
11. How much influence has your answer to question (10.) been impacted by 
the series of sanctions targeting Russia begun in 2014?
 Significantly influenced
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Not been a significant influence 
Other and/or further comment
12. Do you believe the offshore Arctic hydrocarbon regions are the most 
quantifiably significant undiscovered and economically recoverable energy 
reserves within the next 30 years?
 Yes
 No
Other and/or further comment
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13. What other source or change in market dynamics will reduce demand for 
the development of offshore Arctic hydrocarbons?
 Dramatic reduction in overall energy demand through conservation efforts or
otherwise
 Rapid rise in the macro-economic viability of alternative energy sources
(other than hydrocarbons)
 Significant change in the macro-economic viability of non-traditional
hydrocarbon supply
Other and/or further comment
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14. Do you feel the greatest obstacle to developing Russia’s offshore 
hydrocarbons is:
 Geopolitical (such as current sanctions, but also in a broader perspective)
 T echnological
 Economic viability (compared to alternative sources)
 Competiveness of other hydrocarbon investment opportunities
Uncertainty in forecasting the Arctic offshore environment (patterns of 
climate change)
 Other and/or further comment
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15. Please feel free to provide any additional insight that you feel might 
contribute to this study and/or suggested resources (e.g. studies, analysis, 
documents released to the public).
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James Gamble Aleut International Association
Allyssia Garcia University of Alaska Fairbanks
Jessica Garron University of Alaska Fairbanks - Alaska Satellite Facility
Gunhild Hoogensen Gjorv Arctic University of Norway (UIT)
Kristin Gjorv Arctic University of Norway (UIT)
Piotr Gracysk Arctic University of Norway (UIT)
Jess Gunblatt University of Alaska Fairbanks
Anne Merrild Hansen Danish Centre for Environmental Assessment - Aalborg
Lee Huskey University of Alaska Anchorage
Aytalina Ivanova North Eastern Federal University (Yakutia)
Noor Johnson Brown University -  Smithsonian Institute
Jenny Jones University of Alaska Fairbanks
Michael Kingston DWF - International Union of Marine Insurance
Marc Lanteigne Norwegian Institute of International Affairs (NUPI)
Natalia Loukacheva University of Northern British Columbia
Jerome Montague Alaskan Command
Slavomir Raszewski Kings’s College London
Douglas Reynolds University of Alaska Fairbanks
Jessica Shadian Aarhus Institute of Advanced Studies - Bill Graham Centre
**Jon Skinner University of Alaska Fairbanks
Florian Stammler University of Lapland - Arctic Centre
Maria Tysiachniouk Wageningen University
Pips Veazey University of Alaska Fairbanks - NSF EPSCoR
*Participated and also facilitated the discussion.
**Participated as well as organized the work shop as part of dissertation research.
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Record of copyright permissions
Figure 2.1 Global Arctic oil and gas by country 
Figure 2.2 Onshore vs offshore potential by country 
Figure 2.3 Site o f South Kara Sea drilling 2014 
Figure 2.6 Comparative Arctic offshore ice conditions
Permission for use of graphics above granted by National Petroleum Council July 11, 2016 
Jon,
Attached are the graphics that you requested from the "Arctic Potential” NPC report.
No permission is required to use these graphics. In its more recent reports, the NPC 
has the following text appear on each title page:
"The text and graphics herein may be reproduced in any format or medium, provided 
they are reproduced accurately, not used in a misleading context, and bear 
acknowledgement of the National Petroleum Council's copyright and the title of this 
report."
No one can re-sell this copyrighted information, but the public is free to copy and use 
any information published by us or posted on our website as long as it is attributed to 
the National Petroleum Council (per the rules above).
In this case, you may use these graphics, provided that they are accompanied with the 
following language:
Source: National Petroleum Council, Arctic Potential: Realizing the Promise of U.S. 
Arctic Oil and Gas Resources, 2015, page (#).
Should you have any further questions, please contact NPC Editor Barbara Allen 
at ballen@npc.org.
Sincerely,
Arthur Cadeaux
Art Director/Webmaster
National Petroleum Council
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Figure 2.4 Estimates o f undiscovered oil and gas north o f the Arctic Circle
Graphic is a public domain document, US Government. Item not derived from Science 
Magazine.
USGS Response:
Greetings,
USGS publications are Public Domain. If this is something through the Science Magazine you 
would need to get copy right permission from them.
Thank you for contacting the USGS.
Please take a moment to tell us how we did!
U.S. Geological Survey
Science Information Services 
Toll Free 1-888-ASK-USGS 
You can contact us live on Webchat
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Figure 2.5 Kara Sea 2014 drilling
Permission granted.
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Chris
C hristopher E. Smith | Managing E d ito r, Technology | O il & Gas Journal 
1455 W. Loop South, S u ite  400 | Houston, TX 77027 | (o) 713.963.6211 |
O il & Gas P ip e lin e  Conference and E x h ib itio n  
h ttp ://w w w . p ip e lin ew eek . com
Power-Gen N atu ra l Gas 
h ttp ://w w w .p o w er-g en n a tu ra lg as . com
From: Jon Skinner rmailto :iskmne6@alaska.edul
Sent: Monday, June 27, 2016 5:11 PM
To: Chris Smith
Cc: Tayvis Dunnahoe
Subject: Use of image
Chris, request permission via email to use below image, posted from your online journal, within 
an academic dissertation with the University of Alaska. Of course I will credit source....vr Jon 
Skinner 907 441 9186
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Figure 3.1 Transportation cost comparison 
Dear Jon,
The slide you sent me is a simplified version of a slide I have often used in presentations. You certainly 
have my permission to use it, but it is now it is now badly out of date. The most recent updating (with 
the more detailed information I usually include) is based on 2012 data. I am enclosing a PowerPoint 
version. If you wanted to use that, I could find the presentation that includes it and send it to you. If you 
wanted to simplify the slide, I could send you the data for the lines you wanted to include.
Regards,
Jim Jensen
From: Jon Skinner [mailto:iii.skins@gmail.com] 
Sent: Monday, June 06, 2016 12:42 PM 
To: iai-energy@comcast.net 
Subject: Copyright request
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